For a few months in late 2024, it seemed possible that Michigan could single-handedly cost Democrats the presidency as a significant portion of the state’s large Arab American population—furious over the Biden administration’s policy toward Gaza—turned its back on the Democratic Party.
Although Michigan ultimately didn’t decide the election, Arab Americans did back now-President Donald Trump in significantly higher numbers than 2020, and the election revealed a growing chasm between the community and the party. Michigan is likely to remain a crucial swing state, and Democrats cannot afford to permanently lose support from Arab American voters. Party leaders must therefore take steps to regain the community’s support and lay a firm foundation for 2028.
Since Trump’s inauguration—and especially since his shock announcement in early February that the United States would “take over the Gaza Strip”—political commentators and community leaders have debated the wisdom of Arab American support for Trump as well as the decision of many voters to sit out the election entirely.
I share the view that support by members of my community for Trump or third-party candidates was short-sighted, ill-informed, and irresponsible. However, that does not negate the Democratic Party’s mistakes. The 2024 election should serve as a sobering lesson and force Democrats to rethink and prioritize engagement with Arab Americans, especially in times of turmoil in the Middle East.
Although many Arab Americans have begun to sour on Trump, Democrats should not count on Trump to do their work for them and bring the community back into the fold. In 2024, many Arab American voters minimized or overlooked Trump’s failures because they believe that Democrats do not take them seriously and fail to exhibit political courage when it comes to Middle East policy.
In my extensive conversations with potential voters during the 2024 campaign season, Arab Americans and their community leaders frequently expressed frustration that Democrats framed Trump as a dangerous choice without taking meaningful steps to address their concerns and earn their support. Democrats cannot win over voters by pointing out Trump’s failures without offering a genuine alternative.
Below is a set of recommendations to strengthen the party’s engagement with Arab Americans in future election cycles and compete with the Republican Party for this increasingly important demographic—without turning off the broader Democratic voter base.
1. Recognize the significance of foreign policy. Arab Americans care deeply about foreign policy and weigh it heavily when deciding who to back in an election. This is not uncommon among diaspora communities, but the impact on Arab Americans was particularly relevant given events in the Middle East in late 2023 and 2024.
Many voters in the community were not swayed by arguments to vote for former President Joe Biden—or his replacement on the Democratic ticket, then-Vice President Kamala Harris—in order to advance economic prosperity or prevent discrimination against the community. And although many Arab Americans did respond to concerns about Trump’s threat to U.S. democracy, they were conflicted about voting for Democrats while civilians in Gaza continued to suffer.
It’s worth noting that these arguments were ineffective no matter who the messenger was. Campaign staff, political analysts, and members of the Arab American community (myself included) all made these arguments in 2024. In my numerous conversations and private meetings, Arab Americans provided a consistent response: We care about all of these issues, and many of us wanted to support Democrats, but U.S. foreign-policy failures in the Middle East will cost Democrats my vote.
The data backs up the importance of foreign policy to Arab American voters. After the 2020 election, I wrote that existing polls underestimated the role that the issue plays in Arab American voting decisions. And indeed, new polls conducted the Arab American Institute during fall 2024 indicated that 81 percent of Arab Americans viewed Gaza as important in determining their vote, and 26 percent rated the crisis in Gaza as one of their most important issues.
There is also no shortage of anecdotal data to indicate that many Arab Americans opposed Biden and Harris, didn’t vote, voted for third-party candidates, or supported Trump, due to Democratic candidates’ respective positions on Middle East policy. Candidates, campaign managers, and surrogates should take this data seriously and not count on Arab Americans overlooking perceived foreign-policy failures in the future.
2. Focus on policy, not messaging. The Democratic Party should stop trying to appeal to Arab American voters solely through messaging rather than policy commitments. It does not work.
Harris’s tone and messaging regarding Gaza was notably more nuanced, balanced, and sympathetic to Palestinians than Biden’s. It was especially important that Harris led on calling for a cease-fire in remarks made on March 3, 2024, when Biden and other administration officials did not. This won back some Arab American voters, but it ultimately was not enough to regain broad support from the community.
If the improved messaging had been paired with meaningful policy commitments, however, Harris likely could have gained more support from Arab Americans. In numerous venues, members of the community acknowledged the then-vice president’s positive change in tone while continuing to call for concrete policy commitments, such as expanding oversight on the use of offensive weapons supplied to Israel. Harris’s campaign ultimately did not deliver any new policy proposals or indicate any significant intended shifts in the United States’ approach to the ongoing conflict in Gaza.
