Serge Schmemann hosted a video conversation with three former European diplomats, Wolfgang Ischinger of Germany, Judith Gough of Britain and Gabrielius Landsbergis of Lithuania, to talk about how the Trump administration has profoundly shaken the U.S.-European foundation of shared ideals, commitment to freedom, economic ties and democratic values.
Serge Schmemann: What I’d like to ask you, as three prominent former diplomats, is to reflect on what America meant to you in your work, how you react personally to the administration’s approach to the bonds with Europe and what you believe the impact may be on the world.
Wolfgang Ischinger: My personal ties to the United States have gone far beyond the professional realm. I’ve spent a total of more than a dozen years in the country — as a high school student, as a postgraduate student at Harvard Law School, as a young diplomat and then in the early 2000s for almost five years as ambassador.
We had issues in those days, especially over the Iraq war. But I felt very confident as a German in the 1990s or 2000s that for the first time in many decades Germany was now on the right side of history, that after the years under the kaiser and then the Nazis, Germany was identifying with the West and invited to be part of the West — especially by the United States. So the German relationship with the United States until now has been something that created tremendous joy and satisfaction for Germans.
That is why I think what has happened in the West between the United States and her European allies and others has created more pain, more convulsion, more crisis in the mind of German elites than in the minds of most other European elites.
Schmemann: Ms. Gough, can you identify a specific moment or situation in which the United States was critical to your own outlook?
Judith Gough: I don’t think there’s a specific moment, but I think there is a theme that runs through both of my postings, first as British ambassador to Georgia, but then as ambassador to Ukraine, which is that Britain and the United States were very much partners in terms of supporting the progression of democracy in both Georgia and Ukraine, and fighting corruption in Ukraine, supporting reform, the rule of law, human rights.
Of course, there were variances of opinions, particularly around, for example, L.G.B.T.-plus rights, where there were nuances and differences. But I think what I felt as an ambassador was very much a sense of a partnership with America.
Schmemann: Today, when you follow American handling of peace talks for Ukraine, how do you react?
Gough: You know, the vision and the goal is the correct one, which is to bring peace to Ukraine. I think the challenge comes in terms of conducting negotiations. Ukraine has to be at the table, and so do the Europeans. On the one hand, the United States quite rightly wants Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and its own security. But by that token, Europe has to be at the table and playing a serious role.
Schmemann: Mr. Landsbergis, as a Lithuanian you’re a citizen of a country directly threatened by a hostile Russia, and as foreign minister you’ve been a direct participant in the shaping of a post-Soviet universe. Can you describe a concrete instance when the United States shaped your perceptions or actions?
Gabrielius Landsbergis: There’s one particular point in history which I think is quite important to my country. This was just before Lithuania joined NATO, when President George W. Bush came. It was the first time a U.S. president visited my country. He gave a very memorable speech in which, at least as far as we know, he went off script because he was feeling really warmhearted by the amount of people that had gathered there in the main square of Vilnius, all of them wavering U.S. flags and chanting “U.S.A.! ”
And he said something like whoever would choose Lithuania as their enemy would choose United States as their enemy as well. Apparently these words were unscripted. Yet they are now on a plaque on the town hall of Vilnius. A kid in school could probably quote these words. So this is how deeply our fate and our security are bound to our ally across the Atlantic.
So you can imagine what not just me, but the whole country, is experiencing right now. It’s like something in your body being torn, because we grew up with this, we lived with this, we believed in this.
Schmemann: Maybe we could follow that up, if I could ask all of you to describe ways in which the United States of an earlier time embodied values that you and your people regarded as critical, that benefited the world?
Gough: I think the values that the United States stood for were extremely clear. I can remember when the Soviet Union dissolved: It was one of the reasons I decided to study Russian and embark upon the career that I did. You could see a new world opening up, you could see a new direction and the values that prevailed, and they were very much values that were put forward by the United States.
The challenge now is trying to understand what values the United States stands for: What are the values that American diplomats go forth and defend and uphold?
Schmemann: Wolfgang, would you agree? Half of your nation was part of the East. Were there similar sentiments toward the United States, or were they different?
