Matt Kroenig: Hi Emma, Washington is usually pretty quiet in August, with many people on vacation, and I know I’m enjoying the downtime. Are you relaxing during the last few weeks of summer?
Emma Ashford: Oh, yes. The kids are in camp, we’re spending lots of time at the pool, and—as the New York Times put it last week—Joe Biden is winding down his U.S. presidency in “a Nation Entangled in War.”
Things don’t seem like they’ve actually calmed down that much. Shall we start in Ukraine? Or rather, shall we start in Russia? The Ukrainians have decided to retake the initiative and have invaded Russia and seized several Russian towns.
MK: Yes. Did Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky catch Russian President Vladimir Putin napping in his dacha on the Black Sea? This Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk region has caught everyone by surprise. Ukraine has now claimed hundreds of square miles of territory, and, at the time of writing, it is still going.
What do you make of this surprise attack on a region with so much historical meaning for Russia? Do you think it is as significant as I do, or is it much ado about nothing?
EA: Well, “Kursk offensive” has an impressive level of historical gravitas that even casual observers of history have probably heard of. This offensive couldn’t possibly measure up to the last one; the original Battle of Kursk might have been the largest battle in human history and was one of the key turning points of the Eastern Front in World War II, contributing substantially to the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. This fits with a broader pattern: The battles of the war in Ukraine have almost all ranged across well-known territory better known for major World War II or even Napoleonic battles.
I think it’s too soon to really tell what this offensive will achieve. For now, I think we can conclusively say that Ukraine has retaken the narrative initiative; this offensive is attention-grabbing and diverts the media in the West away from the ongoing series of negative stories elsewhere in the war. But it’s not clear whether Ukrainian forces can hold the territory they’ve taken or this is just a fast strike, and whether the move can be leveraged for any political advantage. It’s also not clear if it has weakened Ukraine’s lines elsewhere in the war.
So color me skeptical that this is a war-changing development. Let me guess: You think the Ukrainians are going to waltz to Moscow?
MK: No. But I do think the offensive is significant for many reasons, including that it proved us wrong! For the past several months, you and I have basically agreed that the conflict was likely going to wind down roughly along the current lines, but the Ukrainains have upset that expectation by opening up a new front in the war.
In addition, this offensive accomplishes several other aims. It brings the war home to Russia. Russian officials said they evacuated nearly 200,000 people after the attack, and Ukraine has already taken hundreds of prisoners of war. It calls into question Putin’s competence as a wartime leader. Another week of Putin looking helpless would be very damaging, as it could encourage his inner circle to turn on him.
The move is buoying the spirits of the Ukrainian people and military forces. It is accomplishing operational objectives, such as degrading Russian capabilities that have been used to attack into Ukraine. It is a rebuke to the U.S. and European caution in this conflict—a ground invasion of Russian territory using Western weapons is apparently not a sufficient red line for Russian nuclear escalation! Ukraine could dig in and occupy at least some of the territory as a bargaining chip for future negotiations.
But, yeah, otherwise, no biggie.
EA: Hold your horses. It’s just way too soon to say most of those things. Perhaps this will change the fight in Ukraine’s favor, but the country is still dealing with limited manpower, an overburdened government, a potentially problematic debt crisis, and a much bigger opponent. All those maps of Ukraine advancing into hundreds of square miles of Russian territory look hugely impressive, but that’s what happened in the early days of the war in the other direction. What we saw then was that it didn’t give the Russians political or even military control over most of what they’d seized, and that they struggled to hold any of it. What if we get to a week or two from now and Ukrainian forces find themselves overextended and forced to retreat?
Best-case scenario, it gives them some negotiating leverage. But I still think the biggest benefit here is likely to be in media coverage, rather than practical. This is pretty much the only good news out of Kyiv in months.
MK: We both like to think strategically, so let us examine how this offensive ends. I see three possibilities. First, maybe you are right. Maybe Ukraine will end up abandoning all these gains and retreating to Ukrainian territory. I still think it accomplishes many of the items I listed above. It showed that the lines are not static and that it could do something similar in the future without risking nuclear escalation, for example.
Second, maybe the Ukrainians continue to occupy all the territory they currently claim, or even keep driving deeper into Moscow. I think we probably agree that this is unlikely to be sustainable.
Third, and finally, what if they partially pull back and dig into a more sustainable position, maybe even just occupying a few villages on the border? I think that would provide a substantial bargaining chip in the war and any future negotiations. I don’t see how Putin can declare victory with Ukraine in possession of Russian territory it conquered in war.
EA: It certainly would complicate the Russian demands for freezing the conflict along current lines! But I doubt that is a strategic consideration as much as a pleasant side effect.
You left out some options, though. What if Ukraine manages to hold a small amount of sustainable territory inside Russia, but in doing so commits so much in arms and equipment that Russian gains elsewhere accelerate? I just have difficulty seeing this shifting the fundamental dynamics of the war: Ukraine is smaller and weaker than Russia, and there are limits to what it can accomplish on the battlefield.
I guess we’ll see what things look like in a couple of weeks.
Shall we pivot to the Middle East? Everyone else is. The United States now has two aircraft carriers back in the region, a truly ridiculous number when you consider that we’re supposed to be focused on the rise of China.
MK: Yes. Let’s go there. The world has been bracing for Iran’s threatened retaliation to Israel’s assassination of Hamas’s leader in Tehran since at least our last column, and we are all still waiting.
Part of the delay, I would argue, is due precisely to those aircraft carriers. Iran simply cannot afford a big war with Israel or the United States, so it is calibrating its approach. It needs to hit back, but not too hard.
What do you predict will happen next?
EA: Iranian officials are clearly trying to calibrate their response. They have to respond, or they lose any chance to deter similar actions in the future. But as you say, their options aren’t good.
