The Trump Administration is escalating war threats in Venezuela. Officials claim that the goal is to curb the drug trade. Critics contend that the real aim is regime change. These may be secondary aims. A more noble aim might be to promote democracy in Venezuela. However, the most likely impact of President Donald Trump’s approach to a potential war in Venezuela will be consolidated power, and Republican coalition management, at home.
A key part of Trump’s electoral coalition is fraying. Mass deportations are causing buyers’ remorse among Florida Cubans and Venezuelans who voted for Trump. While popular across his MAGA movement, mass deportations have shocked many Latino Trump voters; they likely never thought deportations would be so massive.
The drumbeat of war in Venezuela could appeal to Latinos who voted for Trump, at least in part, because they thought President Joe Biden was too soft toward Latin America’s leftist regimes.
Ironically, Trump’s initial approach toward Venezuela’s leftist dictatorship in the first half of 2025 was even softer than Biden’s. Guided by a pro-oil coalition, Trump’s initial approach to Venezuela was to pact with the dictator: Return a few prisoners, accept deportees, let U.S. oil firms gain more access to Venezuelan oil, and the U.S government would tolerate the regime.
Maduro signed on to this deal. But many Cubans and Venezuelans living in Florida hated it.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio emerged as the strongest advocate on behalf of this disaffected Florida constituency. He persuaded Trump—ever the change-his-mind president—to change his mind about Venezuela. By the end of summer, Trump abandoned his truce approach in favor of war talk.
To be sure, Maduro is one of the world’s leading autocratizers—and one of the meanest. He inherited from Hugo Chávez a mixed regime that had plenty of autocratic elements but also democratic traces. In less than one electoral cycle, Maduro eliminated all democratic traces and turned the system into one of the most repressive, poverty-producing, and corrupt machines in the world.
But rather than making the case to go to war against Maduro based on the need for democracy, the Trump Administration is making the case for war based on the need for drug security. This too is part of Trump’s coalition-management strategy at home.
No doubt, the Maduro regime is complicit in the drug trade. But in the scheme of human rights abuses, Maduro’s drug offense is the most minor. The regime’s biggest offense is its brutality toward citizens and destruction of democracy.
But Trump is not a democracy builder. In the case of Venezuela, he is more of a coalition repairman. It seems that all this theater is aimed at pleasing multiple domestic audiences: far-right nationalists, who rejoice in public displays of military bravado; the MAHA sections of the MAGA movement, which want hard-line policies toward the drug trade; oil companies, which want an end of sanctions, and of course Florida MAGA Latinos, who want a hard-line policy toward Maduro.
Another MAGA group with high hopes are ICE-enthusiasts. These groups argue that a pro-Trump government in Venezuela would reduce migration and facilitate deportations. If Maduro is gone, U.S. courts would no longer be able to deem Venezuela unsafe, clearing the way for more deportations.
Of course, military operations against Venezuela won’t be fully unifying. Many MAGA voters are non-interventionists and will not welcome a protracted operation. Trump will need to hope for hostilities to be short-lasting, or for these voters to be forgiving.
In short, Trump’s “lethal kinetic strikes” in the Caribbean serve two purposes. In Venezuela, it may prompt some military officers to overthrow Maduro. At home, it may please multiple MAGA factions—oil interests, nationalists, MAHA-supporters, ICE-enthusiasts, and Florida Cubans and Venezuelans.
What is striking is how unessential to either of these purposes democracy promotion seems to be. Removing Maduro does not require, necessarily, installing democracy. Most MAGA factions do not seem to be requiring democracy. They can live easily with a pro-Trump government in Caracas, democratic or not.
Trump might have recognized, therefore, that war in Venezuela could be an acceptable bet. Military action is always costly and risky. But Trump may be thinking that military action in Venezuela need not come with the additional expense of democracy building. In the eyes of Trump, this is war at a discount, with a huge domestic payoff. This realization may make war with Venezuela irresistibly affordable.
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