Ukraine is currently resisting one of the largest wars in Europe since World War II, all while keeping its democratic progress on track. Although various issues indeed remain to be addressed, the significant strides made since 2014 are way beyond the “baby steps” portrayed in the Foreign Policy article titled “Ukraine Is Still Too Corrupt to Join the West,” which largely focuses on Ukraine’s hardships and misses the big picture.
Ukraine is currently resisting one of the largest wars in Europe since World War II, all while keeping its democratic progress on track. Although various issues indeed remain to be addressed, the significant strides made since 2014 are way beyond the “baby steps” portrayed in the Foreign Policy article titled “Ukraine Is Still Too Corrupt to Join the West,” which largely focuses on Ukraine’s hardships and misses the big picture.
Ukraine is at the initial stage of accession to the European Union, while its wish to join NATO remains denied. In their pursuit of rule of law and zero corruption, Ukrainians are inspired by countries such as Denmark, which tops the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International. However, it is fair and objective to compare Ukraine’s current state of affairs with others than the best in class. Furthermore, comparing scores rather than rankings would be more objective, as the scores are individualized and merit-based, while rankings depend on the performance of other states.
In 2023, with a score of 36, Ukraine has made an impressive 11-point jump since 2013, outperforming or coming close to some NATO members, such as Turkey (which received a score of 34) or Albania (37). Ukraine’s score also surpasses the 35 that North Macedonia received in 2020, the year it joined NATO. Transparency International changed the CPI methodology in 2012, so it is impossible to reliably compare Ukraine’s current performance with that of other Central and Eastern European countries at the times of their NATO accessions or invitations. Nonetheless, even the existing data proves that “Western standards” vary.
In the first paragraph of the article, the author emphasizes Ukraine’s corruption scandals, particularly in the defense sector, without highlighting that these very issues have accelerated substantial institutional changes, which the author only mentions unrelatedly later. Specifically, largely in response to the scandals, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was stripped of its procurement functions, leading to the creation of two new agencies with reform-minded leadership for lethal and nonlethal procurements. These agencies are not only “expected to cut down corruption,” as Anchal Vohra writes, but are already delivering tangible results.
For instance, in 2024, the State Rear Operator—charged with nonlethal procurements, such as food and clothing—moved 94 percent of its procurements into the online ProZorro system, ensuring transparency and competition. According to the Ministry of Defense, the auction system saved 22 percent of the allocated budget in the first half of the year, freeing up resources for additional purchases. Meanwhile, the Defence Procurement Agency focuses on concluding direct contracts to eliminate unnecessary intermediaries that inflate weapon prices. An independent supervisory board composed of international defense experts is also being established.
Additionally, it is important to clarify that the mentioned scandals involved Ukrainian funds and did not affect Western aid. This distinction is crucial to avoid any misunderstanding of Vohra’s statement that “[t]he many scandals in the defense sector shook … Western supporters and especially NATO allies, who have sent 99 percent of all military aid toward Ukraine’s war effort.”
The author rightly highlights the importance of judicial reform for Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration, emphasizing the need to establish a high administrative court to mitigate corruption risks in high-level lawsuits involving state authorities.
While this court is indeed important, other more significant developments are already taking place in Ukraine’s judiciary. In 2023, Ukraine completed the reboot of two judicial governance bodies responsible for hiring, firing, and disciplinary cases of judges, in an effort to cleanse them of long-standing corrupt elements. The Public Integrity Council, a civic body that assists judicial governance with integrity screening of judicial candidates and existing judges, has also been kicked off. The competition to fill vacancies in the Constitutional Court is ongoing, with foreign experts involved. The first judge assessed to have impeccable integrity was appointed under the new procedure in May.
Several days ago, the High Anti-Corruption Court approved its 200th verdict in the high-profile corruption case, of which 143 verdicts have been issued during the full-scale war, with almost 40 verdicts in total regarding judges. The case that the author mentions of the head of the Supreme Court being detained in 2023 on an alleged bribe is actually proof that anti-corruption agencies are working, and that there are no untouchables in Ukraine. Before the launch of the High Anti-Corruption Court in 2019, ordinary courts issued roughly 10 verdicts in corruption cases annually.
Vohra mentions several reforms, such as the restoration of the electronic asset declaration system and other digitalization efforts, calling them “remarkable” but also adding that they are still “seen as baby steps.”
Since 2014, Ukraine has managed to achieve substantial progress in many other areas apart from those mentioned, such as the decentralization of power that proved instrumental for the resilience of Ukrainian communities in the first weeks of the big war. Other examples are banking reforms that helped clean the system of insolvent institutions, or efforts to transfer public procurements from paper into ProZorro, the aforementioned online system. Ukraine has transformed its approach to healthcare financing too. Previously, funds were allocated directly to hospitals, limiting Ukrainians’ choices of healthcare facilities. Now, the money “follows the patient,” allowing individuals to choose the best primary care doctors, which in turn incentivizes healthcare providers to improve the quality of their services.
The achievements in energy sector included reforming of an independent transmission system operator called Ukrenergo. Right before the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, it connected the Ukrainian grid to the European network and disconnected from Russia’s. Ukrenergo was also instrumental for the survival of the Ukrainian energy system during the winter of 2022-2023 while under massive missiles and drones attacks from the invading Russian forces.
Many other similar tectonic changes have happened in Ukraine, and they are anything but “baby steps.” Ukraine understands its duties at home well, and further comprehensive reform agendas will be delivered during Ukraine’s EU accession. The Ukrainian people demonstrate a strong commitment to democracy, watchdogging against any attempted disruptions to reform efforts.
However, the real reason for not inviting Ukraine into NATO is not a lack of Ukrainian reforms, but its Western partners’ ongoing delusion that doing so will appease Russia and manage the escalation. But they tend to forget that Russia sees itself as an empire without borders. In these circumstances, the integration of Ukraine into the Western security and economic architecture—with no further delays—is the only mutually beneficial track that can ensure safety and security not only for Ukraine, but also for the entirety of Europe.
The post Ukraine’s Democratic Progress Is Entirely on Track appeared first on Foreign Policy.
