When Israel and Hezbollah signed a cease-fire agreement in late November, it represented a rare bit of hopeful news since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack enflamed the Middle East. But can the pause hold, and can it lead to a similar end to the fighting in Gaza?
On this week’s FP Live, I spoke with Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanese American academic and professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Gerges is the author of several books on the Middle East including, most recently, What Really Went Wrong: The West and the Failure of Democracy in the Middle East. Before we delved into the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire, we addressed a shocking development in Syria, where rebel groups took control of Aleppo, one of the country’s largest cities, in less than four days of fighting—a stunning defeat for President Bashar al-Assad.
What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page or follow the FP Live podcast for an audio feed.
Ravi Agrawal: Let’s start with the news out of Syria. How surprising was it?
Fawaz Gerges: It was more of a shock than a surprise. What has happened in Syria in the past few days is a military and political earthquake. We knew that the Assad government was very weak, but we did not really appreciate the capacity, willpower, and organization of the Syrian opposition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is the vanguard Islamist Salafist movement in Syria. Even though I was shocked by the stunning defeat of the Assad forces, not just in Aleppo but in many parts of northwestern Syria, I think on further reflection, we should not have been surprised. Why? The Syrian war never really ended. It has been dormant since 2020.
The Assad government is a shadow of its former self. There are several reasons why the Assad government, or part of it, collapsed in the past few days. The state capacity has been greatly degraded by American sanctions. Those sanctions exacted a heavy toll on the Syrian economy and people, pauperizing the population, including Assad’s social base. Also, Israel’s attacks degraded Syria’s military infrastructure. And its main great-power patron, Russia, is preoccupied in Ukraine. Iran is also preoccupied, in Gaza and Lebanon. So the opposition, led by the Islamists and the nationalist opposition, have been biding their time, waiting for the right opportunity. They seized the moment. And Turkey, of course, has provided critical logistical, and intelligence, and military support for the opposition. And here we are: The Syrian war has been reignited. It is really a tragedy for everyone, particularly the population in Syria.
RA: Tell us a little bit about Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. What do they hope to get out of this?
FG: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham used to be called al-Nusra Front, which was an affiliate of al Qaeda central. Its leader is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who was initially part of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. He proved to be quite a capable leader on the battlefield in Syria. His operations and affiliates carried out hundreds of targeted bombings against the Assad regime.
In the past few years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has developed its own identity. Even though it’s a Salafi Sunni movement, its leaders would like us to believe they’re not really part of the Salafi jihadist movement of al Qaeda. But the big point is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is the most powerful faction among all opposition. It’s the vanguard. It’s literally leading the fight against Assad. It has more than 10,000 really skilled and hardened fighters with particularly strong motivation and a willingness to fight and die. If the opposition scores a decisive victory against Assad, I think Hayat Tahrir al-Sham will own Syria. And Abu Mohammed al-Jolani would probably become the leader of Syria.
RA: Syria has been a proxy battlefield for larger international players for a very long time. One theory is that these other bigger players were distracted. Russia is embroiled in Ukraine. Iran is weakened after significant blows to Hezbollah and Hamas. America is in transition. But there is another theory that Russia, in fact, wanted to pressure Syria to reach a deal with Turkey. An internationally recognized political solution would allow Moscow to go in and profit off of reconstructing a war-torn Syria.
FG: I don’t buy it at all. In fact, the reverse is true. What has happened in the past few days represents a major setback for Russia. It’s a personal setback for Russian President [Vladimir] Putin. It was Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015 that turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favor. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the opposition view Russia as the enemy. The opposition, both the Islamist and the nationalist opposition, decided to strike now because they know that Russia has been pulling its assets out of Syria over the past three years. Russia now has a very tiny contingent, mainly of air force.
Turkey allegedly played the key role, according to my understanding. Turkey realized that Assad was dragging his feet and was not really interested in a political settlement that integrates the opposition into the political process. Turkey wants to change the political order in Syria. Remember, there are 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, who have weighed down the political, social, and economic order. Turkey would like the Syrian refugees to go back to Syria. Turkey also has a bigger aim of defeating the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces. In President [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan’s eyes, the Kurds represent a strategic threat to Turkey, both in Syria and also within the Turkish political system.
RA: Let’s turn to last week’s cease-fire deal between Israel and Hezbollah. One way of reading it is that both Israel and Hezbollah needed this. Hezbollah suffered immense losses, and Israel is tired of fighting a two-front war. But is this a deal that can last?
FG: Ravi, I fear that the United States tailored the cease-fire to suit [Israeli] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s interests. Many Israeli officials have made it clear that the Biden administration gave Netanyahu written assurances that Israel has the right to strike targets in Lebanon if and when it perceives threats there. And Netanyahu himself has said in multiple interviews that even though there is a cease-fire, the war does not end.