Ischinger: I remember very well when President George W. Bush visited Berlin in 2002, and before he arrived there were the usual anti-American demonstrations in parts of Berlin. I remember a Berlin taxi driver who said to me, if you see President Bush, please tell him this: We Berliners know that these demonstrators owe the fact that they can demonstrate for and against whatever they please to the fact that our city was protected and kept free by the United States for the last 60 years. I’m proud to say I actually managed to transmit that message to President Bush, who loved it and told the story to some American television reporter.
We’re having this conversation almost exactly 30 years since my friend, the late Richard Holbrooke, published an important piece in Foreign Affairs titled “America, a European Power.” There was no question mark at the end of the title. I think it’s very important to read that piece today because most of it rings totally true. It is in America’s interest to make sure that Europe remains at peace and stable.
It seems to me that we are now at a crossroads as far as the development of Europe is concerned. For many decades, the idea was that Europe was going to be protected and supported by the United States. I think we are now facing a very different situation, where America is now suggesting to us that maybe you guys should take your security into your own hands.
That is something totally revolutionary, if the United States is no longer willing to serve as the big protector which takes care of European security now and essentially forever. It requires the European project, which was focused for many decades only on economic and social integration, to add a totally new dimension — a Europe which can protect itself by itself.
Schmemann: There have been differences, of course, but Wolfgang speaks of a “revolution.” Differences between Republican and Democratic administrations is one thing, but are we now in something totally new?
Gough: We are at something new in terms of how the United States is conducting its business. But I don’t think I’m massively surprised. We have a U.S. administration that signaled quite clearly what its intentions were. Whether people chose to listen to that and understand is a different matter. I think it is incumbent upon Europe to think proactively: What are we going to do? How are we going to engage? Hand-wringing will get us nowhere.
Schmemann: How about you, Gabrielius? Did you ever imagine an America such as we have today?
Landsbergis: Well, we’d seen Donald Trump in the first administration. We talked about it. We had all the time to prepare. But we didn’t do that. So it’s very difficult for us to admit that this is happening. And nobody could have prepared for somebody who would shatter the fundamentals, the foundations of trans-Atlantic relations.
What sort of U.S. involvement we will be seeing in Europe? No more troops? No more NATO? No more Article 5? No more nuclear umbrella? I mean, how far does it go?
Schmemann: What about you, Wolfgang?
Ischinger: Let me first respond to what Gabrielius just said. There is a growing concern all over Europe about future U.S. intentions regarding NATO. But it’s important to note that as we speak, no U.S. troops have been withdrawn from Europe. There are still many tens of thousands of American soldiers all over the European continent. Not one nuclear weapon based in Europe has been withdrawn. In other words, NATO still exists.
There may be changes coming. We are worried about that; but they have not started. What has started, however, is that doubt has crept in, a loss of mutual trust. Loss of trust in diplomacy or in international relations is very similar to a loss of trust in a relationship between persons: It’s very easy to lose, but rebuilding trust is very complicated.
Schmemann: Do you think that Europe will finally take a closer and more serious look at its own security?
Gough: Diplomats are hard-wired to see a silver lining in any situation and to look for the positive and look long term. Look at how quickly Europe actually moved on Ukraine, largely led by Britain and France, but with vital input from everybody. It’s very hard to look at the defense of Europe at the moment without U.S. engagement and without U.S. hardware. But I think you will see that when the chips are down, Europe will do that.
Schmemann: Gabrielius, do you see any silver lining in this retreat of the United States?
Landsbergis: Yes and no. On one hand I see positive signs when it comes to specific countries pulling a lot more weight than they probably figured that they would ever need to. I would stress the importance of the announcements that are coming from the German government. I mean, Germany alone is investing billions of euros into defense. That’s an enormous decision for Germany, for Europe, for my country. It’s a signal to Putin. That is huge.
What I’m worried about is this: When we talk about the European Union, when we talk about the institutions, I would like to see more belief in ourselves. We are a continent of 450 million people. We have an enormous economy that, if it wants to, can achieve things. It can reinvent itself and it can actually defend itself.
But I’m worried that we lack the belief that this is the European hour, our make-it-or- break it moment. We have to transform ourselves into a continent that actually believes in itself and is able to defend itself. So the shock is healthy, unless it kills the patient.
Schmemann: Wolfgang, do you think this is a moment when Europe might pull together?
