The Palisades Fire that killed 12 people and leveled much of the community was the result of a “perfect storm” of leadership and communication challenges, exacerbated by “dry vegetation, unrelenting and unusual wind activity, significant ember cast, a landscape packed with combustible vegetation, large vulnerable structures, a diminishing water supply, and a loss of aerial suppression support.”
Those impeded the Los Angeles Fire Department’s initial response to the conflagration, according to a city-commissioned review released today. Even given that, firefighters’ quick action and dedication in the early going saved “thousands of lives and thousands of pieces of property.”
The LAFD today released a 70-page After-Action Review Report. It had been withheld due to the ongoing federal investigation into the cause of the fire. The report was released on the same day that federal prosecutors announced the arrest of 29-year-old former Pacific Palisades resident, Jonathan Rinderknecht, for allegedly sparking the deadly fire.
According to fire officials, the after-action report is an internal training document that is not something typically shared with the public. But with such a large interest from residents, LAFD and city officials decided to make the document available to the public.
It provides a detailed sequence of events that occurred in the first 36 hours of the blaze, outlining successes, challenges, lessons learned and recommendations to improve the Fire Department’s response to future emergencies. But it’s only a first step.
The Governor Newsom has also requested an After-Action Review that will “analyze all aspects of the response, including the efforts of every agency that responded in the City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County who were involved in the preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts during the Palisades and Eaton wildfires.”
The report pointed to a series of what the department considered to be successes — most notably the preservation of thousands of lives. Also, 12,317 structures that were classified by Cal Fire as “threatened,” by the incident were saved.
But it also identified a series of challenges, primarily that the initial response to the blaze lacked adequate resources for the conditions, with some LAFD staff allowed to go off duty the morning of the fire despite the severe weather conditions.
Among those conditions were Santa Ana wind gusts in the area between 60 mph and 90 mph, according to the National Weather Service.
Fuels were primed by growth from a 2022 wet season that registered a total of 28.40 inches of rainfall in the Los Angeles region, followed by 25.19 inches during the year 2023. The seasonal average is about 14 inches. In 2024 that growth was dried out as the region experienced moderate drought conditions, including a period of eight months devoid of any measurable rainfall.
Per the report, “From the years 2022 to 2024, there was a notable deviation from the conventional climate patterns typically observed in coastal Southern California, which consist of moderate summers followed by cool, wet winters. This divergence facilitated the creation of perilous conditions that contributed to the destructive nature of the Palisades incident. When combined with unseasonably warm temperatures and an unusually strong Santa Ana condition, the stage was set for a catastrophic outcome.”
In terms of human factors the report notes that the LAFD factored “fiscally responsibility” into the pre-deployment staffing decisions.
“LAFD command staff determined not to hold over off going LAFD members to fill every available seat,” according to the report. “The fire conditions and initial ferocity of fire behavior overwhelmed the immediately-available resources in the Palisades area. A recall of all members to fill every available seat was implemented after the start of the Palisades incident.”
As a result, “The initial response dispatched to the Palisades incident lacked the appropriate resources for the weather conditions typically associated with Red Flag conditions that the department would normally respond with. Requesting engines specifically rather than the closest available resources delays the response time of arriving to the incident.”
Another mitigating factor: At 10:11 a.m. on January 7, just minutes before the alarm went out for the Palisades Fire, a blaze broke out in the Hollywood Hills. Dubbed The Sunset Fire, 28 fire companies, every water-dropping helicopter available, two dozer units, and multiple overhead command staff responded to the incident. It was quickly put out.
But when the Palisades Fire was reported at 10:29 a.m. that same morning, “all available LAFD aircraft were already dispatched to the Sunset incident.”
The initial vegetation response dispatched was equivalent to a normal vegetation assignment with a brush burning index (BI) lower than 162, requiring only seven fire companies. The BI that morning, however, was 268 and required a total of 27 fire companies and additional support personnel.
The report also notes that following the fire’s outbreak, most firefighters assigned to the blaze worked for more than 36 hours without a break, with many not getting rest for more than 48 hours, “putting them at risk for long-term exposure to smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide.
“Physical exhaustion caused performance and safety concerns,” according to the document. “The combination of fatigue, exhaustion and sleep deprivation severely hindered their ability to make safe decisions.”
The report goes on to describe difficulties in communication and coordination among responding agencies as the fire overwhelmed resources on the ground, with the flames advancing rapidly amid winds topping 100 mph in some locations. There was also confusion as the incident command post had to repeatedly be moved to a safer location because of the advancing flames.
Key takeaways for the department noted in the report include leadership changes and stronger recall protocols, meaning holding people over to fill apparatus — such as fire trucks and other firefighting vehicles — as well as strengthening interagency collaboration, Interim LAFD Chief Ronnie Villanueva told City News Service. He noted that public notification systems and communications need to be improved as well. One step in that direction has been the deployment of Starlink as a backup to ensure connections for communications.
The full list “lessons learned and recommendations” in the just-released report runs more than 10 bullet-pointed pages. You can read them all beginning on page 56 here.
Villanueva told CNS in a telephone interview that the devastating Palisades Fire was the result of a “holdover fire” — in other words, it was a re-ignition of a previous blaze that was believed to have been doused in the same area in the early morning hours of Jan. 1. But federal officials said Wednesday morning the original fire continued to smolder underground in the root system, as much as 15 to 20 feet below ground.
Villanueva said such smoldering is difficult to detect.
“What we can do now is use drones to see if there are any flare ups at all, but remember when we go over with a drone, of if you’re using thermal imaging cameras, it only does down 12 inches, so if there’s anything that’s deep rooted, you’re not going to see it, you’re not going to find it, and you’re definitely not going to extinguish it,” Villanueva told CNS. “So that could (be) living underground for a very long time.”
Rinderknecht is expected back in Florida federal court before a magistrate judge Thursday morning for a detention hearing, according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
City News Service contributed to this report.
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