For the first time since 1958, there is reason for hope in Lebanon. That hope lies today in the rise of two Lebanese public figures who served their country ably over many years: Gen. Joseph Aoun, a former Lebanese army commander who will now serve as president, and Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s former United Nations ambassador who will assume the role of prime minister.
This reformist and philosophically aligned duo, rare in Lebanon’s modern history, could usher a new political era in the country—one that could start to rehabilitate a paralyzed system, a broken economy, and a deeply wounded nation that has incredible potential.
For the first time since 1958, there is reason for hope in Lebanon. That hope lies today in the rise of two Lebanese public figures who served their country ably over many years: Gen. Joseph Aoun, a former Lebanese army commander who will now serve as president, and Nawaf Salam, Lebanon’s former United Nations ambassador who will assume the role of prime minister.
This reformist and philosophically aligned duo, rare in Lebanon’s modern history, could usher a new political era in the country—one that could start to rehabilitate a paralyzed system, a broken economy, and a deeply wounded nation that has incredible potential.
As they did 67 years ago, the Lebanese picked their president from within the military. They had little trust in any of the other candidates—the usual faces of the old feudal system—and viewed Aoun as a nonpartisan outsider who outperformed in his mission to reform the Lebanese army and could champion real change in politics.
As in 1958, when Lebanese lawmakers elected Fuad Chehab as president, Aoun is coming to the presidency during tumultuous times in the country and the region overall. Back then, the Lebanese were bitterly divided over the political direction and foreign-policy orientation of their country, leading to clashes in the streets.
The Lebanese are still bitterly divided but have now found consensus in Aoun, who, like Chehab, had shown no interest in entering the political field until it became clear that he was the only candidate who had any hope of wide acceptance by both the Lebanese people and foreign powers. Undoubtedly, the United States is the most influential of those powers in Lebanon, and its recent diplomacy was instrumental in bringing about a cease-fire between Hezbollah and Israel after a devastating conflict that lasted more than a year, as well as pushing the electoral process forward in Beirut.
There is no question that Hezbollah is the biggest loser under the new government. Aoun is the antithesis of everything Hezbollah represents: a state builder who, in his public testimony, said he will commit to fighting corruption and making the army the sole legitimate force in the country.
The fact that Aoun is favored by Washington and admired by the U.S. military leadership makes him even less attractive to Hezbollah. For several years, Aoun spearheaded major reform of the Lebanese army in close partnership with the United States. In 2017, he led the army in battle to kick Islamic State fighters out of Lebanon, and, more importantly, he turned the army from a decrepit institution into a professional fighting force. He trusted Washington, and Washington trusted him. As president, he will oversee the Lebanese army’s reform program and ensure its continuation, which would serve U.S. interests.
If Hezbollah is apprehensive about Aoun, it is even more opposed to Salam. Salam is an indefatigable lawyer whose intellect, skills, and integrity earned him the position of president of the International Court of Justice. He is expected to commit Lebanon to the rule of law both at home and abroad, and seek to honor Lebanon’s adherence to U.N. resolutions, starting with Resolution 1559, which calls for disbanding and disarming all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias inside Lebanon, and Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, and, like 1559, requires the disarmament of all armed groups in the country. Obviously, none of this is acceptable to Hezbollah.
Based on the speeches that Hezbollah officials gave after Salam’s nomination, it is clear that the group is distressed. It also feels betrayed. The Aoun pill was a bitter one to swallow, but then came the shock of Salam, which caused Hezbollah to almost choke. The group strongly opposed Salam in previous years and denied him the premiership given his stance against corruption and for justice and reform.
Significantly weakened following its war with Israel—with a decapitated leadership, a decimated fighting force, and a heavily penetrated security apparatus—Hezbollah had no choice but to compromise and accept Aoun, though with every expectation that Najib Mikati, the departing prime minister who represents the old guard, would retain the premiership.
However, in a rare moment of political clarity, Lebanese parliamentarians rejected Mikati and formed a large enough coalition to nominate Salam. How this disparate bunch—who hated each other and bitterly clashed for years—came together in the interest of the nation at the last minute is the stuff of political legend. Washington didn’t and couldn’t dictate this outcome, but it certainly influenced it, along with Saudi Arabia.
The immediate challenge Aoun and Salam face is forming a cabinet that represents the aspirations of all those in Lebanon who desire a new beginning. The broader challenge is dealing with a disgruntled Hezbollah, which is already saying that Salam’s appointment goes against the spirit of national unity, even though it is perfectly legal and constitutional.
That’s essentially code for Hezbollah politically opposing the next cabinet and possibly resorting to violence. Over the years, Hezbollah has been accused of several assassinations of its domestic opponents, including former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005—a murder that shocked the world and cemented Hezbollah’s dominance in Beirut for two decades.
Then, in 2008, Hezbollah directed its guns internally because it disagreed with the Fuad Siniora-led government’s decision to investigate the group’s telecommunications system. In one swoop, Hezbollah militiamen took over west Beirut in scenes reminiscent of the 1975-1990 civil war. The 2008 crisis ended with the adoption of the Doha Accord, which further institutionalized Hezbollah’s influence on the country’s political system.
It’s true that Hezbollah today is nowhere near what it was back then, but it is not defeated, and it is still armed and dangerous. Hezbollah’s gameplan and road to recovery is unclear, but it desperately needs international funding to rebuild southern Lebanon, southern Beirut, and other areas where its members and supporters live. And yet, that funding won’t come if the group lashes out and sabotages the next cabinet—creating a major dilemma for its surviving leaders.
Aoun, Salam, and their supporters must not take their foot off the pedal. In no way are the Lebanese obligated to entertain Hezbollah’s wishes or conditions. They have followed the democratic process and have done everything by the book. As they form the next cabinet, Aoun and Salam must only choose ministers who are committed to reform, justice, and the rule of law. And there are plenty of competent and independent Shiite candidates to ensure inclusivity.
But they can’t do it alone. Such bold Lebanese leadership will require the continuous support of Washington and Riyadh, lest history repeat itself.
In 1958, anti-U.S. factions in Lebanon demanded that President Camille Chamoun, who wanted to extend his term, be removed from office and the United States withdraw its Marines from Lebanon. More than 25 years later, in 1983, the United States rushed to the exit after militants bombed U.S. barracks—the single deadliest day for the U.S. Marine Corps since World War II.
Washington’s departure then allowed Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah to turn Lebanon into a vassal state, committed to undermining U.S. interests and stability in the region.
The United States should learn from its history of involvement in Lebanon. This time, it has real allies in Beirut who have wide domestic support and a strong mandate for reform. They could lead the country’s political rebirth and deny Iran an opportunity to rebuild its destabilizing influence in the Levant, especially now that the Assad regime in Syria next door has collapsed.
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