Brad Sherman, a Democrat, represents California’s 32nd District in the U.S. House of Representatives and is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made it clear that he wants the capacity to keep pace with Iran’s nuclear program. Given the threats Saudi Arabia faces from the Islamic Republic, a nuclear capacity may be in the kingdom’s national security interests — but it is not in the interests of the United States.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration is forging ahead with an agreement that would give MBS, as the prince is known, a path to develop a nuclear bomb. This is a serious — and dangerous — mistake, and must be reversed.
The first step toward a nuclear weapon is to begin a civilian nuclear power program while not committing to the safeguards that prevent that program from serving as cover for a nuclear weapons program. This is exactly what the Trump administration is allowing MBS to do.
Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; every nation that signed that treaty and then began suspicious nuclear activity (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) has been sanctioned by Democratic presidents, and two have been bombed by Republican presidents. Saudi Arabia needs the U.S. as an ally and doesn’t dare imitate our enemies. Our alliance would be shattered if the kingdom were to proceed with a nuclear program without an agreement with the U.S.
In August, President Donald Trump submitted to Congress a proposed U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. I have reviewed the agreement and its classified provisions (which even contain a blank page to be completed later, thus hiding the full deal from Congress).
The agreement intentionally excludes the two most important safeguards the U.S. normally insists on in nuclear agreements: the Additional Protocol, which allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to make wide-ranging unannounced inspections, and the “Gold Standard” restrictions, which prohibit enrichment and reprocessing. In fact, the agreement explicitly paves the way for enrichment on Saudi soil. All told, the draft agreement puts far fewer restrictions on the Saudi nuclear program than were imposed by the agreement that former president Barack Obama signed with Iran in 2015.
Saudi negotiators worked hard to get a deal with minimal safeguards for only one reason: to allow the kingdom a pathway to a nuclear weapon. The Additional Protocol and the Gold Standard restrictions would not hobble civilian electric power generation. These two safeguards were included in the 2009 U.S.-United Arab Emirates nuclear cooperation agreement, and today the UAE produces one-quarter of its electricity from a well-safeguarded civilian nuclear program.
A nuclear Saudi Arabia could pose a risk similar to that of a nuclear-armed Iran. The last time the most powerful monarch in the Middle East was a friend of the United States, it was the shah of Iran, and every weapons system the shah held in 1978 fell into the hands of the mullahs in 1979. Something similar could happen in Saudi Arabia. Most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi citizens, and Islamist extremism continues to have support in that country, which is not a democracy. We don’t know who might be running it in 10 years. Nor do we have any proof that the policies of MBS reflect the current — let alone the future — will of the Saudi people.
And even if we trusted Saudi Arabia with a nuclear weapon, the kingdom’s possession of one would quickly lead regional peer powers such as Turkey and Egypt to believe that they had to keep pace. At that point, the nonproliferation regime that has served us well for half a century could crumble as midsize powers in the Middle East and elsewhere seek nuclear capacity.
In 2018, then-Sen. Marco Rubio and I introduced the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act to prevent an American nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia unless it included the Additional Protocol and the Gold Standard. Today, Secretary of State Rubio defends the exact agreement that he and I worked hard to prohibit.
President Trump is not a trustworthy defender of American national security interests. In August, he said that the deal could not go forward unless Saudi Arabia agreed to join the Abraham Accords by normalizing relations with Israel. Then, for unexplained reasons, he appeared to drop that condition, as the deal is going ahead without any sign of an Israeli-Saudi rapprochement.
In addition, transactions between the Saudi government and the Trump family raise troubling questions. The Saudis have already disclosed a $2 billion government investment in Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners private equity firm and a developer’s $10 billion investment in Trump-branded real estate. Did those sweetheart financial arrangements — or any others — have any bearing on White House policy?
Congress must stop this deal. That’s why I joined Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-New York), in introducing a joint resolution of disapproval in September. In October, Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Oregon) and Ed Markey (D-Massachusetts) introduced a similar resolution in the Senate. But because Trump can veto any resolution, this dangerous deal is likely to go forward unless there is substantial bipartisan public outcry. That’s why I applaud Republicans like Sens. John Kennedy of Louisiana and Rand Paul of Kentucky in opposing an un-safeguarded nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia.
Trump is waging a war to prevent one Middle East non-democracy from moving toward a nuclear weapon while giving the green light to another non-democracy just across the Persian Gulf. The first Trump administration recognized that a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia needed to include the safeguards that ensure American national security; the current Trump administration should do the same, or Congress must move to block this dangerous deal.
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