The Trump administration’s first 100 days in power signaled a sharp and dramatic reorientation of the U.S. relationship with Africa. Public health forecasting models estimate that that the administration’s grave cuts to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief will result in 26 million additional HIV infections, 15 million preventable AIDS deaths, and 14 million more children orphaned by AIDS by 2040, with more than 60 percent of these impacts concentrated in only six African countries.
Macroeconomic projections from the University of Denver similarly warn that cuts to U.S. foreign aid programs will push an additional 19 million Africans into extreme poverty by 2030. The imposition of sweeping tariffs against all African economies, large and small—should they last—will only make African livelihoods more precarious.
Beyond the cuts to aid and trade, a steady stream of leaked predecisional documents portend a deeper U.S. retreat from engagement in Africa. On March 14, the New York Times and other media outlets reported on a draft “travel ban” that would impose more stringent travel requirements on 43 countries, 22 of which are African. Four days later, NBC News reviewed internal Defense Department proposals that would result in the elimination of the U.S. Africa Command (Africom) as an independent geographic combatant command of the Pentagon.
In mid-April, African headlines were dominated by a leaked draft executive order that would close embassies across the continent and perhaps even completely eliminate the Bureau of African Affairs, which oversees U.S. relations with 49 countries. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent announcement of his department’s reorganization plans indicated that the Africa bureau will remain in place for now, but it offered little clarity on the broader strategic vision for U.S. engagement with the continent.
Though perhaps too early to tell, the Trump administration’s foreign policy toward Africa shows clear signs of being driven by transactionalism. Through this lens, Africa is not likely to be judged by its long-term potential or the future strategic risks of disengagement. Instead, under the “America First” approach, relationships are likely to be measured by their immediate benefits and the potential to offer tangible, clear, and easily messaged “wins” that show a return on investment to U.S. audiences.
This approach means that partnerships and interests will become increasingly conditional. Whether via security cooperation or economic investment, U.S. policy toward Africa is unlikely to be framed as part of a broader global effort to protect the rules-based international order, promote democratic norms, or advance development and human rights. Many African states, especially those facing internal instability or lacking the capacity to reciprocate in strategic or economic terms, are likely to find themselves on the outside looking in.
But instead of retreating from Africa, the Trump administration should embrace a smarter form of transactionalism. U.S.-Africa policy can still prioritize tangible returns, but those returns should come through investments that build enduring partnerships, not through quick exits or short- or one-sided gains. Those may seem seductive, but they risk strategically crippling the United States at the exact moment when adversaries are looking to capitalize.
To do so, U.S. policy toward Africa should refocus around four strategic priorities: supporting resilient and self-sufficient regional organizations; curbing threats to U.S. security at their source; fostering African support for U.S. positions in international institutions; and co-developing a positive economic vision for the continent that promotes economic development and integration while resisting the extractive and abusive economic practices of rival global powers.
Pursuing this approach would preserve an “America First” strategy while respecting an “Africa First” vision built on partnerships, not dependency.
When President George W. Bush went on a five-nation tour of the continent in 2008, he claimed that rather than establish a significant military presence around the continent, the mission of the new U.S. Africa Command would be to “help African leaders solve the continent’s crises.” Today, African states remain plagued by enduring conflicts in several regional conflict zones, but important Africa-led, U.S.-supported security cooperation efforts have been successful and provided valuable lessons for further investments around the continent.
In the Gulf of Guinea, for example—a comprehensive interagency approach involving the U.S. departments of Defense and State, USAID, the Coast Guard, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, among other agencies—has contributed to a robust regional maritime security architecture. With U.S. and other international support, African states and regional security institutions have been the primary designers and implementers of new frameworks for coordinating regional efforts to combat piracy, trafficking, fisheries crimes, and other maritime threats.
Significant security gains have been made in the gulf, including a roughly 90percent drop in piracy and armed robbery incidents between 2020 and 2024, despite Washington and other international partners having a minimal military footprint in the region. Effectively, this Africa-led, U.S.-supported effort has improved so-called security burden-sharing with African partners and allowed the United States to allocate more resources and attention to counterterrorism, an outcome that is certainly in line with the Trump administration’s “America First” priorities.
Successes such as the Gulf of Guinea security architecture should shape future U.S. efforts to support African-led solutions. Organizations including the African Union and Africa Standby Force, alongside regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States and Southern African Development Community, are critical actors for intracontinental relationships. These organizations have played essential roles ranging from economic cooperation to crisis response and prevention. Washington’s Africa policy should focus on providing support and expertise to these initiatives.
Critics of increased U.S. engagement in Africa are sometimes eager to criticize Washington for dominating responses to supposedly African problems, but this critique ignores the transnational nature of the continent’s most pressing security challenges. Problems such as civil war, terrorism, military rule, public health crises, and black-market economies will not be solved without African leadership—but these problems, if left unchecked, will undermine U.S. security whether or not Washington chooses to remain engaged.
