U.S. President Donald Trump has reportedly approved military plans to attack Iran but is giving himself two weeks to make a final decision. “I may do it, I may not do it,” he said, as Israel’s war with Iran was about to enter its second week. The United States could help ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is devastated and add to existing pressure on Tehran to come to the table on terms that are favorable to Israelis and Americans. But the risks to both U.S. personnel and other foreign-policy objectives are considerable, and the United States must be clear-eyed about the potential costs.
Here are four questions that Trump should ask himself to determine whether military intervention against Iran is a smart move for the United States.
What Is the Goal of the U.S. Operation?
The United States could attack Iran with discreet, limited goals in mind or pursue expansive objectives. The most obvious and important goal in the short term involves destroying, or at least severely setting back, Iran’s nuclear program. Although Israel has done significant damage to Natanz, Iran’s main and largest uranium enrichment facility, Fordow—another central site—is largely untouched, and several other locations have not suffered much damage. Fordow is a particularly hard target as it was built inside a mountain to guard Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities and other infrastructure against exactly the sort of operations that Israel is doing now. Washington could use specially designed bunker-buster bombs to crack Fordow and otherwise help finish the job the Israelis started.
Indeed, the current war might be a key moment for setting back Iran’s nuclear program. Without the United States, Israel may leave Iran wounded but angry, able to rebuild its program rapidly—and this time, Iran won’t pause at the brink of weaponization, as it had before the strikes. If the United States were to also bomb Iran, its program would suffer far more damage. Also, the threat of continued U.S. military action could be a strong deterrent. Even a covert program might be deterred, as the clear penetration of Iran’s security establishment by Israel makes discovery seem likely.
More ambitious efforts could involve coercing the Iranian regime. In addition to attacking nuclear targets, Israel has killed several Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists, attacked its missile arsenal, and struck at its energy infrastructure. The United States could increase the damage, further devastating Iran’s military—such as taking out much of Iran’s navy and conventional military forces—and otherwise weakening the country. Such operations put Iran in a weaker position and hurt its economy, making it more likely to eventually accept severe limits on any nuclear program and perhaps helping achieve other ambitious goals, such as reducing its support for proxy groups.
The most expansive goal would be regime change, which, for now, is not an official Israeli (or American) goal but is at least being considered. The Iranian regime is a leading supporter of terrorism, undermines its neighbors, and has a poor human rights record at home, which are all reasons, along with its nuclear program, to want the current regime gone. Change might come from a popular uprising or a military coup. But it’s difficult for outsiders to pull it off, especially short of an outright invasion with large numbers of ground forces, and it often backfires.
Although the Trump administration might begin with modest goals, wars have a way of expanding: In Afghanistan, the initial goal of crushing al Qaeda broadened to include supporting a pro-U.S. government there and promoting women’s rights, among other issues. The cost of the war, the potential lives lost, and the hope that more resources could enhance the success of the mission all create incentives to increase the stakes.
How Might Iran Respond?
If the United States bombs Iran and openly joins in, Iran is likely to retaliate by trying to kill Americans. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has threatened “irreparable harm” if the United States attacks. Even though Iran has a healthy respect for U.S. military power, it would be hard for any regime to do nothing while being bombed, and doubly so for Iran, which has long made anti-Americanism a core part of its legitimacy.
Iran’s easiest option for retaliation involves its proxies in the Middle East, especially in Iraq. When the United States assassinated Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in 2020, Iranian-backed groups launched missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq. Similar attacks in Iraq would be likely if Iran were bombed directly, as would attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel elsewhere in the region. Iran might also attack U.S. allies in the Middle East, especially if they provide basing and access for U.S. forces striking Iran.
For now, most of Iran’s proxies are lying low. Hezbollah and Hamas, in particular, have already been battered by Israel and have limited capacity and desire to also go to war with the United States. But Iran could call in its favors, and some proxies may feel compelled to respond, at least in a token way, to please their Iranian patrons.
International terrorism is another option for Iran. The regime, often working with Hezbollah, has conducted terrorist attacks against U.S., Jewish, and Israeli targets (Iran often portrays the latter two as identical) in Argentina, Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. Terrorism often backfires, uniting countries against Iran, but Tehran will likely be desperate and want the United States to pay a price for any attack, believing that this bolsters Iran’s deterrent in the long term.
Similarly, it is plausible, if counterproductive, for Iran to attack the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. This would disrupt Iran’s own oil shipments and would unite Arab and European states against it—and the United States has long prepared for this contingency. Less drastically, Tehran might also threaten such attacks and, in doing so, drive up oil prices temporarily.
What Are the Long-Term Consequences?
Although the overt Israel-Iran war might end in days or weeks after the United States joins in, many of the consequences will linger. International terrorism, for example, might occur months or even years after the war ends, with Iran seeking vengeance and hoping that a veneer of deniability would shield it from attacks. A year after the United States killed Soleimani, Iran plotted a revenge attack against former National Security Advisor John Bolton, among other senior officials.
An even bigger risk involves a rush toward nuclear proliferation. As Iraq did after Israel bombed its nuclear reactor in 1981, Iran might redouble its weaponization efforts, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and developing a clandestine nuclear program outside of arms control commitments and international inspections. Monitoring such a program is possible, and Israel has proved it has excellent intelligence, but it can be difficult to be sure that all weaponization activities are being tracked. The United States could also go to war again in the future to halt or set back the program, but no one knows if the political and diplomatic conditions would be favorable.
What Are the Opportunity Costs?
U.S. military intervention in the Middle East doesn’t just affect the Middle East. Trump has prioritized countering China, but he is diverting military assets from Asia to the Middle East. Scarce munitions and the scarcest of all resources—the time of senior officials—are being consumed with the crisis in the Middle East at a time when China hawks would have the United States largely leave the region to focus on Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other Asian hot spots. Similarly, the Russia-Ukraine war has fallen from the headlines, and Trump’s drive for negotiations there is likely to falter even more.
Judging other opportunity costs is difficult, but they are still real. War is expensive: The U.S. intervention against the Houthis in Yemen cost more than $1 billion. An Iran operation would be far more extensive and expensive. The United States would call in favors with its allies to ensure support and otherwise devote its time and resources to intervention against Iran, inevitably involving trade-offs on other policy issues.
If Trump asks himself these four questions and determines that the war aims are achievable, Iran’s response can be managed, the long-term implications are favorable on balance, and the opportunity costs aren’t exceedingly high, then attacking Iran might be a sound strategy.
In that case, U.S. leaders should treat any strike on Iran not as a discrete tactical move but as the opening act in a multiyear strategy. Before a single aircraft launches, Washington needs a plan to translate battlefield effects into political leverage. Equally important, the U.S. Congress and the public must understand the financial, industrial, and personnel demands that an Iran campaign would impose in an era of contested budgets and constrained munitions production. In short, success would hinge not on the first night’s explosions but rather on thinking through long-term goals and properly anticipating and managing risks.
The post Four Questions Trump Should Consider Before Attacking Iran appeared first on Foreign Policy.
