Iran’s new reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, took the stage at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Sept. 24 with an unmistakable message. “The appropriate response to Iran is not more sanctions,” he declared. “It’s the fulfillment of previous commitments to lift sanctions, improve the economic conditions of the Iranian people, and pave the way for further agreements.”
Pezeshkian was referencing the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief. Despite U.S. President Joe Biden’s efforts to revive the agreement after former President Donald Trump’s withdrawal, the deal remains effectively dead. Yet Pezeshkian and his team of seasoned JCPOA negotiators are signaling a readiness to either restore the original nuclear deal or build a new one, with the possibility of using it as a foundation for broader agreements.
Iran’s new reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, took the stage at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Sept. 24 with an unmistakable message. “The appropriate response to Iran is not more sanctions,” he declared. “It’s the fulfillment of previous commitments to lift sanctions, improve the economic conditions of the Iranian people, and pave the way for further agreements.”
Pezeshkian was referencing the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief. Despite U.S. President Joe Biden’s efforts to revive the agreement after former President Donald Trump’s withdrawal, the deal remains effectively dead. Yet Pezeshkian and his team of seasoned JCPOA negotiators are signaling a readiness to either restore the original nuclear deal or build a new one, with the possibility of using it as a foundation for broader agreements.
The JCPOA was once seen as more than just a nuclear deal; it was a potential gateway to peacefully resolving broader U.S.-Iran disputes in the region. Even Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, hinted in 2015 that a successful nuclear agreement could pave the way for talks on other issues. While it’s impossible to know how things might have progressed had the deal been fully implemented, it’s plausible that regional dialogues could have been established, possibly averting the current crisis and the looming threat of a wider regional war.
What is clear now, however, is that with Pezeshkian, Iran is once again signaling a readiness for diplomacy.
Pezeshkian’s election was the result of intense political maneuvering within the Islamic Republic’s rival factions. Although the process fell short of the standards of democratic elections in leading countries, his victory reflects ongoing contentious debate both within the political establishment and among the broader public. His platform, which emphasized de-escalation and pragmatic diplomacy, resonated with segments of the political elite and society that are increasingly aware of the economic and political costs of prolonged confrontation with the West.
Crucially, Pezeshkian has managed to secure support from some conservative forces. His proposed cabinet, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi—a key figure in previous nuclear negotiations—was approved by the conservative-majority parliament. Remarkably, Araghchi even secured the backing of a hard-line member who once famously burned a copy of the JCPOA in protest.
This fragile consensus suggests there is room for diplomacy under Pezeshkian’s leadership. Reflecting this, in a recent speech, the supreme leader said that while Iran cannot fully trust the West, “engagement with the enemy” is still acceptable, as long as Iran protects itself from being spurned again as it was during the presidency of moderate President Hassan Rouhani.
Against this backdrop, Pezeshkian and his team emphasized at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) that Iran is ready for diplomatic de-escalation, but they suggested this may not last. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister and now Pezeshkian’s vice president for strategic affairs, highlighted Iran’s restraint, despite what he described as Israeli provocations. He pointed to the Aug. 1 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran as a key example.
Zarif also issued a stark warning amid the current escalation in Lebanon: “Hezbollah is capable of defending itself but has chosen restraint. The international community must act now before the situation spirals out of control.”
Meanwhile, Pezeshkian is facing growing pressure from hard-liners at home, driven both by his diplomatic outreach and his reappointment of key JCPOA negotiators. Hard-liners sharply criticized the comments he made suggesting that Iran might consider disarming if Israel did, accusing him of weakness. One conservative analyst remarked: “Pezeshkian’s remarks about disarmament in New York are naive and a source of national shame. … What role do individuals like Zarif, who are intimidated by the U.S., play in such humiliation?”
Another analyst, reflecting on Pezeshkian’s rhetoric at UNGA and the backlash from his recent press conference in Tehran—where he suggested that the United States and Iran could one day “be brothers”—stated, “Pezeshkian and his reformist government’s remarks show a clear detachment from the harsh realities of the international system, which leave little room for such idealistic fantasies.”
Critics of Pezeshkian’s diplomatic overtures also argue for a much tougher stance. They say that Iran’s lack of retaliation for the assassination of Haniyeh has emboldened Israel to escalate attacks, including in Lebanon. These analysts advocate for a more forceful Iranian response, urging Tehran to target U.S. interests and its regional allies. Some propose that the Houthis should end their cease-fire with Saudi Arabia and strike its oil installations and suggest Iran could threaten the oil and gas infrastructure of Persian Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, citing their hosting of U.S. military bases. Additionally, they demand an end to any normalization efforts with Bahrain.
It’s an enormous risk for the West to dismiss Pezeshkian’s presidency outright and to fail to explore diplomatic avenues. Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, and the region remains on a knife’s edge. The alternative to dialogue is a march toward greater conflict, which could culminate in a regional war involving not just Iran, but also its neighbors and global powers. Diplomatic engagement with Pezeshkian’s government, while challenging and uncertain, remains the best way to manage these risks.
From Washington’s perspective, the upcoming U.S. elections and political controersy surrounding any engagement with Iran make direct negotiations unlikely before November. However, this should not preclude forward-leaning diplomatic groundwork. The Biden administration and its allies can still lay the foundations for future talks, particularly in areas such as nuclear transparency, by working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and exploring pathways for de-escalation through European intermediaries. Engaging Pezeshkian’s government now, even in small ways, can help build momentum for diplomacy once the political climate in the United States allows for more substantive talks.
The stakes are too high for the United States and Europe to ignore this opportunity. Engaging with Pezeshkian’s government may not produce immediate breakthroughs, but it offers a chance to reduce tensions, prevent further nuclear development, and avoid the specter of war. For those in Washington and European capitals who are committed to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and avoiding regional escalation, the time to act is now.
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