Every leader attending next week’s NATO summit should be perfectly clear on one thing: Russia is preparing for war with the alliance. Several NATO intelligence services have noted that Russia is not only replacing vast amounts of manpower and materiel lost in Ukraine but also stockpiling weapons, expanding its overall force, and upgrading and building military infrastructure near NATO’s eastern frontier. Although Russia may wait for its war in Ukraine to conclude in one fashion or another before opening a new front, it could also choose to act earlier.
Europe must therefore prepare for war—precisely to deter Russia from starting one in the first place. For many decades, NATO’s deterrence has worked, but two critical factors have changed. First, NATO’s military capabilities—particularly those of the European allies—are not commensurate with the growing threat the bloc faces. Russia is now operating under a fully mobilized war economy with a society that seems prepared to bear any costs imposed by its leadership, but Europe’s armed forces, defense industries, and societies are only beginning to respond. Second, NATO’s cohesion as an alliance has been fraying: Donald Trump’s verbal attacks on European allies have cast serious doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, and key Western European states have repeatedly demonstrated fear and hesitation in confronting Russia over Ukraine. All this pushes the perceived balance of resolve dangerously in Moscow’s favor.
Russia’s theory of victory likely involves an attack that aims to split or paralyze the alliance. One scenario is a ground attack on a small front-line NATO state, with Russia confident in its larger pool of readily available manpower and well aware of the casualty intolerance of Western societies. Russian planners assume that a combination of heavy Western front-line losses, deep missile strikes against NATO’s rear (including on critical civilian infrastructure), and escalating nuclear threats from the Kremlin would pressure Western policymakers and publics to seek a rapid settlement—on Moscow’s terms, of course—rather than endure a prolonged war.
How should NATO prepare?
First, support for Ukraine is key: As long as Russia is forced to use most of its resources on the war in Ukraine, an attack on NATO territory remains unlikely—even if it cannot be entirely ruled out.
Second, NATO must move toward a credible forward defense posture, which it still lacks. The most effective way to counter the type of short, high-intensity campaign that Russian decision-makers likely envision is to deny a Russian incursion at the border. A substantial increase in forward-deployed forces also requires European NATO states to finally shift their defense industries to a wartime footing.
Third, NATO must invest in a credible capability to counterstrike, making clear that any conventional missile attack on European critical infrastructure will be met in kind. NATO states must also signal unequivocally that, while they do not seek nuclear escalation, they will not yield to nuclear threats or the use of nuclear weapons—and back these words with capabilities. Given rising doubts over the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Europe’s nuclear-armed states must bolster the credibility of their nuclear deterrents.
The post How Russia Might Attack appeared first on Foreign Policy.
