The diplomatic relationship between the United States and South Africa has reached its lowest point since the transition to democracy in 1994. On Feb. 7, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order titled “Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa.”
The order directed all U.S. agencies to “halt foreign aid or assistance” to South Africa and instructed the State Department to, in a move that shocked South Africans across the racial and political spectrum, prioritize refugee resettlement for “Afrikaners in South Africa who are victims of unjust racial discrimination.” The government of national unity, largely organized around the African National Congress (ANC) and the white-dominated Democratic Alliance (DA), suddenly seemed to find a common purpose for the first time.
Relations became strained under the Biden administration when South Africa took a nonaligned stance on the war between Russia and Ukraine. Things escalated when a Russian ship, the Lady R, docked at a naval base near Cape Town in December 2022.
Then-U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety called a press conference to assert, with confidence—but without providing evidence—that weapons were loaded onto the Russian vessel.
South Africa’s decision to accuse Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in December the following year significantly escalated tensions. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed the genocide accusation as “meritless.”
Despite U.S. opposition, in January 2024, the ICJ issued provisional measures in South Africa’s case against Israel, ordering Israel to take measures to prevent acts of genocide in Gaza and improve humanitarian conditions, though it stopped short of ordering a cease-fire. This ruling gave South Africa’s position significant international legitimacy and strengthened its standing among global south nations.
South Africa’s recent leadership in forming the Hague Group—a coalition of countries supporting the ICJ proceedings against Israel that includes Malaysia, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Honduras—demonstrates that Pretoria is unlikely to retreat from its position on Palestine despite U.S. pressure.
In an article recently published in FP, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, writing with the president and prime minister of Colombia and Malaysia, respectively, took a forceful position, arguing: “We believe in protagonism, not supplication. The choice is stark: Either we act together to enforce international law or we risk its collapse. We choose to act, not only for the people of Gaza but for the future of a world where justice prevails over impunity.”
Through this new diplomatic bloc, South Africa has actively worked to build a coalition from the global south to sustain international legal pressure regarding Gaza, showing its commitment to maintaining an independent foreign-policy stance.
Trump’s order mentions the accusation of genocide leveled against Israel by Pretoria but focuses on the South African government’s extensive affirmative action policies, its plans for further land reform, and claims that Afrikaners are being targeted for hostile treatment by the state. This claim is patently untrue but follows years of attempts by the Afrikaner right to build relations with the right in the United States and Europe.
Within South Africa, the leading figures who have been pushing hard in recent years to demand that South Africa abandon its nonaligned position on the Russia-Ukraine war, exit the BRICS grouping, withdraw the ICJ case, and align itself with the United States come from among the country’s white English-speaking minority and not the Afrikaner right. A set of think tanks and media projects, such as the Brenthurst Foundation and the Daily Maverick, among others, have pushed hard to demand that South Africa fully ally itself with the West.
Trump’s order has now pushed the most stridently pro-Western voices to the margins of society as the bulk of South African opinion, including among whites, moves toward opposing Trump’s actions. Indeed, leading Afrikaner figures and organizations have made it clear that they prefer to remain in South Africa rather than to become refugees in the United States.
Flip Buys of the Solidarity Movement, an Afrikaner lobby group, insisted, “We want to establish the conditions for Afrikaners to stay in South-Africa, in order for us to make a sustainable contribution towards the country and all its people.”
South Africans are, despite their divisions, a deeply patriotic people, something often witnessed with some surprise by visitors when there is a big rugby game on. This shared patriotism has now led to a shared sense that South Africa is under siege, a shared sense that has left pro-Trump forces isolated. Trump’s advisors clearly did not understand that this would be an inevitable outcome of his threats against South Africa.
The government of national unity (GNU), formed after the ANC’s electoral losses in May 2024, has been plagued by internal contradictions and policy disagreements since its inception. Trump’s actions have, ironically, provided an external threat around which these disparate parties have rallied.
The DA, despite its previous alignment with Western positions on many issues, has found itself in the surprising position of joining with the ANC to defend national sovereignty against what many South Africans view as unwarranted intervention. The big issue between the two parties at the moment is a dispute over how South Africa should deal with its inability to pay for its expenses.
