Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.” He writes POLITICO’s From Across the Pond column.
“The Trump Summit” — that’s what U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called this week’s gathering of NATO leaders in The Hague. And he wasn’t wrong.
The 32 leaders who gathered for the annual meeting had one goal in mind: sufficiently satisfy U.S. President Donald Trump on defense spending, so he won’t blow up the alliance. And in that task, they succeeded. Trump claimed the win as NATO countries agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2035, and other allies breathed a sigh of relief as the U.S. president reiterated America’s commitment to NATO — at least for now.
These are all reasons to celebrate: The U.S. remains a key alliance member; Europe’s commitment to spend means that, in time, its governments will take on much greater responsibility for their own defense; and NATO will now be better able to deter and, if necessary, defend against a military threat from Russia.
Behind all the backslapping, broad smiles and bonhomie, though, it’s impossible to ignore the real concerns and fears that now fully penetrate the alliance.
Most importantly, it’s difficult to gloss over the vast difference in how alliance members view the threat posed by Russia. While the brief statement agreed by leaders calls Russia a “long-term threat,” this language is considerably toned down compared to last year’s statement, which called it “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” And when asked directly whether he agreed President Vladimir Putin was “an adversary,” Trump deflected.
Shared threat perception forms the very core of a military alliance — and disagreements about the nature of the Russian (and, before that, Soviet) threat have often led to crises. But the U.S. had never before led the effort to downplay the military challenge from the East.
Of course, these differences in threat perception also inform the alliance’s policy toward Ukraine — a country that’s been the victim of Russia’s aggression for over a decade now. Trump sees this war as a purely “European situation” and has given up on his rather short-lived effort to end the conflict. But for most Europeans, Ukraine and its security are integral to peace on their continent. And despite Trump firmly closing NATO’s door to Kyiv, Secretary-General Mark Rutte and other allied leaders insist its path to membership is “irreversible.”
It’s not just the main threat to NATO that Trump sees differently, though. He has also called the idea that security within the alliance is indivisible — that one ally’s security depends on the security of all allies — into question.
That is the core idea behind NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee, and yet, Trump doesn’t buy into it. “There’s numerous definitions of Article 5,” he told reporters on his way to the summit. “You know that, right? But I’m committed to being their friends.”
In reality, however, its definition is clear: “An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” And so far, it’s been invoked precisely once — after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S., leading every single ally to deploy troops and capabilities to Afghanistan, many for well over a decade.
Being a friend is one thing, being a real ally another. The latter is what matters in international politics, and America’s NATO allies are as worried about Trump not understanding this as they are about Russia.
That is why they agreed to spend so much more on defense — 5 percent of GDP, including 3.5 percent on core defense capabilities, nearly double the current 2 percent mark.
European allies and Canada have all come to understand they can no longer count on the U.S. for their security and defense. As U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told them in February: “Stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.”
Moreover, while claiming victory over the 5 percent target, Trump made clear the U.S. would exempt itself from it. “We’ve been supporting NATO so long,” he said, when asked about the new requirement. “So, I don’t think we should, but I think that the NATO countries should, absolutely.”
Even more important than the spending target, however, is the agreement made on new force requirements to ensure the defense of NATO against Russia and other military threats. These detail the military forces and capabilities each NATO country will need to acquire and deploy, so the alliance can counter any threat to its security.
Then, as spending increases, troops are trained, and new forces are fielded, both Europe and Canada will assume a much greater share of the overall defense burden, replacing their long-standing dependence on the U.S. In turn, responsibility for NATO will shift increasingly toward Europe.
This isn’t a bad thing — Europe can, and needs to, do more to ensure its own security. But it will change the alliance’s internal power balance, moving it away from Washington and toward Brussels and other European capitals.
Unlike all his predecessors, Trump isn’t interested in burden-sharing. He wants burden-shifting. And as a result, Washington’s influence in and leverage over both NATO and Europe will steadily diminish.
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