U.S. President Donald Trump pulled off a significant diplomatic breakthrough with the recent Israel-Hamas cease-fire and Gaza peace plan. The key to Trump’s success was his willingness to (finally) pressure Israel. Trump used his frustration, as well as that of Arab states, following Israel’s missile strike on Doha in September to create a new degree of strategic ambiguity with Israel—that is, uncertainty whether the United States would still support Israel if opted to continue the war in Gaza – if Tel Aviv opted to continue the war in Gaza—to get Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept terms that he otherwise would not have. It was a masterful strategic move.
The danger now, however, is that Trump may deviate from this strategy of stepping back and, in the process, do significant damage to U.S. security interests. By signing a document related to the cease-fire himself (which is unusual because the United States is not a direct party to the conflict), Trump clearly sees the peace deal in bigger terms, notably as the “historic dawn of a new Middle East,” according to him.
With his reputation—and ego—now on the line to deliver this transformation, Trump’s grand vision for the region could lead him to take on a raft of new commitments in the Middle East that are at odds with U.S. interests. In short, if Trump isn’t careful, Washington might come to “own” peace and stability in Gaza and the Middle East in ways that leave the United States overstretched and tied down in the region as bigger challenges gather elsewhere.
To avoid this, Trump needs to expand strategic ambiguity with Israel, which is especially important now that Israel has already broken the cease-fire deal that Trump just negotiated. He should also stick to his promise to limit U.S. military support for the peace agreement (i.e., no peacekeeping forces in Gaza) and avoid making additional security pledges to Arab states, like the one he gave Qatar after Israel’s strike on Doha. In general, a U.S. policy of leaning away from the Middle East will be good for U.S. interests and help facilitate the peace and stability that Trump wants.
To put America first, Trump needs to center Middle East policy on U.S. interests, not grand visions for regional transformation. That starts by recognizing that the United States has very limited strategic interests at stake in the region today.
Neither oil nor terrorism, the two main drivers of U.S. military engagement in the Middle East historically, currently pose a major security issue for the United States. The country is now a net exporter of oil, and thus not dependent on the Middle East for its energy needs. The 2019 defeat of the Islamic State, coupled with the general weakening of al Qaeda over the past two decades, means that counterterrorism efforts can be handled mainly by local actors. Given these limited interests, it’s no surprise that every U.S. president since Barack Obama has tried to pivot away from the region, which is also a core theme of the Trump administration’s forthcoming strategy documents.
There are at least two ways that Trump’s newly invigorated zeal to transform the Middle East could drag the United States deeper into the region, contrary to its interests.
First, despite ruling it out, Trump’s determination to get peace could lead to U.S. boots on the ground in Gaza, actively doing the work of nation-building. The vague peace deal stipulates the creation of a Board of Peace, headed by Trump, and an international stabilization force (ISF) to help secure Gaza. If the peace process stalls and/or Arab states drag their feet (as they are now) on staffing the ISF, an exasperated Trump—with reputational costs on the line—may feel the need to deploy U.S. forces to fix to the problem.
Does that seem farfetched? It shouldn’t. Trump keeps floating the idea of an active U.S. peacemaking role in Gaza. In February, he suggested the United States take over Gaza and recently said that if Hamas does not disarm, “we will disarm them … quickly and perhaps violently.” Trump later walked those comments back, but as other cases have shown, his MAGA instincts may not restrain him much in Gaza. Once skeptical of using force against Venezuela, Trump is now blowing up Venezuelan boats and laying the groundwork for regime change there. Likewise, days before bombing Iran this past summer, Trump said force was not on the table.
If U.S. troops do wind up in Gaza, history shows us that getting bogged down (after all, this would be nation-building) or some other disaster—like the 1983 Marine barracks bombings in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. service members—could easily follow.
More security commitments to Arab states are a second way—again, at odds with U.S. interests—that Trump could drag the United States deeper into the Middle East. Arab states have put up with a lot from Israel to come onboard with the peace plan. Despite Trump’s promises to the contrary, they accepted watered-down language on a Palestinian state and a partial, rather than full, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This came on the heels of Israel’s missile strike on Doha, which rattled and humiliated Arab states. And now, Trump is asking hesitant Arab partners to staff the ISF.