Consider the global drug trade and the Trump administration’s clear concern over narcotics trafficking. Parts of Africa have been integral nodes in the global drug trade—particularly in West Africa, which has historically served as a key transit hub and corridor for narcotics trafficking to Europe and beyond. But there is no reason that this threat will remain confined to Europe as criminal syndicates evolve, mature, and expand.
The Sahel region’s deteriorating security situation, brought on by an intricate web of terrorism, domestic conflict, coups, and corruption, has also raised alarms among analysts who warn of an emerging nexus between organized crime and violent extremist groups. There is a real risk of the region evolving into a hub of narco-terrorism where al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates benefit.
In addition, migrant smuggling and trafficking has remained a persistent issue around the continent and has shown no signs of slowing down. Europe’s efforts to quell and crack down on migration flows through North Africa have pushed many migrants to pursue alternative destinations. Thousands of African migrants, for instance, have opted to make the trek to the United States, often via routes leading to the U.S. southern border with Mexico.
And as the COVID-19 pandemic showed, disease outbreaks do not respect geography. The best defense comes from proactive engagement to develop resilient health systems—not reactionary policies. Reconsidering aid cuts and investing in early detection, rapid response capabilities, and basic public health infrastructure in Africa is a smart investment..
Addressing these problems closer to their source, through targeted and selective engagement, can advance U.S. security while minimizing the need for costly interventions later.
Despite the Trump administration’s skepticism toward international institutions, organizations such as the United Nations remain essential arenas for advancing U.S. strategic interests. China and Russia use the U.N. and other intergovernmental bodies to win favor for their actions, legitimize their views of a post-U.S. global order, and amplify their narratives. They also recognize the importance of African votes, as they form a voting bloc of more than a quarter of the world’s sovereign states.
Africa represents the largest regional voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly, with 54 member states. That gives African countries significant collective influence. That influence is seen in the bloc’s voting behavior over the war in Ukraine. In a General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, African countries accounted for nearly half of all abstentions. Later, some countries that have grown increasingly close to Moscow (e.g., Mali), shifted their voting on Ukrainian issues in favor of Russia.
Beijing and Moscow are only likely to increase their diplomatic onslaughts at the U.N. in an effort to win friends and allies in addition to courting partners via African leaders’ summits. If the United States continues to treat Africa as a peripheral interest while strategic adversaries do not, its indifference risks being reciprocated in international institutions.
Trump’s first term saw the establishment of the “Prosper Africa” program, an effort aimed to boost U.S.-Africa trade through increased private sector investment across the continent. The initiative was designed to align with the America First approach by opening African markets to U.S. businesses—it was a way of positioning the United States as an economic counterweight to China.
It was also heralded as an important pivot away from simply delivering development aid or humanitarian assistance, which had come to define U.S.-Africa relations. Foundationally, the program’s design aligns with the transactional approach that is likely to define the Trump administration’s Africa policy this time around. But the status and future of that program, which was primarily housed under USAID, is unclear.
Moreover, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted in 2000, has given more than 30 African states access to U.S. markets without import tariffs for certain products. The payoffs have been significant for several African states. For instance, Deutsche Welle reported that under the program, Kenya’s apparel exports to the United States grew from $55 million in 2001 to $603 million in 2022, comprising nearly 68 percent of Kenya’s total exports to the United States.
Despite such successes, the Trump administration’s preferences for tariffs as a bargaining tool suggest that AGOA is unlikely to be renewed when it expires in September. Letting this legislation lapse would not only damage bilateral economic ties and create opportunities for China to consolidate its trade dominance, but would also undercut the value of long-term economic partnerships.
Arguments about the geostrategic importance of Africa are not new, and talking points about future economic potential, rapid population growth, strategic geographic positioning along vital sea lanes, and deposits of critical mineral resources have been echoed for decades. This belief in the long-term strategic value of the continent is exactly what motivated the creation of Africom nearly 20 years ago and inspired the Biden administration’s “Africa Strategy” in 2022.
Even as the new administration shifts the focus to short-term transactionalism, this is not the time to turn away from strategic priorities in Africa. Retreating from the continent risks sending signals of unreliability at a time when credibility and commitment are precious commodities. Pursuing these four objectives would provide Washington the opportunity to realize tangible, near-term gains that are mutually beneficial. They would also reduce the costs that would surely arise for any future intervention and would improve prospects for support of U.S. priorities globally while blunting the influence of China and Russia.
Through commitment, not retrenchment, the Trump administration can protect U.S. interests, reinforce American leadership, and secure tangible returns on investment in a region whose global significance is only set to grow.
The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Naval War College, Defense Department, or U.S. government.
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