Shyam Sankar is the chief technology officer at Palantir Technologies. Madeline Hart is a deployment strategist at the company. They are the co-authors of the book “Mobilize: How to Reboot the American Industrial Base and Stop World War III.”
The U.S. military is consuming missiles much faster than it can produce them, but it’s the production, not the consumption, that’s the problem.
Insufficient missile production has been a problem for over a decade, and recent operations against Iran have exposed the depth of that longstanding shortfall. U.S. stocks have also been reduced by transfers to Ukraine. Since the spring, a munitions shortage has reportedly prompted the Pentagon to shift resources from Europe and Asia to the Middle East to help fill the gap, causing concern among allies about potentially weakened posture toward Russia and China in those regions.
A willingness to use arms when necessary is central to the United States’ ability to deter adversaries and aggressors, but so is its capacity to regenerate the stockpile during conflict. The Pentagon clearly understands that improvement is needed on the latter point. Over the summer, Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg implored industry leaders to drive “significantly faster” and push for “more aggressive delivery schedules … for critical capabilities.” Several multibillion-dollar contracts were awarded to RTX and Lockheed Martin, the nation’s main missile suppliers.
Money helps, but more funding alone will not solve America’s missile production woes. The lead time for priority missiles — from ground-attack weapons such as Tomahawk and JASSM cruise missiles to air and missile defense interceptors such as the Patriot and THAAD systems — is two to four years. That’s nowhere near fast enough. The solution is greater competition among suppliers.
Right now, the Pentagon relies on production strangleholds that were created by its own procurement choices. Legacy missile producers essentially have government-sanctioned monopolies on decades-old designs whose research and development were funded by taxpayers. So when the Pentagon needs more Tomahawks or THAADs, there is only one company that can supply them, at whatever lead times must be endured.
For a better model, military leaders should look to the astonishingly successful National Security Space Launch program, which broke the United Launch Alliance monopoly and delivered cheaper, more frequent launches for America.
In 2014, space transport faced the same structural problem that missile production does today. Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s joint United Launch Alliance controlled all U.S. military space launches. America sent 23 rockets into orbit that year, fewer than Russia, and each launch cost as much as $435 million. Meanwhile, United Launch Alliance relied on Russian-made RD-180 rocket engines, a dangerous supply-chain dependency if there ever was one.
Then SpaceX sued the government for the chance to compete, and the Air Force agreed to open up the market. Now, under the National Security Space Launch program, if a company can launch a given amount of mass to orbit, it can qualify as a certified launch provider. This process enabled SpaceX to compete, and the rest is history. The space-launch market flourished, with a third company, Blue Origin, undergoing certification right now. (Blue Origin owner Jeff Bezos also owns The Washington Post.) Launch costs dropped to about one-eighth of their previous level, and today the U.S. launches more rockets annually than the rest of the world combined.
Here’s what implementing a version of this program for missiles could look like: First, define clear performance requirements. Certification for a deep-strike missile like the Tomahawk might include the ability to carry a standard payload a specified distance. But importantly, the requirements should not dictate the manufacturing approach or specific components used in the missile. That way, any company that can make a missile that meets the requirements can sell it to the military.
SpaceX was able to design the Falcon 9 rocket for frequent launches because it was freed from legacy aerospace assumptions. Open up missile-making in the same way, and creative new entrants will have an incentive to optimize their manufacture by substituting materials, dropping unnecessary features and loosening tolerances where physics permits.
Second, shorten the missile procurement calendar and guarantee production orders. Multiyear procurement orders lasting five or more years are increasingly common. More frequent competitions every one to two years would prevent incumbents from securing renewal contracts simply because they’re incumbents, while sending a clear demand signal to entice new entrants to make the capital-intensive investments required. The message would be unequivocal: If you can qualify as a certified provider, you can compete for contracts with real funds attached to them.
To the Pentagon’s credit, it has started some new efforts to provide greater competition for missile contracts. The Low Cost Interceptor program aims to develop a cheaper, more manufacturable alternative to the Patriot PAC-3. In September, the Army selected five companies, including three new entrants, to create long-range missile prototypes. But these efforts are still too few and far between. A Senate Armed Services Committee hearing this year noted that 97 percent of missile funding still goes to legacy munitions.
Both new and old companies are innovating on costs and production, but today only a small number of legacy producers can compete for the big contracts. A more competitive approach can unlock innovation. A model exists for what works; the Pentagon just needs to use it.
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