Ischinger: In the long run, yes, but this is not what the original European Community was built for. The idea was integrating, not defending against the outside. We are going to be facing a totally new challenge to make of this European Union something that can play this role. In the long term, there’s no reason not to be optimistic. But it’ll take time.
Building up a Europe that can protect itself, even if we spend a lot of money, will take years. This is why I am quite skeptical and worried. I hope the United States is not going to abandon us at this very critical juncture.
Schmemann: What scenarios do you fear most immediately?
Ischinger: It’s worth noting that China has so far not officially recognized Crimea to be part of Russia, nor has China recognized the four oblasts in Donbas that Russia claims to be part of Russia. It’s very important from a legal point of view that the United States also remind itself of how it once refused to recognize Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries.
It’s crucially important that even if certain compromises may be required to obtain a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine war, there should be no legal recognition of territorial occupation. If we neglect these principles, we would really be in trouble in Europe.
Schmemann: Judith, do you have any nightmare scenarios in all this?
Gough: They’re not dissimilar to Wolfgang’s. As somebody who served in Ukraine, my nightmare scenario is that a short-term peace deal is favored over a long-term perspective that will hold.
We have to be really clear that Russia is actually not interested in a bit of Ukraine. It is interested in ensuring that Ukraine is not a sovereign nation able to make its own choices and decide its own destiny, which includes drawing closer to Europe.
There’s a very old saying that’s attributed to Lenin — and I have no idea whether he said it or not — which is that if you have a bayonet and you push against something soft, you keep on pushing, but if you hit something hard, you stop. What really needs to be in place is some really hard resolve that says to Russia, stop. If we accept that borders can be changed by force and aggression in Ukraine, then where else can that happen?
Schmemann: And you, Gabrielius, what keeps you awake at night?
Landsbergis: Well, my scenarios are close to home, so to say. My biggest worry is that the signaling of the last couple of months to the Russians might change their calculations as to how and when to test other countries in NATO and the E.U. As Wolfgang mentioned, in the short term, Europe might not be ready. If we know this, so does Putin. And if he is given a respite in Ukraine, he might decide that maybe this is a time he could test whether NATO is still alive. This is the stuff of nightmares for any European country.
Schmemann: If the United States has indeed abdicated its role as the beacon of freedom, what is the alternative? What can or should Europe do?
Landsbergis: First of all, leave the door open. I think that there are enough people in the United States who hold the same values we do, who want to be part of building the world in that idealistic image. I’m convinced there will be a turnaround. But we cannot just wait. Until we are back in this reinforced, reinvigorated, trans-Atlantic arrangement, there are countries and people out there looking for a beacon of freedom, for somebody to light it up. If the United States cannot do it, well, Europe has to do it.
Schmemann: Judith?
Gough: The key thing for us in Europe to remember is that we haven’t changed. Neither have our interests. We need to be confident and we need to keep engaging and need to keep talking with the United States. You are still our closest partner. We need to keep sticking up for our values and articulating our values and articulating our interests.
Schmemann: Wolfgang?
Ischinger: We should not despair about what some of us may see as unfortunate developments across the Atlantic. There are so many governors and senators and intellectuals and academics who are totally aware of how important American soft power has been and continues to be; how important the partnership and alliance and other links with Europe are for the United States. We need to remind our American friends that we’re in this together. So engage, engage, engage, that would be my final word.
Schmemann: In fact, that is exactly what we have tried to facilitate today. The chance to engage, to keep talking. So I want to thank the three of you very sincerely.
Wolfgang Ischinger is a former German ambassador to the United States and president of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference; Judith Gough is a former British ambassador to Georgia, Ukraine and Sweden; and Gabrielius Landsbergis is a former Lithuanian foreign minister and former member of the European Parliament. Serge Schmemann is a member of the Times editorial board.
Source photographs by Tasos Katopodis and Santiago Urquijo via Getty Images.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
Serge Schmemann joined The Times in 1980 and worked as the bureau chief in Moscow, Bonn and Jerusalem and at the United Nations. He was editorial page editor of The International Herald Tribune in Paris from 2003 to 2013.
The post ‘Doubt Has Crept In’: Three European Diplomats on Trusting America appeared first on New York Times.
