On Aug. 28, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom triggered the U.N. snapback mechanism, leading to the reinstatement of pre-2015 sanctions against Iran last month. Despite Russian and Chinese efforts to stall the process, their draft proposal was rejected by a majority in the U.N. Security Council. With snapback restored, Iran once again faces much harsher restrictions on arms sales, bans on ballistic missile activity, asset freezes, and travel bans. For policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Jerusalem, one question quickly arose: How will Tehran respond?
The first answers may already be visible inside Iran. Days after the snapback took effect, the Guardian Council approved new laws stiffening punishments for espionage and collaboration with Israel or “hostile states” and restricting civilian drone use. Around the same time, the Fatehin special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted high-profile drills in Tehran, showcasing new uniforms and equipment. In a surprising move, the Expediency Council also conditionally approved Iran’s accession to the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, after years of resistance. Officially, some council members argued that compliance would disrupt funding for regional allies such as Hezbollah, part of a broader attempt to counter Western narratives of the country as supporting terrorism.
These measures are not routine; they signal how the Islamic Republic intends to withstand renewed isolation by tightening internal security, projecting resilience abroad, reducing foreign pressure, and demonstrating to adversaries that sanctions will not break the regime. In this way, Iran will choose patience over provocation.
Although Tehran tried to delay the snapback, many Iranian officials had long anticipated it. Domestically, they downplay its impact, insisting that Iran’s economy can endure. IRGC-linked media frame the sanctions not as an existential threat but as a Western psychological operation designed to weaken public confidence and fuel political polarization. This is a familiar narrative, portraying sanctions as part of a broader regime-change strategy.
Yet following the decision, Tehran has taken only limited steps: recalling ambassadors from several European capitals, denouncing the move as “illegitimate,” and issuing vague warnings about reducing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Concrete escalation has not followed.
Some voices in Tehran have urged more drastic measures, including withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Leaving the NPT would free Iran from inspections and, in theory, allow the open pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yet the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and senior elites have consistently resisted this option, emphasizing that Iran will remain in the treaty, even if it brings little benefit. Withdrawal, they recognize, would almost certainly provoke Israeli strikes, invite U.S. intervention, and push Saudi Arabia and Turkey to develop their own nuclear programs. In Tehran’s calculus, such risks would escalate tensions, legitimize foreign military intervention, and ultimately jeopardize the regime’s survival.
Tehran is also acutely aware of its limited capabilities and lack of viable options for escalation. Most of Iran’s proxy groups have been severely weakened since Oct. 7, 2023, and by the collapse of the Assad regime. Only the Houthis in Yemen and a handful of Shiite militias in Iraq retain the ability to harass U.S. and Israeli interests, and even their reach is limited. On paper, Tehran could still resort to cyberattacks, disruptions to shipping in the Persian Gulf, or limited drone and missile strikes against Israel and U.S. bases. Yet all these carry serious risks. Israel has demonstrated its willingness to strike inside Iran, while Washington has vowed to retaliate forcefully against any attacks on U.S. personnel.
The cost of escalation weighs heavily on Iranian decision-makers. They still recall the lessons of war with Israel, which inflicted devastating damage on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and eliminated much of its senior military leadership. For this reason, Tehran is more likely to downplay the snapback sanctions while resorting to incremental, familiar tactics that increase leverage without crossing the nuclear threshold, such as advancing enrichment, deploying faster centrifuges, and restricting IAEA access. These steps bolster bargaining power while avoiding a direct confrontation that could legitimize military intervention.
Sanctions, while painful, are not new. The Islamic Republic has developed ways to live with them. Oil sales to China, extensive smuggling networks, and a tightly managed domestic economy provide enough oxygen for survival. For a regime that has endured economic warfare for most of its 45-year existence, sanctions remain a grim constant.
At the political level, Iran is divided. Hard-liners call for bold defiance, but pragmatists urge caution. In moments of existential pressure, Khamenei has consistently sided with restraint. During the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, Tehran endured sanctions without quitting the NPT or launching a full-scale war. The same logic is likely to prevail now.
