The Israeli killing of Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas and the key architect of the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks that killed almost 1,200 people, may prove to be more of an anti-climax than a turning point in the Israel-Gaza war. The killing is yet another indicator that Israel has devastated Hamas as an organization, but both Hamas and Israel appear ready to continue fighting, and Israel has yet to resolve the harder question of what should come next in Gaza.
Sinwar had been a leading member of Hamas from the group’s inception. He spent many years in prison until a 2011 prisoner swap and was known for his militant views. Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel has made him public enemy number one, declaring him a “dead man walking” early in the war—a promise that, after a year of brutal conflict, Israel made good on.
The Israeli killing of Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas and the key architect of the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks that killed almost 1,200 people, may prove to be more of an anti-climax than a turning point in the Israel-Gaza war. The killing is yet another indicator that Israel has devastated Hamas as an organization, but both Hamas and Israel appear ready to continue fighting, and Israel has yet to resolve the harder question of what should come next in Gaza.
Sinwar had been a leading member of Hamas from the group’s inception. He spent many years in prison until a 2011 prisoner swap and was known for his militant views. Since the Oct. 7 attacks, Israel has made him public enemy number one, declaring him a “dead man walking” early in the war—a promise that, after a year of brutal conflict, Israel made good on.
In theory, Sinwar’s death might make a cease-fire more likely. He took a hard-line stance on negotiations, seeking to prolong the war because it hurt Israel’s international reputation and relationship with its key ally, the United States. He was also willing for ordinary Gazans to suffer, immensely, to achieve his ends.
From Israel’s point of view, killing Sinwar is a political victory, a visceral reminder of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s promise to destroy Hamas. With his death—along with those of other key planners of the Oct. 7 attack, such as military wing leader Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa—much of Hamas’s Gaza leadership is destroyed. Hamas is also devastated outside Gaza, most notably by Israel’s killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July but also due to other attacks on leaders in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Israel has also decimated much of Hamas’s rank and file. Among the 42,000 or more Gazans who Israel has killed, Israel claims that more than a third were Hamas fighters—huge losses for an organization whose fighting total was believed to be between 25,000 and 30,000 before Oct. 7. Israel has also removed Hamas as a governing force in Gaza, depriving the organization of an important source of money, power, and legitimacy.
It will be hard for Hamas to recover from these blows. The loss of many senior, experienced leaders will bring less-experienced individuals to the fore, and they will have to prove themselves to Hamas’s foreign backers, supporters in Gaza and other Palestinian communities, and their own rank and file.
The constant killing campaign makes it dangerous for Hamas leaders to communicate and, consequently, difficult for them to run their own organization: They could communicate and direct their teams only by risking the fate of Sinwar, Deif, and many others. Curtailing communication, however, leaves Hamas untethered at a critical time, with no clear guidance on what the organization should do next other than stagger on. Hamas’s popularity in Gaza is also suffering, as Palestinians there, along with blaming Israel for the destruction, are also angry at Hamas for provoking the Israeli bear.
What kind of Hamas will rise from Sinwar’s ashes? On the one hand, the devastating Israeli campaign against Hamas and Gaza is a lesson for future leaders about the perils of confronting a much stronger, determined foe. Hamas would benefit from time to regroup and rebuild its organization and try to reverse the decline in its support.
On the other hand, future Hamas leaders might double down on what they would call resistance. Under Sinwar’s leadership Hamas hit Israel hard, put the Palestinian issue back on the political map, and damaged the country’s international reputation: Ending the struggle might set these gains back. After the loss of so many leaders and fighters, as well as the deaths of so many Palestinian children and other noncombatants, organization members also have a thirst for revenge.
Israel, for its part, shows little sign that it will let up on Hamas. Its rhetorical commitment to destroying Hamas is matched by its actions on the ground. Hamas endures, and the organization has recovered from major leadership losses in the past. Although many Israelis favor a cease-fire in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages, the Netanyahu administration has made continued operations against Hamas its priority.
For Israel, killing Sinwar does not solve the broader problem of governance in Gaza. More than a year after Oct. 7, Israel is no closer to conceptualizing, let alone implementing, a realistic framework for who will govern Gaza. A failed state is the most likely near, and perhaps long-term outcome for Gaza.
In such an environment, Hamas, even if weak and disorganized, will be able to endure and perhaps even prosper. Ordinary Gazans, of course, will find no relief from war and misery.
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