Trump’s Approach to Afghanistan Is Already Limited

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The highlights this week: U.S. President Donald Trump repeats a demand that the Taliban return U.S.-made military equipment from Afghanistan, India hosts a large European Commission delegation led by President Ursula von der Leyen, and Pakistan makes inroads in Central Asia.

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Trump’s Afghanistan Conundrum

At the Conservative Political Action Conference over the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated a demand issued the day before his inauguration: for the Taliban to return U.S.-made military equipment. Trump tied future U.S. aid to Afghanistan to the return of the weaponry, which is worth $7 billion and was seized by the Taliban in August 2021.

This may sound like another case of the transactional leader seeking a deal to benefit U.S. interests. But Trump could be looking for new leverage over the Taliban regime—something that the United States has struggled to do since exiting Afghanistan. (The presence of U.S. military personnel was previously a key source of leverage.)

Though the Taliban are headed by hard-line mullahs in Kandahar, the Kabul-based political leadership seeks better ties with the United States for more global legitimacy; more U.S. assistance; and access to Afghan central bank funds frozen by Washington. The United States has sent $21 billion in humanitarian and refugee assistance to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return to power.

Largely because of their implacable senior leadership, however, the Taliban have done little to address international demands. The Trump administration might see a pitch for the return of weaponry as a more realistic request than calling for changes in specific Taliban policies, which have long been at the heart of the group’s core ideology.

Turmoil among the Taliban over policy differences, including several top leaders publicly upbraiding the country’s ban on girls’ secondary education, arguably gives the regime a stronger incentive to seek more foreign aid. Such assistance would better enable the group to ease economic stress and reduce risks of social unrest.

But demanding that the Taliban return U.S. weaponry is a hard sell. For the Taliban, the arms have prestige value and symbolize what the group views as its defeat of the United States; returning them would amount to a form of surrender.

The Taliban also have tactical reasons to reject Trump’s demand. The weaponry bolsters the regime’s capacity to carry out operations against the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), which is a rival to the Taliban. U.S. forces relied heavily on air power to manage the IS-K threat, and the Taliban’s U.S.-made equipment includes air-to-ground munitions and aircraft.

Though the Taliban haven’t responded to Trump’s latest demand, the group rejected his initial one and reportedly called on the United States to supply Afghanistan with more weapons. After all, the group aims to strengthen its limited air power.

Trump may face broader challenges with Afghanistan policy. Much like under former U.S. President Joe Biden, the United States will struggle to pursue its goals in the country—including addressing concerns about IS-K’s growing threat—without formal ties with the Taliban or a physical presence in Kabul.

There may also be divergent views within the Trump administration. During his first term, Washington participated in talks with the Taliban that led to the U.S. troop withdrawal, and he might be open to some engagement. But U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, an Afghanistan war veteran who opposed the withdrawal, condemns the Taliban in harsh terms.

Ultimately, Trump’s approach to Afghanistan will likely be as limited as Biden’s. The administration’s policy bandwidth will largely focus on securing the release of U.S. citizens still held captive in Afghanistan. It may also look to India for help with counterterrorism. New Delhi has scaled up ties with the Taliban and might be willing to share intelligence on IS-K.

Trump’s second-term foreign policy has already produced some agreements on tariffs and immigration. But not all deals come easily, especially with an uncompromising interlocutor like the Taliban. And some experts say that the Taliban’s U.S.-made weaponry isn’t even in good condition. Trump’s proposed deal may not make sense for the United States, either.

What We’re Following

New Delhi hosts European delegation. On Thursday and Friday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will welcome what Indian reports describe as the largest-ever European delegation visit to India. Led by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the group includes nearly all 26 EU commissioners.

According to an Indian External Affairs Ministry statement, trade and technology will be key issues on the agenda, though geopolitical matters will likely be discussed, especially Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The economic stakes of the visit are especially high for New Delhi. The European Union is currently India’s top trading partner. European corporate investment in India, especially in high-growth sectors such as clean energy, has generated millions of jobs. This partnership is important for New Delhi as Washington threatens new tariffs and India’s economy shows signs of a slowdown.