Precedent reinforces this path. Time and again, Tehran has chosen to endure pressure rather than risk escalation that could endanger the regime’s survival. In other words, Iran’s leaders are unlikely to seek a dramatic escalation and will instead opt for restraint, which they refer to as “strategic patience.” Timing also favors this approach. With Israeli parliamentary elections a year away, Tehran calculates that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could lose power. And beyond Israel, Tehran hopes that a Democrat could win the 2028 U.S. presidential election, potentially altering Washington’s stance toward Iran.
In this scenario, Iran’s leaders need only endure for a maximum of three years, relying on what they call “divine miraculous and unseen assistance.” For Khamenei, however, the snapback is not merely a foreign-policy crisis but also a domestic one. Despite his rhetoric, he recognizes that the gravest threats originate from within, rather than from abroad. These include elite fragmentation and widespread unrest, both of which intensify when the regime is under pressure. His strategy, therefore, is twofold: preserve unity among the ruling elite at the top while managing social pressures through a mix of controlled concessions and intensified repression against opposition below.
Elite cohesion has always been the regime’s key survival mechanism. Divisions among Revolutionary Guard commanders, clerics, or political elites would embolden adversaries and destabilize the system. This is why Khamenei avoids risky moves, such as withdrawing from the NPT, that could fracture the elite. Instead, he stresses unity, framing resistance as both a revolutionary duty and a matter of national honor. His strategy combines rewards for loyal elites with calibrated violence to deter defection. In this way, Khamenei seeks to bind his own fate to that of the regime’s elites, ensuring that their survival is inseparable from his own.
At the same time, Khamenei will attempt to maintain Iran’s silence. Sanctions have already driven up food prices and devalued the currency against the dollar, heightening public discontent. To alleviate social pressure, the regime has adjusted its approach to morality policing, which was once a central ideological pillar. According to interviews with police personnel and active Basij members, they have been instructed not to interfere in enforcing the Islamic dress code. The aim is to avoid provoking public anger and prevent a repeat of incidents like the arrest and death of Mahsa Amini, which sparked nationwide protests. Anything that risks triggering mass unrest is to be carefully avoided.
The regime is simultaneously intensifying repression against parts of society, even though such measures risk sparking protests or destabilizing the system. Leaders understand that renewed sanctions will worsen economic hardship, driving inflation and unemployment higher. The memory of the 2019 fuel protests, when security forces killed some 1,500 people in less than a week, still haunts the state. To preempt a repeat, the government has begun flexing its muscles: staging street patrols by Basij and IRGC units, expanding surveillance, criminalizing dissent as “espionage,” and invoking new security laws, recently approved by the Guardian Council, to legitimize harsher crackdowns. The IRGC’s Fatehin drills were not merely a tactical exercise; they were also a warning to Iranians that the state is watching and prepared to use force. Additionally, according to a report by an opposition group, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council has issued a security directive outlining the government’s plan for responding to potential unrest in the event of increased international sanctions. The directive encompasses both security measures, such as deployment, surveillance, and suppression, and propaganda and social resilience strategies, including media efforts and economic messaging.
This dual strategy, characterized by unity at the top and repression below, is designed to buy time. Khamenei expects three difficult years ahead, but his bet is simple. If the regime can maintain internal stability and suppress dissent, it can endure external pressure until the geopolitical context changes.
The snapback mechanism delivers a major diplomatic defeat and deepens Iran’s economic woes. Yet Tehran is unlikely to respond with a dramatic escalation, in the hope of surviving the next three years of the Trump administration. Instead, it is more likely to fall back on its oldest survival strategy: patience.
The Islamic Republic will securitize its domestic sphere, showcase military defiance, and wait for the U.S. election, hoping for a new and more compromising president in the White House.
For Khamenei, now frail but still in command, restraint is not weakness but necessity. He prefers to exit history as the symbol of steadfast defiance and an anti-American hero rather than a defeated and humiliated leader who accepts “unconditional surrender.”
For the outside world, the paradox is clear. While sanctions make Iran appear cornered, in Tehran’s view, unity, repression, and patience are enough to keep the Islamic Republic afloat during the storm. From this perspective, endurance itself is a form of victory.
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