Beyond projecting military strength and pledging unity, a more pressing theme has emerged for next week’s NATO summit: Keep President Trump happy.
As leaders prepare to meet for the annual forum starting on Tuesday, U.S. allies have watered down their public support for Ukrainian membership and drafted a policy communiqué as short as five paragraphs to keep the American leader on board. The meeting itself, in The Hague, will open and close in under two days — a timeline designed to keep it devoid of drama.
“No one wants to say no to Trump,” said Mujtaba Rahman, who analyzes Europe for the Eurasia Group. Asked on Wednesday whether the Iran-Israel war would prompt him to skip the meeting, Mr. Trump told reporters that he still planned to attend.
In any case, his influence is certain to loom over the gathering.
It has already driven an effort by NATO’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, to increase military spending by each of the alliance’s 32 members to meet a figure suggested by Mr. Trump. He has demanded it be raised to 5 percent of each country’s gross domestic product, up from the current level of 2 percent. Mr. Rutte has proposed widening the definition of military spending to help meet that objective.
The new benchmark would include 3.5 percent of G.D.P. on core defense spending — weapons, capabilities, troops — and the rest on what NATO calls “defense and security-related investment, including in infrastructure and resilience.”
In the weeks since Mr. Rutte’s idea gained steam, its details, and shortcomings, have become clearer, according to officials and experts. The timeline to increase spending may be different for everyone, and officials are confused about the requirements. Even if countries do allocate the sums, European and even American defense industries may not be able to absorb the money or deliver in a timely fashion.
And while NATO countries generally agree it is past time to spend more on security in Europe, where officials believe a militarized Russia might be tempted to test the alliance within years, some nations already struggle to reach the existing target on military spending. They are unlikely to meet Mr. Trump’s demand soon, if ever.
The discussion about Mr. Rutte’s proposal, experts said, has devolved into a debate over spending billions of dollars to fund an ever-widening range of priorities.
“It is largely a shell game,” said Jeremy Shapiro, a former State Department official and now research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “There is some reality there, because defense spending is increasing across Europe, but more because of Vladimir Putin than Donald Trump.”
A NATO Numbers Game
Mr. Trump first demanded the 5 percent figure two weeks before his inauguration, although his ambassador to NATO, Matthew G. Whitaker, insisted recently that the United States was not “driving the timeline” for allies to spend more on defense.
“The threats are driving the timeline,” he said. “Europe keeps telling us that Russia is their biggest threat and we agree, in the Euro-Atlantic it is. And so we need to make sure everybody’s investing.”
Initially, Mr. Trump’s ambitions seemed both abstract and implausible: Only 23 NATO members were meeting their spending goals by the end of last year. But Mr. Rutte’s proposal allows for some spending on what NATO calls “military-adjacent” projects. In practical terms, that could include investments in advanced technology; rebuilding roads, bridges and other infrastructure; civic defense; education; improved health services; and aid to Ukraine.
In effect, the Trump benchmark “is both real and not real,” said Nathalie Tocci, director of Italy’s Institute of International Affairs. “The real thing is 3.5 percent, which has nothing to do with Trump and everything to do with NATO’s getting what it judges it needs,” she said.
“The unreal part is the 1.5 percent, the P.R. move for Trump,” she said. “Of course infrastructure is important, and diplomacy and education, so lump it all together for Trump. And if the magic figure of 5 percent ensures benign indifference rather than malign hostility, that’s all to the good.”
Counting Aid to Ukraine
The proposal may have helped Mr. Rutte balance the president’s desires with those of European leaders, but it has also created complications. Defense ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels this month appeared confused over how the money should be spent, and how soon, and over whether aid to Ukraine could count.
“We have to find a realistic compromise between what is necessary and what is possible, really, to spend,” said Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius.
Luxembourg’s defense minister, Yuriko Backes, was more blunt. “It will be the capabilities that will keep us safe, not percentages,” she said. “This is what should be driving our investments, not the other way around.”
Luxembourg will reach the current spending threshold — which was set in 2014 to be accomplished in a decade — only this year.
And not until recently was it clear — even among some NATO defense ministers — that countries could include a small fraction of their military contributions to the war in Ukraine as part of their defense spending.
But the rules for what qualifies are complex and decided at NATO headquarters on a case-by-case basis, to ensure that countries don’t double-count what they give to Ukraine as a part of domestic military investment.
“Supporting Ukraine is really an investment into our own security,” said Sweden’s defense minister, Pal Jonson.
Allies are debating how to count the aid to Ukraine. The current plan is to consider it core military spending. But some of the countries nearest to Russia’s borders do not want to dilute their domestic defense and want aid to Ukraine categorized as “related investments.”
A Matter of Time
There is also uncertainty about when allies would be expected to meet the higher spending threshold.
Mr. Rutte initially proposed 2032, but countries on NATO’s eastern flank want it to happen sooner. NATO intelligence suggests that, without a credible military deterrent, Russia could mount an effective offensive against the alliance in five years after the Ukraine war ends.
“We don’t have time even for seven years,” Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur of Estonia said recently. “We have to show that we have everything we need to defend our countries.”
Britain, for example, has committed to spending only 3 percent by 2034, long after Mr. Trump is scheduled to leave office. Canada, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain will reach 2 percent, a decade-old goal, only this year. And the United States itself currently spends about 3.4 percent of its G.D.P. on defense, even though in sheer dollars it accounts for nearly half of NATO spending. The amount that Washington spends just on Europe is a much smaller percentage of the Pentagon’s $997 billion budget.
Like Mr. Rutte, other world leaders have sought ways to get the most out of their dealings with Mr. Trump and avoid unpredictable problems. At this week’s Group of 7 summit, the newly elected prime minister of Canada and host of the event, Mark Carney, deployed a mix of flattery and discipline. Yet the president still disrupted the gathering, departing early to address the Iran-Israel war. Mr. Rutte hopes to avoid such an outcome.
“Trump is making a fake demand for more spending, and they’re giving him a fake response,” Mr. Shapiro said. He called the Rutte plan “clever, because it lets Trump get what he wants and he can brag about it.”
Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years.
Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe and is based in Berlin. He has reported from over 120 countries, including Thailand, France, Israel, Germany and the former Soviet Union.
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