In July, the local government of the Italian region of Sardinia suspended the construction of hundreds of new wind turbines, claiming that it would destroy the island’s beautiful landscape. In October, the government then announced its intention to stop the construction of new wind farms altogether, also adding solar panels to the ban.
These decisions followed mounting protests by large groups of activists who opposed these renewable energy developments, advocating instead for the use of natural gas to produce electricity. In August, unknown people set fire to two wind farms that were due to be installed in the north of the island. Similar attacks destroyed solar panels destined to be constructed on local farmland.
Under its new plans, Sardinia is betting instead on developing its natural gas infrastructure while delaying the shutdown of its coal-fired power plants, which now produce more than 60 percent of the electricity needed by the island of 1.6 million people.
The opposition to renewables in Sardinia is a blow not only to other Italian local governments, which are facing tough decisions on how to curb greenhouse gas emissions. It is also a major setback for the central government in Rome and especially for the European Union and its European Green Deal, the ambitious climate plan for the entire continent.
The ongoing battle in Sardinia is the latest example of the struggle European countries are facing in reaching their ambitious decarbonization plans in the continent. Countries such as France, Germany, and Spain have been facing opposition to these projects over the past few years, raising questions about the attainability of a central element of the EU’s green strategy.
The ability and political will of each European country to translate Europe’s plans and goals into actual national laws and policies will be crucial in reaching the continent’s ambitious climate targets. But the risk that a two-speed—or even multispeed—Europe could ultimately derail the overall plans is growing, and it will test the new European Commission’s determination to achieve sufficient progress during its upcoming mandate.
“The commission’s legacy will depend on its ability to push forward vital green policies within a maelstrom of political and domestic discontent,” said Mats Engström, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The climate team’s members must also bridge political divides within the commission to deliver on its Green Deal promises. Whether it succeeds in this task will be closely scrutinized over the upcoming five-year term.”
The European Green Deal, a policy framework to achieve climate neutrality—meaning full decarbonization—by 2050, was approved in 2020. Subsequent legislation set a 55 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. EU institutions are currently assessing the feasibility of an intermediate goal of a reduction of 90 percent by 2040, which has also been proposed by the commission.
Replacing fossil fuel energy production with renewables is just one aspect of the bloc’s goals. Others include recovering Europe’s biodiversity, making its food system more sustainable, and creating a well-functioning circular economy, all while making its industries greener.
These policies will affect all sectors of the bloc’s economy—households, industry, services, and agriculture—with the aim of also making it more competitive globally.
Analysts at Brussels-based think tank Bruegel published a report in October that identified four areas of risk that may derail the achievement of the EU’s climate goals, which also appear to be intertwined: geoeconomic instability, technological progress, exacerbated inequality, and policy credibility.
“A global economy with more trade disputes and greater risk of conflict endangers the massive capital investment needed for the transition, while the cost of clean technologies is a primary determinant of the economic viability of decarbonisation,” the analysts wrote. They added: “Climate policies will affect people’s everyday lives in disruptive ways, meaning that regressive outcomes must be guarded against, balanced with a concrete commitment to the established climate policy pillars.”
In a September report, the European Commission—the executive arm of the EU—listed a number of key achievements already reached. EU’s greenhouse gas emissions have fallen by 32.5 percent from the 1990 baseline, while the European economy has grown by 67 percent over the same period, demonstrating the decoupling of growth from emissions.
However, the commission warned that although the installation of renewable power plants has been at a record high over the past few years, the pace toward EU energy efficiency and renewable targets must be further increased to ensure their achievement.
The bloc’s executive also warned about the significant challenge to the continent’s competitiveness due to rising competition with China, high energy price differentials compared to industrial competitors such as the United States, and potential strategic dependencies on clean energy technologies.
At the same time, European citizens still face high energy bills, which—combined with the rising cost of living—further reduce their purchasing power.
“The sectors in which it goes pretty well are the sectors where the economic case is there,” said Linda Kalcher, the executive director at Strategic Perspectives, another Brussels-based think-tank. “For instance, as long as there are schemes that actually support households to buy heat pumps or electric vehicles, we see that there is high uptake on them. The areas where it’s still not economically beneficial, like renovating the building stock, are obviously very slow.”
This September’s Eurobarometer, a survey conducted over the previous few months on behalf of European institutions, found that 81 percent of the sample agree that implementing a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions target will contribute to Europe’s fight against climate change and to the protection of the environment.
Yet, 53 percent said the EU should encourage member states to make their first or second energy priority enacting measures to support households in energy poverty, while 50 percent said that member states should prioritize focusing on measures to reduce energy consumption or that help citizens to produce or consume energy from renewable sources.
Conall Heussaff, a research analyst at Bruegel, said the biggest risk that could hamper the achievement of the EU’s 2030 decarbonization targets is what the think tank called the “policy credibility risk.”
“There’s a danger for divisive politics to use the energy transition as a wedge, as a way to divide the public and push against the sort of ‘elite imposition’ on people’s lives,” he said.
Political disputes about climate policy were evident in the run-up to European Parliament elections in June in relation to several policy measures, including the phaseout of internal combustion engines, the so-called nature restoration law, and gas boiler sales bans in Germany. These laid bare the divisive nature of policies with a direct impact on households, businesses, and agriculture.
Experience suggests the European Green Deal policies will likely face postponements and even rollbacks in the coming years, analysts warn. These rollbacks, in turn, could stall planned investments and trigger a rise in cost for businesses and citizens that have already made investments in clean technologies.
Achieving the intermediate 90 percent emission reduction target by 2040 largely relies on replacing the current expenditure on fossil fuel with capital investments in clean technologies. According to the European Commission, the annual investment required would be around 700 billion euros ($760 billion) from 2031 to 2040.
But geoeconomic risk looms large on these plans. The disruption of clean technology supply chains potentially emerging from simmering trade tensions between the major trading blocs could derail the continent’s energy transition. So too could broader economic shocks, which might destabilize the macroeconomic situation by driving up interest rates or limiting fiscal space of European countries.
Trade tensions—particularly with China, which dominates the market for critical raw materials and many green technologies, such as solar panels and batteries—could slow down the energy transition and increase its costs.
At the same time, the initial capital investment for technologies such as wind, solar, and batteries comprises the largest share of the total cost of their implementation. Rising interest rates could therefore slow down such investments.
Increased geopolitical instability—and the possible reelection of former U.S. President Donald Trump, some argue—could also trigger higher defense spending by European countries, limiting their fiscal space to finance the energy transition. The slower development of technologies could also have a negative impact. All pathways to a net-zero economy partially rely on technologies which are so far unproven on a large scale.
In particular, progress on carbon removal technologies will be key, because if it proved to be insufficient, other sectors such as agriculture or industry could be required to reduce emissions more quickly. “To succeed, the 2040 climate and energy policy framework needs to be designed to be resilient to such risks,” Bruegel’s analysts said in their October report.
The green transition envisaged by the EU will need to have the buy-in of all the bloc’s governments as well as its citizens to overcome the risks to its success. It will require European leaders to ensure the timely and thorough implementation of existing EU legislation, while limiting political concessions to the many different groups opposing the changes needed.
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