As Washington’s long-standing alliances take a back seat in Trump’s world, there is a strong incentive for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia to do more with each other. Until now, the United States was expected to have two different approaches to its alliances in Europe and Asia, focusing U.S. military energies on Asia and pushing Europe to relieve Washington’s burden on the old continent. While there might be a section of the Trump coalition that articulates this approach, the president has been consistent in signaling his skepticism of alliances, period. His focus on trade above all else has great consequences for allies and partners, mainly in Asia, that are deeply tied to U.S. market access. Trump’s emphasis on slashing U.S. burdens abroad will also hit Asian allies hard. They are staring at a far greater military asymmetry with China than Europe’s with Russia.
On top of that, Trump has made no secret of his desire for grand geopolitical bargains with Russia and China. At the G-7 summit that ended on June 17, Trump reiterated his desire to bring Russia back into the group and expressed support for the idea of China joining as well. Whether or not Trump moves decisively towards strategic retrenchment from Europe and Asia and settles for regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, there is more than enough uncertainty in U.S. policies for America’s Eurasian allies to come together for greater security cooperation across their shared region.
The Biden administration built on the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to bring European powers into the Indo-Pacific framework. These efforts emphasized the importance of seeing the European and Asian theaters as an interconnected geopolitical space and called on Europeans to contribute to Asian security and vice versa. The presence of the so-called AP4—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—at the last three NATO summits is part of that initiative, and leaders of all four countries will hopefully show up at the summit in The Hague. Beyond the AP4, India has also been turning to Europe as insurance against U.S. unpredictability and Russia’s deepening ties with China. It is building out from its traditional security ties with France to widen the circle of defense cooperation in Europe, both bilaterally as well as collectively with the European Union.
It is reasonable to see this as a return to normal—the dynamic interaction, both negative and positive, between Europe and Asia that shaped the Eurasian and global order for over four centuries. The two world wars resulted in the United States become the dominant security actor in both Europe and Asia. Rather than wring their hands at Washington’s departure, Europe and Asia should join arms to stabilize the Eurasian balance of power. Some of those conversations could start in The Hague.
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