The ANC wanted to increase the value-added tax, something that the DA has opposed. This has marked an interesting shift to more technical and less ideological contestation—which is in many ways the sign of a functioning democracy.
The Freedom Front Plus (FF+) party is the furthest right-wing party in the South African parliament, and its core aim is to represent Afrikaner interests; even this party has distanced itself from Trump’s order.
While Trump’s stated concern for white Afrikaners might seem politically advantageous, the party has recognized that the economic consequences of deteriorating U.S. relations would disproportionately harm the very constituency it represents. Commercial agriculture, heavily dependent on exports, stands to lose significantly from trade restrictions. The sanctions intended to “protect” Afrikaner farmers paradoxically threaten their economic viability.
This reassessment demonstrates the complex calculations facing South Africa’s new political configuration. The FF+ party, which is also part of the GNU, must balance its traditional support base, including mostly white commercial farmers who benefit from U.S. trade, against the broader national interest and maintaining coalition stability.
The GNU’s united stance emphasizes what South Africa’s new ambassador to the United States, Ebrahim Rasool, has called South Africa’s “dual miracle”—the peaceful transition from apartheid under Nelson Mandela in 1994, followed by the ANC’s acceptance of electoral losses in 2024 and its willingness to participate in a coalition government. This directly challenges Trump’s characterization of South Africa as a failing democracy with deteriorating human rights conditions.
The economic reality is that U.S.-South Africa relations cannot be reduced to simplistic political narratives. Approximately 600 American companies operate in South Africa, employing thousands and generating billions in bilateral trade. The automotive sector exemplifies this interconnection—Mercedes-Benz vehicles manufactured in South Africa and exported to the United States represent not just South African interests but also those of German industrial policy and American consumers.
Furthermore, Black South African professionals, who have benefited from economic transformation policies and international investment since apartheid’s end, stand to lose significantly from economic disruptions. The Black Economic Empowerment programs that have created a new generation of entrepreneurs and executives depend partly on the stability of foreign investment, including from U.S. sources.
In 2023, bilateral trade between the United States and South Africa reached approximately $21 billion, with South African exports to the U.S. valued at just under $14 billion and U.S. exports to South Africa at $7.1 billion, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
This substantial economic relationship is important to South Africa’s export economy and supports thousands of jobs in both countries, although of course it’s far more important to South Africa. While exports to the United States are significant for South Africa, exports to China are considerably more important.
Moreover, the geopolitical consequences of a rift between the United States and South Africa extend beyond bilateral relations. South Africa remains a strategic regional power and a member of BRICS, which has expanded its influence under Russian and Chinese leadership.
At the August 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa played a central role in the expansion of the bloc to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, demonstrating its growing influence as a bridge between major non-Western powers and the African continent.
South Africa also currently chairs the G-20, which further elevates its global diplomatic profile at precisely the moment when Trump’s administration has chosen to confront it. This position gives South Africa significant agenda-setting power in a forum that includes both Western powers and the global south.
A permanent deterioration in U.S.-South Africa relations would likely accelerate South Africa’s pivot toward these alternative power centers, contradicting broader U.S. strategic interests in maintaining influence across Africa.
The GNU’s united response has created space for diplomatic engagement that might otherwise have been impossible now that white and Black political leaders have a shared opposition to Trump’s actions. Furthermore, as Washington’s new foreign-policy elites assess the initial impact of Trump’s executive order, there are indications of internal disagreement in the government.
In private conversations, career diplomats at the State Department have reportedly cautioned that alienating South Africa could undermine broader U.S. objectives across the continent, particularly as China continues to expand its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative.
Continued antagonism between Washington and Pretoria risks pushing South Africa firmly into the orbit of geopolitical competitors while achieving few concrete policy objectives. A recalibration that acknowledges South Africa’s positions, including its support for Palestine, while addressing specific areas of concern would better serve long-term U.S. interests than pushing South Africa more firmly into the BRICS alliance.
Although Trump’s executive order was intended as a punitive measure, it has inadvertently created an opportunity for South Africa to demonstrate democratic resilience, underscoring a broader truth about international relations: Dramatic interventions often produce results opposite to those intended.
By attempting to exert pressure on South Africa through an executive order, the administration has instead fostered greater political cohesion within the GNU and created the conditions for a more unified South African foreign policy.
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