Though India’s ties with EU states are generally strong, there are some points of contention, including India’s close friendship with Russia. One of New Delhi’s goals during the visit will likely be to ensure that geopolitical tensions don’t spill into the commercial partnership.

Pakistan works to solidify Central Asia links. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Azerbaijan on Sunday and Monday, meeting President Ilham Aliyev and concluding accords largely focused on trade, connectivity, and energy. Sharif followed this trip with a two-day visit to Uzbekistan on Tuesday and Wednesday that produced an additional trade deal.

Though Pakistan’s deepest partnerships lie elsewhere, in recent years it has sought deeper ties with Central Asian states. Consider, for example, that the new Pakistani head of intelligence, Asim Malik, visited Tajikistan in December. Malik is one of the country’s most powerful officials; he has made few public appearances since taking office last September.

Gas-rich Central Asia holds potential benefits for energy-deficient Pakistan, which also seeks to expand connectivity links with the region. Those include a transnational rail project connecting Pakistan to Uzbekistan via Afghanistan that is scheduled to begin construction this year.

All this said, Pakistan’s Central Asia push also has geopolitical motivations: It seeks to gain an upper hand over India. New Delhi also wants to scale up ties with the region, but it faces a major constraint: Pakistan doesn’t provide it with transit trade rights, meaning that India lacks direct land access to Central Asia.

Pakistan rains on its own cricket parade. The Champions Trophy, a prestigious tournament featuring many of the world’s top national cricket squads, began in Pakistan last week. The 19-day tournament marks the first time since 1996 that the country has hosted a major international cricket event.

Concerns about terrorism, heightened after the Sri Lankan cricket team’s bus was attacked in Lahore in 2009, long kept teams away. But a relatively improved security situation has given Pakistan new opportunities.

Unfortunately for cricket-crazed Pakistan, the euphoria over hosting the Champions Trophy was short-lived due to the country’s poor performance. The Pakistani squad is in an extended slump, and on Monday it was knocked out of the tournament just five days into the event after suffering a demoralizing loss to India on Sunday—held in Dubai, where New Delhi agreed to play.

Under the Radar

The United Nations human rights office released a detailed report this month that highlights the shocking scale of the brutalities perpetrated by the government of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and its security forces against peaceful protesters last year, before the leader fled the country.

The report estimates that as many as 1,400 people may have been killed between July 15 and Aug. 5, 2024—nearly 15 percent of them children. Most of the deaths were shootings by security forces. The report’s accounts of deadly violence validate the brave reporting by Bangladeshi journalists during the protests.

The report’s methodology included interviews with former Hasina officials assigned to handle the protests—which should shield it from criticism that it is not a balanced account. It also focuses on the retaliatory attacks against Hasina’s supporters after her ouster.

The report disproves conspiracy theories alleging that Bangladesh’s mass protest movement was orchestrated by external forces. It also underscores in great detail the depths of the Hasina regime’s brutality, which essentially turned the public against the prime minister and prompted the protests to swell in numbers, resulting in her downfall.

Finally, the report finds that all major branches of the security forces, including the military and intelligence agencies, were complicit in the violence in some way. Earlier commentary suggested that the police and others linked to Hasina’s Awami League party were the main perpetrators and that the army had distanced itself from the crackdown.

FP’s Most Read This Week

Regional Voices

In the Kathmandu Post, scholar Sucheta Pyakuryal laments the undemocratic direction of Nepal’s political parties. “They seem to have forgotten that the actual sovereigns are the people: Men, women, indigenous, urban, rural, both rich and poor people of Nepal whose will and aspirations they are instated to reflect and serve,” she writes.

A Daily Star editorial decries the rising levels of crime in Bangladesh and the government’s insufficient response. “Given this explosive situation, we need visible improvements in law and order, not assurances or boastful claims,” it argues. “Given the alarming crime statistics … the government must treat law enforcement as its number one priority going forward.”

In Dawn, public health expert Nida Ali argues that a new self-test for the hepatitis C virus recently prequalified by the World Health Organization could be a major boon for Pakistan: “Self-testing can be a tool to expand participation in Pakistan’s national screening,” she writes. “This can provide a more accurate picture of prevalence of HCV in the population.”

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