As we have seen in the past few days, Israel has violated the cease-fire more than 50 times and has carried out attacks outside of southern Lebanon. I fear that Israel is trying to Syrian-ize Lebanon, to establish the freedom of action to carry out attacks whenever Netanyahu and his security apparatus feel like, just as they do in the occupied West Bank and in Syria. I hope that I’m wrong. I hope that by violating the cease-fire agreement with dozens of attacks, Netanyahu is only trying to reassure his extremist coalition that the cease-fire does not really mean that Israel is weak or that Hezbollah will continue to replenish its arsenal. I’m hoping that once the 60 days are over, the cease-fire will hold. Both sides, Hezbollah and Israel, have a vast interest in not returning to the intense phase of hostilities.
And, of course, we have to wait and see what role the United States plays, because the United States is in charge of the international committee overseeing the cease-fire. I fear that without American pressure on Israel, the cease-fire will implode. But I’m hopeful that after 60 days, the Lebanese army will be deployed in southern Lebanon, and the cease-fire will be consolidated.
RA: You’re sketching out the immediate short term for Hezbollah, but I’m wondering about the longer term. How easy is it to reactivate after senior leadership dies? And, in a sense, this isn’t just a question for Hezbollah. More broadly, if you look at lessons from other militant or terrorist organizations, what happens when you decapitate the top leadership?
FG: There’s no doubt that Hezbollah’s military, political, and leadership capacity has been degraded. But Hezbollah is not defeated. It still has thousands of hardened fighters. It still has missiles. Israel says that it has destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah’s missile arsenals, but many experts dispute this. Even to the last day, Hezbollah was targeting the very heart of Tel Aviv and Haifa. And, more importantly, Hezbollah, as a religiously driven social movement, has the ideological imagination to shield itself from great losses. Its social base of support, which is the largest in Lebanon in terms of electoral votes, is very solid. So I have no doubt in my mind that Hezbollah will try to regenerate.
But Hezbollah has three major challenges. Hezbollah has to replenish its arsenal while under fire, because Israel will continue to hammer Hezbollah even during the cease-fire. And the second point, Iran will find it very difficult to provide Hezbollah with the arms and money that it used to because Israel now controls the skies. And finally, the most important challenge that faces Hezbollah is internal Lebanese politics. Lebanese society is deeply polarized. More and more Lebanese are asking why they have to suffer the consequences of a war with Israel. So Hezbollah will have to think very hard about the way forward, not just militarily and politically, but also about its relationship to the Lebanese state as a major political actor. My hope is that Hezbollah will become deeply engaged in the Lebanese political system, which will give it a broader role to play, as opposed to just making the Israel-Palestine conflict the most fundamental aim of its strategy.
RA: But do you think it is likely that Hezbollah can become more moderate? Or wouldn’t it be better for it to be replaced with an empowered political movement that is not predicated on attacking Israel as its first order of business?
FG: The reason why Hezbollah does what it does is because Palestine is very fundamental to the identity of Hezbollah. Palestine is not a tactical or utilitarian thing. Palestine resonates deeply in the Arab and the Muslim imagination. Hezbollah did not exist before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 but rather, Hezbollah, like Hamas, is a byproduct of Israel’s use of overwhelming military force. And finally, on this particular point, if we really want the geopolitical structure to shift from violence and war into stability and security, the underlying fundamental question is Israel’s military occupation of Palestinian lands. The Israel-Palestine conflict, and I’m not exaggerating, is the most fundamental fault line in the region.
RA: Fawaz, as we talk about the Hezbollah-Israel cease-fire, has Gaza been forgotten? Does a cease-fire on one front make it more or less likely that you would see progress on a cease-fire in Gaza?
FG: Biden officials speak as if a cease-fire in Lebanon paves the way for a similar cease-fire in Gaza. Antony Blinken and other officials have made it very clear that’s what they’re hoping, but the reality is we have to take Benjamin Netanyahu seriously because he has been true to his word. He has reassured his extremist far-right coalition that the cease-fire in Lebanon will allow Israel to refocus on Gaza. I don’t need to tell your audience that Israel plans a long-term occupation, that Israel is establishing military bases all over Gaza, that some of Netanyahu’s allies and coalition members hope to build settlements in Gaza.
And in terms of forgetting Gaza, it’s really a moral stain on our conscious—all of humanity. We talk about Gaza in terms of a geopolitical clash. But more than 44,000 civilians have been killed, more than 100,000 have been injured. Hospitals, clinics, universities, schools, libraries, mosques, and churches demolished. Gaza is literally a wasteland. Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition have used starvation as a weapon of war. What’s happening in northern Gaza is catastrophic. The word does not really capture the loss and suffering that the people of Gaza have been subjected to.
RA: You wrote recently in the Guardian, “If the U.S. does not demand an immediate ceasefire and halt Israel’s escalations, this period may be remembered as the rupture that ended the U.S.-led order.” Tell us more.
FG: I am vehemently critical of the Biden administration, both as an academic and as an American, because of the colossal failure to bring the war to end in Gaza and prevent the war from escalating into neighboring countries. I asked myself a very simple question, “Who feeds Benjamin Netanyahu’s war in Gaza?” We, the United States, have provided Israel with $18 billion in arms and ammunition in the past one year. I asked myself, “Who shields Israel in the [United Nations] Security Council?” And when the International Criminal Court indicted Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister, President [Joe] Biden said he was outraged. I wish that the president would feel outraged about the crimes and the massacres in Gaza.