Perhaps this was due to the short campaign period and Harris’s position as vice president to Biden. These are legitimate, if lamentable, reasons for not promoting major policy changes on a short turnaround. Still, Harris could have previewed the broad contours of her intended approach to the issue if she became president.
Party leaders and policymakers should spend the coming years developing new proposals in order to demonstrate a serious commitment to promoting peace, security, and prosperity for the Palestinian people. Future presidential candidates should recognize that Arab American voters, like all voters, want to see that their concerns are taken seriously and can translate into meaningful policy change.
3. Prioritize speed. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be the most dangerous of all third rails in electoral politics, and therefore, there is an understandable desire to “get it right” and avoid unnecessary risks. However, this mentality can result in a slow, excessively deliberative process that is out of touch with the needs of the moment.
Harris’s presidential candidacy initially brought a flurry of excitement among Arab Americans and high hopes that she would be responsive to their input and concerns. While the campaign did eventually organize several roundtables with community leaders and ramp up its outreach in Michigan, it took weeks to do so.
In those precious weeks, which comprised a significant chunk of her campaign, Arab Americans quickly grew frustrated with the lack of engagement. To many, it was a signal that Harris would not meaningfully shift her approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from Biden’s methods. By this point, Trump surrogates were already on the ground in Michigan, engaging extensively with Arab American leaders.
This disappointment was exacerbated when a Palestinian American speaker was not permitted onstage at the Democratic National Convention, though Harris did reiterate her commitment to a cease-fire in her remarks. Once the community’s frustrations hardened, it was difficult to repair the damage.
In the future, Democratic campaigns should mobilize quickly and prioritize engaging with Arab Americans. It should take hours or days, not weeks, to reach out to these voters to respond to new developments in the Middle East.
Presidential candidates themselves should also convene directly with members of the Arab American community early on in their campaign cycles. This approach can certainly create risks, but it’s preferable to delaying engagement and allowing confusion or frustration to develop among voters and community leaders.
Candidates can signal an appetite for engagement, conduct preliminary listening sessions, and build trust. They should also reflect on the success or failure of previous strategies and anticipate backlash.
4. Pursue structural changes. Campaign surrogates to specific communities generally reside within coalition outreach teams or serve as one of many voices on policy teams. Their feedback is solicited routinely and often incorporated, but ultimate decision-making authority remains with the highest level of foreign-policy advisors, communications directors, and campaign managers.
Given the policy-heavy and high-profile nature of engagement with Arab American voters—and their large presence in critical states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—presidential campaigns should put at least one Arab American advisor high in the policy or communications chain of command. It is important that Arab American advisors are involved in final decision-making and discussions on this divisive issue—not just at the early stages.
It’s also important that they have direct access to presidential candidates and can make their case to said candidates directly, rather than having it filtered through traditional gatekeepers who cannot or do not accurately articulate the community’s views. This would also build confidence from the community by demonstrating that Arab Americans are integral to final decision-making and are likely to be equally empowered in policy decisions in a future presidential administration.
5. Increase collaboration between progressive Arab and Jewish Americans. The months following the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the ensuing bombardment of Gaza were deeply painful and politically charged for both Arab and Jewish Americans. Both communities sought support, policy commitments, and engagement from the Biden and Harris campaigns.
One positive dynamic that doesn’t receive much attention is that some of the most effective policy and campaign efforts have been led by progressive Arab and Jewish American surrogates and advisors working closely together. There is often a strong relationship of mutual respect and shared policy objectives between advisors and top surrogates for both communities.
Cooperation between these two communities could help mitigate electoral risks, facilitate open dialogue among the communities, and assist politicians with developing stronger policy positions and electoral strategies. This should complement but not replace personalized, dedicated engagement with each community.
For example, hosting policy discussions with prominent leaders from each community and then releasing a readout would indicate seriousness and sophistication to voters, donors, and political commentators. It would also dull any political attacks that seek to portray a candidates’ positions as one-sided and disrupt efforts to sow divisions.
Democratic operatives cannot afford to cross their fingers and hope that entire groups of historically reliable Democratic voters will ultimately turn out for them—or that they can bank on winning Michigan without Arab Americans. Even if other constituencies in Michigan turned out in full force to back Democrats, it would still be tight without Arab American support. It is essential that presidential candidates do not take that gamble again in one of the most important swing states.
This does not mean that Democrats should prioritize Arab Americans in Michigan over electoral interests in other states or demographic groups; that is not advisable or realistic. However, until Democrats truly grasp the importance of the Arab American vote in the current environment and invest in the community accordingly, they will risk losing it by the same margins—or even larger ones—in future elections.
The post How Democrats Can Win Arab American Voters Back appeared first on Foreign Policy.