I’m most worried about the several thousand U.S. troops located at bases in Iraq and Syria who are sitting ducks for rocket attacks from proxy groups in the region. They’re in harm’s way for no good reason that I can ascertain.
And then there’s the broader context. The Israeli government continues to refuse to countenance a cease-fire in Gaza, keeping the whole situation at a boil, and the White House appears to be more concerned about offering a sweetheart security guarantee to Saudi Arabia than actually looking for ways to put pressure on Israel. Maybe the ceasefire talks in Doha, Qatar, will yield some progress, but I’m not holding my breath. It’s a mess.
MK: Too often, Washington’s instinct is to de-escalate the conflict. But sometimes escalation is helpful to advance national security objectives.
Biden should return to his initial instinct of backing Israel in its effort to eliminate Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s former national security adviser has argued this would mean two to three more months of intense fighting against Hamas followed by an occupation of Gaza for about one year, during which Israel could continue to conduct targeted raids and strikes against any holdouts. After that, Israel could turn Gaza over to some form of international governance.
EA: I’m not sure another three months will resolve the inherent problems of rooting out insurgents embedded within a civilian population. Historically speaking, that’s not something that ends well. That’s probably why there’s significant division within the highest levels of the Israeli government over how to proceed! Netanyahu might want to keep the war going, but his own Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant has expressed openness to a cease-fire.
MK: There is also a renewed debate in Netanyahu’s cabinet about how to handle Hezbollah. Some argue that a war is inevitable sooner or later and that, rather than wait for the next Hezbollah attack, Israel should go ahead and conduct a preemptive strike and move ground forces to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.
Finally, Washington should see any Iranian retaliation as an opportunity to retaliate and finally destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Middle East can be more secure in the long run if Washington and its allies are willing to take some risks in the short term.
EA: You know, every time you suggest bombing Iran, I get that Beach Boys parody song stuck in my head.
Seriously, though. You’re argued above that Iran isn’t responding forcefully to Israeli actions because it’s wary of starting a big war with the United States that it cannot win. And then you’re arguing that Washington should go ahead and start that war instead? And the Israelis should invade Lebanon, too, despite the fact they’re struggling to clear Gaza? Do we think the Arab states will be happy with us effectively joining the Israeli war effort?
The risks are huge, the downsides substantial, and I’m really struggling to see how this would do anything other than cause the regional cataclysm that we are trying to avoid.
MK: The single biggest driver of conflict in the region is Iran and its proxies. A nuclear-armed Iran would only make everything much more dangerous. Meaningful military action against Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran’s nuclear program could defang the threat.
With those threats degraded, what is left to cause a cataclysm? As Monty Python asked, what are they going to do, bleed on us?
EA: Well, I’m pretty sure they’ll actually go nuclear as soon as the dust settles. Perhaps sooner. There are already rumors—albeit not from the most credible sources—that Iran might accelerate its nuclear program in light of everything that’s happened. With no nuclear safeguards like those created by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran’s breakout time down to just a few weeks, we might be looking at a nuclear Iran sooner than later.
MK: Iran has been accelerating its nuclear program for years, and, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the JCPOA did not provide a meaningful constraint. I agree Iran is on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, but that is mostly because the West deluded itself into thinking it could talk Iran out of building a bomb. A tougher approach has always been the only effective solution, and the world is running out of time.
EA: Even an attack like you suggest only delays Iran a few years. And then there’s the prospect for regional instability in friendly states: popular unrest, a wave of new Palestinian refugees, and all the rest of it. And what makes you think—after the United States’ 20 years in Afghanistan and the past year of Israeli intervention in Gaza—that Washington can actually eradicate or destroy Iranian proxies throughout the region? Or do you propose going all the way to Tehran?
MK: Iran might choose not to rebuild, and, if it does, rebuilt nuclear facilities can be hit again. U.S. allies in the region would be delighted to see Iran weakened. Israel could have succeeded in Gaza already if it were not being held back by the United States.
Iran is the only country in the world that regularly provides weapons to non-state groups to attack across international lines. The world should be clear that such behavior is unacceptable and that Iran will pay a severe price.
EA: Holding Israel back from doing what? Bombing population centers? Torturing prisoners? I’m sympathetic to the Israeli dilemma—they face a difficult security environment—but this war has been brutal and highly unrestrained. Israel cannot succeed in Gaza through military means alone. That’s not just my opinion. It’s the opinion of senior U.S. officials and has also been expressed by the spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces!
I’d suggest we discuss Venezuela next, but I think we’re almost out of time. For me, current events just show how difficult it can be to get entrenched authoritarians to leave, even when hugely unpopular. Everyone would benefit from Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro bowing out gracefully, but since he’s likely to face prosecution if he gives up power that’s unlikely to happen. We’ve done what we can with sanctions; it might be time to think about carrots rather than sticks.
MK: It was reported that the Biden administration offered Maduro amnesty in the United States. That is a pretty sweet carrot, but it doesn’t look like he will take it.
EA: OK, finally: the Olympics! International sport, after all, is meant to be a replacement for warfare. Which was your favorite?
MK: I don’t care what Foreign Policy says, the United States is still the world’s basketball superpower in my heart. Did you see Steph Curry’s string of three pointers in the waning minutes of the gold medal game? Very impressive!
You?
EA: Fencing, equestrian, archery, kayaking … it’s all good. Though I did question the inclusion of “breaking”—better known to us all as breakdancing—as a demonstration sport. A number of the participants seemed to lack basic rhythm or hand-eye coordination. Maybe next time we’ll get something culturally appropriate for Los Angeles. Red carpet walking? White Bronco racing?
The post Will Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Turn the Tide? appeared first on Foreign Policy.
