President Donald Trump is being pulled toward war in the Middle East by his predator’s eye for a victim’s weakness and his ego’s need to claim the work of others as his own. But since his “unconditional surrender” social-media post on Tuesday, other Trump instincts have asserted themselves: above all, his fear of responsibility.
Trump enjoys wielding power. He flinches from accountability. Days ago, Trump seemed to hunger for entry into Israel’s war. A dramatic victory seemed poised to tumble into somebody’s lap. Why not his? But as the hours passed, Trump reconsidered. Instead of acting, he postponed. He said that a decision would come within “two weeks.”
Time for diplomacy to work? Perhaps that might be the case in another administration. In this one, as attentive Trump watchers have learned, the “two weeks” promise is a way of shirking a decision altogether, whether on Russia sanctions (deadline lapsed June 11, without action), trade deals (deadline lapsed June 12, without result), or a much-heralded infrastructure program (deadline lapsed May 20, 2017, without action then or ever).
During his first term, Trump claimed to have taken the U.S. to the verge of war with Iran in the summer of 2019, only to cancel the mission (again, by his own account) 10 minutes before mission launch. The story, as Trump told it, can hardly have impressed the rulers of Iran with the U.S. president’s commitment and resolve. But the experience of 2019 could suggest to the Iranian regime a strategy for 2025:
Step 1: Absorb the Israeli strikes, as painful and humiliating as they are.
Step 2: Mobilize Russian President Vladimir Putin to dissuade Trump from military action.
Step 3: Agree to return to negotiations if Trump forces a cease-fire on Israel.
Step 4: Dawdle, obfuscate, and generally play for time.
Step 5: Reconstitute whatever remains of the Iranian nuclear program.
This strategy would play on all of Trump’s pressure points, especially his unwillingness to ever do anything that Putin does not want. It would leave Israel in the lurch, but over the years Trump has left many other allies like that.
Trump is vulnerable to the negotiate-to-delay strategy because he has not taken any of the necessary steps to lead the nation into the war he once seemed ready to join.
Trump has not asked Congress for any kind of authorization. The decision, he insists, will be his and his alone. Which will be feasible if the operation turns out as Ronald Reagan’s invasion of Grenada did in 1983: over in a few days with few U.S. casualties and at minimal cost. But Grenada was a nearby island nation with a population of less than 100,000; Iran is a regional power with a population of more than 90 million.
War with Iran will also need real money. The 78-day air war against Serbia in 1998 cost the U.S. and its NATO allies a comparatively modest $7 billion (about $14 billion in today’s dollars). Iran is likely to prove a more dangerous enemy than Serbia was. Israel’s air war against Iran costs about $1 billion a day, according to estimates published by Ynet News. A fight with Iran will likely require some kind of supplemental appropriation above the present defense budget. Congress may balk at funding a costly war it did not approve in the first place.
Trump has not put competent leadership in charge of the nation’s defense or domestic security. Trump’s secretary of defense is accused by his own former advisers and friends of playacting a role that completely exceeds his abilities. If Iran retaliates with terror attacks inside the United States or on American interests abroad, it will find the U.S. desperately vulnerable. Trump purged experienced leaders from counterterrorism jobs. He installed underqualified culture warriors atop the FBI, and appointed at the Department of Homeland Security a cosplaying partisan who diverted $200 million of agency resources to a “Thank You Trump” advertising campaign.
Trump has not mobilized allies other than Israel. The United States has generally fought its major wars alongside coalition partners. Even Trump did so in his first term. France, the United Kingdom, and many other partners shouldered heavy burdens in the 2014–17 campaign in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State terror group. But Trump did not assemble that coalition; he inherited it from the Obama administration. Trump shows no inclination to try assembling his own in 2025.
Trump has not rallied domestic public opinion. Before this year, only a minority of Republicans and not even a third of Democrats regarded Iran as an important security threat to the United States. George W. Bush went to war in Iraq with almost three-quarters of Americans behind him. As late as the spring of 2006, half the country still supported Bush’s war. Trump will begin a war with Iran with less support than Bush could muster after three years in Iraq. Nor does Trump have any evident path to broadening support. As my former Atlantic colleague Ronald Brownstein quips, Trump is governing as a wartime president, but the war into which he has led the country is red America’s culture war against blue America: Even as Trump weighs the deployment of U.S. air power against Iran, he’s leading a federal military occupation of California.
Trump seems to recognize that he cannot unify the nation and therefore dares not lead it into any arduous or hazardous undertaking. That may be the secret self-awareness behind Trump’s “two weeks” hesitation. This is not a self-awareness that will help Israel or secure the United States’ long-term interest in depriving Iran of a nuclear weapon. But in the absence of any strategic planning or preparedness, that self-awareness is all we have to guide the country through the next fortnight and, very possibly, a long succession of “two weeks” after that.
Illustration Sources: Iranian Leader Press Office / Handout/ Anadolu / Getty; Brendan Smialowski / AFP; Getty.
The post How Tehran Might Be Playing Trump appeared first on The Atlantic.
