In Bangladesh, a broad coalition of disaffected university students, civil society activists, and radical Islamists played a critical role in the nationwide protests that pushed longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign last August. Disparate groups united against her increasingly authoritarian regime in an unprecedented social movement.
In the wake of Hasina’s ouster, Bangladeshis of various ideological stripes coalesced around Nobel laureate Mohammed Yunus, who took office as interim leader. But now, the hopes held by many that Yunus could steer Bangladesh toward order and social progress are in question. Through its foreign-policy moves and choices that have allowed other forces to flourish, the interim government has raised profound concerns about the country’s future.
To start, Yunus seems either unwilling or incapable of reining in the Islamist zealots who are increasingly coming to the fore in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, on the foreign-policy front, he seems inclined to move away from historic ties with neighboring India and instead reorient the country toward China and Pakistan. Both shifts could have adverse consequences for Bangladesh and regional stability.
Bangladesh, which emerged as an independent state after a bloody civil war in 1971 that led to its breakaway from Pakistan, has long had a fractured national identity. Bengali linguistic nationalism, which emerged after Pakistan’s decision to make Urdu its sole national language in 1952, ultimately played a large role in the creation of a new state. Since then, Bangladeshis have taken pride in their linguistic heritage and cherished their Bengali literary traditions.
However, this linguistic heritage has coexisted uneasily with another important facet of Bangladeshi nationalism: a commitment to a form of orthodox Islam, embraced in part because it distinguishes Muslim-majority Bangladesh from the Indian state of West Bengal, with which it shares a common language despite the state being predominantly Hindu.
This attachment to a parochial form of Islamism stems from both historical and contemporary sources. When Bangladesh was part of a united Pakistan, adherence to orthodox Sunni Islamic precepts was an important component of the political culture. And a radical Islamist party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, has been an important political force in both pre- and post-independence Bangladesh, even though it lacks significant electoral clout.
The party’s record was tainted during the 1971 civil war because its members sided with the brutal Pakistani military crackdown, but a segment of Bangladeshis have remained sympathetic toward Jamaat-e-Islami due to party’s commitment to its faith.
More recently, Jamaat-e-Islami and its followers have found support from the Persian Gulf states, with resources flowing from Bangladeshi migrant workers returning from these countries as well as transfers of funds and ideological guidance from religious authorities in the region. These twin forces have steadily undermined a long tradition of syncretic Islam in Bangladesh with complex historical roots.
Owing to both domestic and international factors, Hasina sought to contain Jamaat-e-Islami during her tenure. At home, she needed to court the vote of Bangladesh’s Hindu community. From an external standpoint, taking a tough stance against the Islamists played well in India. Not long before her ouster, Hasina’s government banned the party and its youth affiliate outright, citing what she described as its growing willingness to resort to violence.
But Yunus has taken a more indulgent approach to Jamaat-e-Islami, including by lifting the ban imposed under Hasina. And with the interim government not confronting these Islamist forces, they are increasingly asserting themselves into public life. Among other matters, mob violence has targeted members of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority as well as a Muslim minority sect, the Ahmadiyya.
This turn of events in Bangladesh is bound to have adverse repercussions for India’s Muslim minority population in the states that border the country. Religious intolerance in India has risen in recent years, and attacks against Hindus in Bangladesh will only exacerbate hostility toward Muslims in India. To some degree, this has already begun.
Such reciprocal violence would mirror past events in the region. In December 1992, Hindu zealots attacked and destroyed the Babri Mosque in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Widespread attacks on Hindu communities and places of worship in Bangladesh ensued, as noted Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasrin vividly documented in her novel Lajja (Shame).
The Yunus government’s failure to rein in Islamist zealotry could fuel Hindu-Muslim tensions and violence in northeastern India, with significant destabilizing consequences for the whole region. Within Bangladesh, rising religious intolerance will almost inevitably lead to more violence and the possible flight of Hindus into India.
Dhaka also might also end up undermining its long-standing partnership with New Delhi. Yunus has recently courted China, India’s long-term adversary. During a visit to Beijing in late March, Yunus offered Bangladesh as potential foothold for China to expand its economic influence in South Asia. He added that because India’s seven northeastern states were landlocked, only Bangladesh could offer China access to the Bay of Bengal, describing Dhaka as the “guardian of ocean access.”
China has yet to issue an official response, but Yunus’s comments raised concerns in India’s diplomatic and foreign-policy circles, as Chinese access to ports on the Bay of Bengal could undermine India’s maritime security. This could all come at a significant cost to Bangladesh, too: Sri Lanka, for example, found itself caught in what some analysts have described as a “debt trap” after seeking significant Chinese investment.
Both developments are bad for India, which should play a stronger role regarding Bangladesh. China has of course long enjoyed a warm relationship with Pakistan, India’s rival. But it has also made significant inroads in Nepal and Sri Lanka in recent years. In part, Beijing has been able to expand its footprint because New Delhi hasn’t forged a consistent and coherent set of policies to address the concerns of its smaller neighbors.
If Bangladesh comes even partially under the sway of Islamists and starts to actively drift into the orbit of China, India will find itself isolated and face security challenges in its backyard. Worse still, New Delhi is likely to lose an invaluable partner, in which it has invested significant material and diplomatic resources in recent decades.
The compelling need to push back against these two emerging trends poses a significant challenge for India’s foreign-policy community.
New Delhi cannot afford to see the steady erosion of its influence in Dhaka. Instead of just sounding the alarm about shifting politics or the Yunus government’s flirtation with China, India needs to step up its own diplomatic efforts—highlighting its long-term support for Bangladesh, offering financial assistance, and addressing concerns about market access to India. Otherwise, there is a real risk that the fraught India-Bangladesh relationship will inexorably deteriorate.
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