U.S. President Donald Trump’s seeming change of tune on Russia and Ukraine has perplexed his critics, myself included. Throughout his time in power, Trump offered little but praise for Russian President Vladimir Putin, often defending him in the face of domestic political furor. In contrast, Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky have drawn only scorn from Trump, which culminated in an abrupt end to their meeting at the White House in February.
That posture appeared to shift last month after a phone call with Putin that, in Trump’s telling, left him “disappointed.” Referring to Russia’s continued assault on Ukraine, Trump , “I’m just saying I don’t think [Putin’s] looking to stop, and that’s too bad.”
The weeks following that phone call had the feeling of a liberal internationalist fever dream. The White House reversed the Defense Department’s decision to halt weapons transfers to Ukraine. Trump, sitting beside the NATO secretary-general in the Oval Office, pledged to send weapons worth billions of dollars to Ukraine. He even vowed to impose sweeping tariffs and sanctions on Russia unless it ended the war—a demand that he first framed as a 50-day ultimatum but then shortened to less than two weeks.
For once, it seemed, the White House was putting pressure on Moscow rather than Kyiv. Many of us might have been tempted to believe Trump was finally—and firmly—standing on the side of sovereignty, independence, and democracy. In reality, however, he was probably acting more out of political imperative than newfound principle. When Putin’s unrelenting assault on Ukraine continued even after Trump’s ultimatum, it made him appear feckless and mocked his pledge to end the conflict on his first day in office.
Rather than bow to an American ultimatum, Putin has instead engineered a trap, one in which Trump will walk into later this week. For Putin, the Alaska summit—which notably will exclude Zelensky, almost certainly at Russia’s insistence—is tailor-made to enable Russia to continue evading sanctions and tariffs, while also ending Trump’s more sympathetic approach to Ukraine once and for all.
Putin laid the groundwork for his maneuver in a three-hour in Moscow with Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. The Russian leader put an offer on the table, the details of which may have escaped Witkoff. But it was enough for both sides to justify a summit between the two leaders, which was announced within hours of the meeting.
Putin surely—and rightly—calculates that Trump is predisposed to be on his side. An hourslong discussion, during which Putin can reinforce Trump’s misreading of the war’s origins, is likely to leave Trump more impervious than ever to the Ukrainian and European claim that Russia, and Russia alone, is responsible for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Almost as if to preview what we can expect later this week, Trump again suggested on Monday—falsely—that Ukraine chose to start the war.
Putin is, by all accounts, prepared to put a land-for-peace deal on the table. Regardless of the specifics, it is likely to appeal to Trump’s real estate mogul sensibilities. After all, Trump has never appreciated the normative aspects of Russia’s aggression. To the extent he has faulted Putin for the war, he has described it in terms of a land grab rather than an effort to extinguish Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and national identity. Putin almost certainly reasons that Trump will be inclined to think that land, and land alone, can end the war—giving short shrift to Ukrainian and European convictions that long-term security guarantees are necessary to ensure any peace is durable.
In the same vein, Trump’s worldview leaves him sympathetic to Putin’s argument that today’s lines of control should form the starting point for negotiations—not the prewar map from 2022 or even from 2014, when Putin first invaded Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. Trump has never put much stock in the tenets of the rules-based order that emerged from the ashes of World War II, including the notion that might does not make right and that bigger countries cannot be allowed to bully their smaller neighbors. As he famously reminded Zelensky during their meeting at the White House earlier this year: “You don’t have the cards.”
As if to put a finer point on it, Trump’s ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, recently said of Ukrainian land: “No big chunks or sections are going to be just given that haven’t been fought for or earned on the battlefield.” That last astoundingly anachronistic phrase—“earned on the battlefield”—reinforces the concern that a summit will find Trump operating from the principle that possession is nine-tenths of the law. The starting point for any territorial talks will be on Putin’s terms.
Finally, Putin almost certainly calculates that the summit is an opportune moment to flip the script, portraying the Kremlin as the sensible party engaged in a constructive process while Ukraine, in his telling, stands in the way of peace. It didn’t take long for that cynical bet to pay off—shortly after news of the summit emerged, Zelensky said, “Ukrainians will not give their land to the occupier.” It was the kind of statement that, while principled and morally sound, led Trump and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance earlier this year to accuse Zelensky of standing in the way of peace.
Zelensky later adopted a more politically astute approach, working closely with his European counterparts to formulate a counterproposal rather than a flat-out rejection. Nevertheless, the fact that Trump is reverting to Kremlin talking points to discuss the war’s origins suggests that Putin’s effort to reframe the terms of the diplomatic process may already have had some success with Trump.
To his credit, Trump has professed to have an open mind heading into the summit, calling it a “feel-out meeting.” The challenge, however, is that the meeting itself will provide Putin with a structural advantage, just as he devised it to do. Putin’s engagement in face-to-face diplomacy and his presentation of a concrete offer, while one-sided and unjust, could well be enough for Trump. In Trump’s mind, and that of his followers, it will justify reverting back to his default state—praising Putin and pressuring Kyiv.
Indeed, the Kremlin has already bought a respite from looming sanctions and tariffs. Putin, however, has bigger ambitions in mind: He almost certainly hopes that the summit can bring Trump back to his side once and for all.
The arc of history may be long, but for Trump, it bends toward accommodating Moscow.
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