Mark T. Kimmitt is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general and has also served as the U.S. assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs.
Support for a postwar European mission in Ukraine is growing within the White House and the Pentagon. If carried out, this would mean an operation starting with the principles of European forces and resources, alongside U.S. assistance in areas like intelligence and air support — but no U.S. troops on the ground.
Crucially, a mission like this would establish somewhat of a security guarantee for Ukraine. Certainly not the NATO Article 5 guarantee sought by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but probably the best he can expect at this juncture.
It would also provide numerous other benefits to Europe, NATO and the U.S.
First, the presence of European troops on the ground would be a visible and credible deterrent to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
As continuing Russian operations further west in Ukraine and beyond would come at the cost of European casualties — and an inevitable response — it would be essential to answering the question: Will Putin want more? And should Russian forces then attack into NATO lands, these troops would function as a tripwire, providing critical time for a far larger and more robust force to arm, mobilize and prepare.
Deployed as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR), the 6,000 U.S. tankers, infantrymen, artillery and aviation troops in Europe are more than a deterrence — they are a credible force, ready today, and a down payment on a far larger U.S. deployment if necessary. Together, the European tripwire and OAR would thus provide time and space to deploy most, if not all, the forces needed to face any Russian attack.
Second, deploying a peace enforcement or peacekeeping force in Ukraine would also improve Europe’s independent operational capabilities. While many of the EU-led missions, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean have been successful — and greatly appreciated — they weren’t of the size or scale of full-spectrum combat, or even of the size that would be needed in Ukraine.
For half a century, nations like France have aspired to achieve credible military force structures and capabilities apart from their dependence on the U.S. A European mission in Ukraine — supported by U.S. “over the horizon” assets — would deliver the next step in this process.
Moreover, such a mission would help reveal and rebuild the continent’s sorely needed force structures, manpower, combat equipment and logistics capability, which dissipated over its decades-long “holiday from history.”
Indeed, great strides have been made since Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022, but far more are needed. Ukraine has disabused both Europe and the U.S. of the notion of short wars and small budgets. And though the rearmament of European militaries is impressive, it’s still inadequate to combat a full-scale Russian invasion.
Along these lines, such a deployment would reveal the shortfalls of Europe’s forces in full-spectrum operational capabilities.
For example, while the lack of helicopters, artillery ammunition and strategic airlift has been an openly recognized problem for years, an operation in Ukraine would make apparent the lack of smaller items needed to conduct synchronized forces — or what George Patton called the “symphony of Mars.” Keeping a force in the field requires fuel and water tankers, camouflage nets, heaters for troop tents and hundreds of other items that are likely missing from current supply points. If leaders aren’t already aware, their troops will tell them.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan doesn’t call for abandoning Europe. America can and likely will provide significant enablers outside of Ukraine, including command and control, logistics, in-theater air transport and other assets that aren’t constrained by the tyranny of long distances. Delivering long-range air defense, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance reports are just as valuable, whether provided to the European force from Kyiv or Krakow.
The truth is, should this mission be realized, there will be inevitable calls for more, as well as more proximate U.S. support. Mission creep is endemic to well-meaning American military leaders that operate with allies. In one personal example, when NATO agreed to take over sectors of Afghanistan from the U.S. in 2006, alliance members initially agreed they’d be self-sufficient. But soon after their contingents started deployment planning, requests for U.S. helicopters, quick reaction forces, special forces and intel support began to come in. As always, the U.S. supported within its means.
In the case of Ukraine, however, the White House is setting a clear geographic dividing line, and so, for that matter, are the American people.
A European force in postwar Ukraine is an important mission for Zelenskyy and his people. They have fought bravely and stubbornly against a larger Russian Army, which was once thought unstoppable. Now, they’re asking for security guarantees to ensure Putin doesn’t attack subsequently — as he did in 2022 despite a ceasefire in 2014 — having swallowed Crimea and a large chunk of eastern Ukraine.
If properly manned, trained and equipped, this mission wouldn’t just benefit Ukraine — it would have significant collateral benefits for European defense, both as a short-term tripwire and in rebuilding much-needed defense capability in the longer term.
The most difficult part, of course, will be convincing European voters of the importance of forming and deploying such a force, as they will be putting their sons and daughters in harm’s way. But, this is the cost of providing a security guarantee, ensuring an enduring peace and, if that peace should fail, being ready to defend not only Ukraine but the whole of Europe.
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