We are living in a dangerous and uncertain time — with the world’s most powerful nations increasingly using their economic, diplomatic and military clout to force others to pick a side. When once it was Europe’s great powers that carved up the globe into their zones of influence, now the continent is caught in the struggle between east and west. In this age of increasing geopolitical uncertainty, the EU and Ukraine stand as natural partners — with close economic links presenting huge opportunities to both sides.
At the start of the 21st century, it would have been difficult to present the rationale for greater integration between the EU and Ukraine. The latter, despite breaking free from the USSR a decade prior, remained deeply embedded in the post-Soviet economic space, which seriously limited its opportunities for strategic rapprochement with the EU. Economic dependence on Russia not only shaped Ukraine’s trade policy but also determined its geopolitical outlook.
Yet developments over the past 15 years have dramatically changed the picture. Following the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine reconsidered its foreign policy priorities and finally declared its strategic course toward European integration. The key step in this direction was the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in 2014, which included provisions on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).
The results of trade liberalization became noticeable in the first years after the agreement was implemented. The EU’s share of Ukraine’s exports began to grow rapidly. While in 2012 it was only 24.9 percent, in 2016 it was 37.1 percent and in 2020 it was over 40 percent. In 2021, the EU’s share of Ukraine’s total exports reached about 41 percent, making the EU Ukraine’s largest trading partner. European producers also benefitted, with EU imports growing from $16.4 billion in 2016 to $23 billion in 2021.
These figures demonstrate how Ukraine has been drifting toward the European economic space, consistently cutting old ties with the post-Soviet region. On the eve of the large-scale invasion, the share of foreign trade from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had fallen to 15 percent, while the EU accounted for about 40 percent of export-import turnover — a clear shift toward the west.
The war has further bound Ukraine into the contours of the European common economic space. In June 2022, the EU took an unprecedented step by introducing so-called autonomous trade measures, suspending the DCFTA provisions on import duties, quotas and safeguards for Ukrainian products. After several extensions, this regime remains in effect until at least June 5, 2025, serving not only as economic support but also as a powerful political signal of solidarity.
The results were quick. By the end of 2023, the EU’s share of Ukraine’s trade turnover exceeded 56 percent, while the share of the CIS countries fell to just 2.5 percent. Ukraine has effectively consolidated its place in the European economic space. At the same time, for the EU, Ukraine remains a modest trading partner – its share in imports was only 1.7 percent in 2024, suggesting a soft, gradual integration into the single market.
Ukrainian business has long focused on European standards, transparent rules and a predictable environment. This is a class that thinks critically, takes responsibility and drives economic progress — a natural ally of the European integration course. Its orientation toward the EU is not only economic, but also value-based.
This is why trade with the EU is such a strong pillar of Ukraine’s foreign policy — something the union should aim to support and deepen. European integration is based not only on geopolitics but also on shared economic thinking and institutional alignment.
Delaying this path could create space for alternative scenarios — as seen in Georgia. In June 2014, Georgia signed its Association Agreement with the EU, officially declaring European integration a strategic priority. However, foreign trade patterns between 2014 and 2024 show a different reality.
In 2014, the EU’s share of Georgia’s trade was 32 percent, and Russia’s 9 percent. By 2020, the EU’s share fell to 24 percent while Russia’s rose to 14 percent. In 2024, the EU’s share is about 25 percent while Russia’s is estimated at 16 percent. This shift reflects the political course of the Georgian Dream party — founded by a Russian billionaire of Georgian origin, Bidzina Ivanishvili — which emphasizes improved relations with Russia and a more cautious approach to Euro-Atlantic integration. As a result, Georgia is drifting back toward the post-Soviet space, where Russia remains dominant.
The EU’s autonomous trade measures regime, which enabled simplified access for Ukrainian products, will expire on June 5, 2025. As that date approaches, uncertainty is growing over what the future trade framework will look like, especially amid internal EU debates over sensitive commodities.
Concerns center around products such as sugar, poultry, eggs and bioethanol. Discussions over possible restrictions are fueled by certain industry associations defending national agricultural interests. These dynamic risks politicizing trade and jeopardizing the broader partnership.
In this context, it is essential to protect the strategic framework of cooperation and avoid actions that could erode mutual trust. The EU, as Ukraine’s principal trade and political partner, has both a practical and moral interest in maintaining open, predictable access for Ukrainian goods – this is the basis for economic integration and for jointly strengthening the single market.
It is time to shift the narrative promoted by lobbying organizations in the EU that reduce the partnership to debates over agricultural competition. Such a narrow focus distorts the full picture and endangers a relationship that has value well beyond trade in a few commodities.
From a geopolitical and geoeconomics point of view, Ukraine should not only remain part of the European economic space, but be systematically and permanently embedded within it. Deepening integration with Ukraine gives the EU new tools to reinforce its strategic autonomy and compete globally, especially in light of growing challenges from both the United States and China.
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