I truly have never seen so much anger and rage in the Middle East and throughout the global south against the United States. Obviously, there is one rule for the West and one rule for the rest. The major winner of all of this is China. The United States, during the war on terror from 2001 to 2021, provided China with opportunities to expand its influence worldwide. It seems to be happening again because the United States is failing to use leverage against Benjamin Netanyahu to bring about a cease-fire and to bring the Israeli hostages home. This is President Biden’s major failure. Gaza will be remembered as Biden’s war, not just Benjamin Netanyahu’s war.
RA: And now, of course, one of those two people is departing from the scene. The United States will have President [Donald] Trump in place. What is your sense of how he might shift U.S. policy on this conflict?
FG: I wish you hadn’t asked me this question. I’ve been raving about Biden, but we’re going to see a much worse presidency. Donald Trump is not only unpredictable and chaotic, but the team he has put together is the dream team for Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right extremist coalition. To me, it’s a scary team.
You and I have not really talked about the likelihood of a Palestinian state. But Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump share two priorities. The first is the annexation of the occupied West Bank, and the second priority is Iran. Most of those appointed by President Trump share visceral anti-Iranian views and are warmongers, too, when it comes to Iran.
RA: But two aspects could constrain some of what you’re describing. On Iran, there is a significant anti-war strand, not only within some of Trump’s picks, but in the broader MAGA movement and in the United States more broadly. An increasing number of Americans have no appetite for being embroiled in wars abroad. And as far as annexing the West Bank goes, that would be completely against what Saudi Arabia wants. And we know that one thing that both Israel and the United States want is to restart the normalization process with Saudi Arabia. But it would be very hard for [Saudi Crown Prince] Mohammed bin Salman to sell that to his people if there is further annexation of Palestinian territory.
FG: President-elect Trump has an anti-war temperament that could be a major guardrail against the warmongers among his officials. He has made it very clear that he wants to end the wars in Ukraine, in Lebanon, and in Gaza, as well.
And Iran is really anxious about the coming Trump administration. We could see a diplomatic breakthrough between Iran and the Trump administration. And Iran has stated that it wants to restart the diplomatic process with the United States. I think they are genuine.
The biggest prize for Donald Trump in the region is Saudi Arabia. It’s where the money is. Follow the money, and you understand Donald Trump. Saudi Arabia has made it very clear that it has increased the cost of normalization with Israel. But at the end of the day, it’s not what Saudi Arabia and Donald Trump want. The question is what Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right extremist coalition want. This is a deeply ideological coalition. It views the world through the lens of settlement and greater Israel.
Based on everything I know, there’s no light at the end of the tunnel for the Israel-Palestine conflict, but who knows? Let’s hope that Donald Trump surprises all of us and brings about not only an end to the war in Gaza, but also an end to the Israel-Palestine conflict.
RA: You’ve been quite critical of both U.S. policy and Israeli policy. But to flip that for a moment—if you were an Israeli leader, what would you do to improve Israel’s security, which ultimately is the thing that worries it the most? Oct. 7 shook the country to its core at an existential level, which has led to everything you’ve described in the last 14 months. What would an alternative strategy have been?
FG: I have a radically different take. The question for me is not absolute security. Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli leaders want absolute victory, which does not exist. What I really want for the region, for the Palestinians and for the Israelis, is peace. Permanent peace and reconciliation. Instead of being a military fortress, Israel must have a genuine reconciliation with the Palestinians. For me, the existence of the Jewish community in the heart of the Arab world is the highest priority. It’s not about the security or the ideological rubric of Benjamin Netanyahu. How do you anchor Israel into the social fabric of the region? How do you make Israel a good citizen in the region? The Palestinians would be the moral conscience of Israel in the same way that Black Americans are the moral conscience of the United States. This means that for Israel to be integrated into the social fabric of the region, to ensure the long-term survival of the Jewish community, it requires a fundamental shift in the imagination and strategy of the Israeli leadership. Reconciliation is not about owning 28 percent of the Palestinian territories but about genuinely coming to realize that security for Israel means security for the Palestinians and security for the neighborhood. This is a long-term transformative paradigm as opposed to security in terms of degrading Hamas, degrading Hezbollah, degrading the groups that fight Israel. This is just one round, a temporary lull.
And finally, on the question of normalization, Israel and the United States have made a major fundamental mistake by focusing on top-down normalization with autocratic Arab leaders. What Israel and the United States need to do is normalization from the bottom up—for Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian lands, acknowledge the historical suffering of the Palestinian people, and grant them self-determination, and for the United States to stop arming Israel and making it a military fortress. I really believe deep in my heart that the United States has not been a true friend of Israel. By making Israel a military fortress, it prevented Israel from coming to terms with its neighbors, from reconciliation with the Palestinians.
I don’t think I’m going to see this transformation in my lifetime, but I hope new leadership in Israel and the Palestinians will come to realize that reconciliation is bigger and greater than this piece of territory. It’s about really integrating and reconciling both communities to live in one piece of land.
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