Eager to keep Arab states on board, hold the deal together, and expand the Abraham Accords, Trump is feeling a lot of pressure to hand out favors. After the Doha strike, he took the unprecedented step of giving Qatar a NATO-like security guarantee—a first for any state in the Middle East—to quiet doubts about U.S. reliability as a security partner. Now that Qatar has a pledge, Saudi Arabia is pushing hard for one, too. Reports indicate that Trump may grant this next month, when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visits the White House.
This is a bad trend for the United States. More security pledges in the Middle East are not in the U.S. national interest. Benign as they might appear in the immediate future, these commitments inevitably require the United States to keep military assets in the region and could someday drag the country into new conflicts, which is the last thing it needs in a region of diminished strategic value like the Middle East today. Less, not more, is best for U.S. national security.
Rather than stepping deeper into the Middle East, the United States needs fewer commitments and more strategic ambiguity to best serve its interests and promote regional stability. To get that, Trump should follow his Gaza playbook, in which he used strategic ambiguity to pushIsrael to stop the war and agree to the cease-fire deal.
For decades, and especially since Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, the United States has had a huge moral hazard problem with Israel. In a nutshell, Washington’s robust security pledge to Israel has provided so much assurance of U.S. support that Israel is more risk-acceptant and less responsive to U.S. demands and interests. The most glaring recent examples have been bold Israeli attacks in Syria, Iran, Gaza, and Qatar that directly undermined U.S. regional objectives and, in the case of Qatar, led to Trump’s ill-advised security commitment.
With Israel’s strike on Qatar, Trump hit his boiling point and used the incident to finally create strategic ambiguity in Tel Aviv by tempering U.S. support and making Israel realize that it would bear the brunt of its security if it continued with its provocative behavior. In no uncertain terms (which included Trump’s public pledge to stop Israel from annexing the West Bank), Trump told Israel to accept the peace plan or carry on the war in Gaza without U.S. help. The ambiguity of U.S. assistance worked. “He’s got to be fine with it,” Trump said of his pressure on Netanyahu, adding, “He has no choice.” Trump was right—Netanyahu caved and signed the deal.
Trump now needs to embed strategic ambiguity like that into the country’s relationships across the Middle East.
With Israel, that means ending all suggestions—including about disarming Hamas—of the United States stepping in to secure peace in Gaza. It also means setting a deadline to withdraw the 200 U.S. troops committed so far to help implement the peace plan, and with the war in Gaza now over, withdrawing all additional U.S. forces (approximately 15,000) sent to the Middle East since the Oct. 7 attack. Since the majority of fighting has stopped, it might also be useful to limit military aid to Israel going forward to that of a defensive nature only. This should be part of building greater strategic ambiguity through upcoming negotiations to renew the U.S.-Israeli memorandum of understanding.
As was the case with the Gaza peace plan, steps like these will force Israel to think long and hard about how it uses military force. Carrying out regional strikes and returning to war in Gaza (which Trump officials now worry much about) will become far more costly, thus likely to compel greater Israeli restraint. Coupled with a firm U.S. pledge to step back on Gaza troops, that will also allow Arab states to further embrace the peace process, plus compel them to provide troops for the ISF. In short, progress is possible—perhaps most possible—without the United States having to grease the wheels of cooperation with commitments at odds with its security goals.
Trump should reinforce strategic ambiguity in bilateral relations with Gulf states, too. Above all else, he needs to step away from making a new security commitment to Saudi Arabia and let Qatar know that U.S. action on its behalf will only come after the United States decides on whether it has interests at stake. Taking these steps will be a lot easier as U.S. strategic ambiguity with Israel tames aggression.
History has also shown that U.S. strategic ambiguity with Arab states can help advance peace and stability. In the 2010s, robust U.S. military support fueled Saudi moral hazard, contributing to a brutal Saudi war in Yemen against the Houthis. Trump’s decision during his first term not defend Saudi Arabia after a direct Houthi attack showed Riyadh the limits of U.S. support, the weight of which led the Saudis to end military operations in Yemen and normalize relations with Iran. In recent months, we’ve seen a similar stability in Syria after the United States began withdrawing troops.
In short, sometimes less is more. From Gaza, to Yemen, to Syria, more U.S. strategic ambiguity has brought the kind of peace, stability, and cooperation in the Middle East that is in accord with U.S. interests. Trump made the blueprint, now let’s hope that he keeps following it.
The post How Trump Can Avoid ‘Owning’ Gaza appeared first on Foreign Policy.
