The incoming Trump administration seems genuinely committed to finding peace in Ukraine. Whether it’s capable of the extremely complicated diplomacy required is a very different question. One issue that will have to be decided at the very start of the process is at what stage, and on what issues, Ukraine should be involved in the process. The issue is more fraught than has generally been acknowledged.
The first and most fundamental goal of the talks (as in all such negotiations) will be for each side to clearly establish, on the one hand, its vital interests and absolute and nonnegotiable conditions and, on the other hand, what points it is prepared, in principle, to compromise on. It may be, of course, that the nonnegotiable positions of the three sides are fundamentally opposed and incompatible. If so, peace negotiations will inevitably fail, but we will not know this until these issues have been explored.
The incoming Trump administration seems genuinely committed to finding peace in Ukraine. Whether it’s capable of the extremely complicated diplomacy required is a very different question. One issue that will have to be decided at the very start of the process is at what stage, and on what issues, Ukraine should be involved in the process. The issue is more fraught than has generally been acknowledged.
The first and most fundamental goal of the talks (as in all such negotiations) will be for each side to clearly establish, on the one hand, its vital interests and absolute and nonnegotiable conditions and, on the other hand, what points it is prepared, in principle, to compromise on. It may be, of course, that the nonnegotiable positions of the three sides are fundamentally opposed and incompatible. If so, peace negotiations will inevitably fail, but we will not know this until these issues have been explored.
The three parties involved are Ukraine, Russia and the United States. The initial stages of the negotiations, however, should be between the United States and Russia. It goes without saying that certain aspects of an eventual agreement will require Ukraine’s full assent, and that without this assent a settlement isn’t possible. These aspects include the terms of a ceasefire, the nature and extent of any demilitarized zones, and any constitutional amendments guaranteeing the linguistic and cultural rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine. U.S. negotiators will have to be fully cognizant and respectful of Kyiv’s views on Ukraine’s vital interests.
Given certain categorical—and entirely legitimate—Ukrainian positions, a number of key issues seem to be a priori off the table, and if Russia insists on them, no agreement will be possible. The most important initial task of Gen. Kellogg and his team will therefore be to discover whether the Russian government regards these conditions as nonnegotiable, or whether Moscow is prepared to compromise on them if the Trump administration is prepared to compromise on wider issues.
The first nonnegotiable issue from Ukraine’s and the U.S.’ point of view is Ukrainian and Western legal recognition of Russia’s claimed annexations, as opposed to an acceptance of the fact (already accepted in public by President Zelenskyy) that Ukraine cannot recover these territories on the battlefield and therefore has to accept the reality of Russian possession, pending future negotiations.
Russian experts have suggested to me that Moscow will not, in fact, insist on this in talks, because in addition to Ukraine and the West, China, India, and other key Russian partners would also refuse the very suggestion. They said that Moscow hopes for a situation like that on the island of Cyprus, where no country but Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but talks have lasted 50 years with no result.
The second nonnegotiable issue is Putin’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from the territory it still holds in the four provinces of Ukraine that Russia claims to have annexed. This is absolutely unacceptable to Kyiv, and should be to Washington, too. Ukraine should not be encouraged and helped by Washington to batter itself to pieces in a hopeless effort to drive Russia from the territory it controls, but it cannot be asked by Washington to give up more territory without a fight. The Ukrainian government will doubtless make this clear to the Trump administration, and its view must be accepted as definitive by the United States as well.
However, certain other basic questions are not up to Ukraine to decide. They are chiefly up to the United States, and it is the U.S. administration that will have to negotiate them. Central Russian proposals in the ultimatum issued before the war were for new agreements with the United States and NATO not relating to Ukraine.
Today, key aspects of the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian armed forces depend on the United States, since it is only the United States that can provide Ukraine with long-range missiles and the intelligence to guide them. The question of which Western sanctions to lift or suspend as part of a deal with Moscow is also up to the United States and EU.
Ukraine can, of course, ask to join NATO, but the decision of whether to accept a new member lies not with that country but with the existing members—and each of them has a veto on the issue. A U.S. administration could take the lead, but it will be up to Washington to decide how much influence to use with, and pressure to put on, other members, and it cannot simply override the likely vetoes of Hungary and Turkey—or perhaps of France, if Marine Le Pen is the next president.
The question of what Western security guarantees can and should be given to Ukraine as part of a settlement is also not up to Ukraine to answer. President Zelenskyy has suggested the deployment of troops from European NATO members, which has been echoed by certain Western officials and commentators and is reportedly being discussed between President Macron of France and the Polish government.
However, everything that I have heard from Russians tells me that this is just as unacceptable to Moscow as NATO membership itself and would therefore make agreement impossible. Moreover, European countries would agree to send their troops only if they had an ironclad guarantee from Washington that the United States would intervene if they were attacked. This, in effect, punts the decision back to Washington—not Kyiv, and not Brussels, Warsaw or Paris.
Above all, Russia’s motives for launching this war extend beyond Ukraine to the whole security relationship between Russia and the West, led by the United States. They include the demand for military force restrictions (which would have to be reciprocated on the Russian side) and some form of European security architecture in which vital Russian interests would be taken into account and future clashes avoided.
It may be that either the Putin administration or the Trump administration—or both—will refuse to compromise and that talks will accordingly collapse. Testing this, however, will be an extremely complex and difficult process, requiring patience and diplomatic sophistication on both sides. It would be extremely foolish to expect either Russia or the United States to put all their cards on the table at once.
Because this process will be so difficult, the sad but unavoidable truth may be that if Ukraine takes part in the talks from the start, progress toward a settlement will become completely impossible. Every prospective compromise will immediately be leaked and will cause a firestorm of protest in Europe, in Ukraine, in the U.S. Congress, in the U.S. media, and perhaps even from Russian hardliners.
The United States has been the essential and irreplaceable supporter of Ukraine in this war, not only because of the aid that it has given but because European countries would not have given their aid without U.S. encouragement and backing. American citizens have, in consequence, been faced with great costs and considerable risks, and wider U.S. interests have been endangered. This gives U.S. citizens the right to expect their government to take the lead in trying to negotiate an end to the Ukraine war—especially since it is the only government that can.
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