Earlier this month, three of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour stops were canceled in Austria after officials announced that they had arrested two men accused of plotting a terrorist attack focused on the singer’s stadium shows. One of the men was a 19-year-old Austrian citizen who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State online. There have been other recent attacks and plots targeting Western nations including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia.
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has undoubtedly emboldened existing militant groups, such as al Qaeda, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), Hamas, and others. And just three years after the U.S. withdrawal, Afghanistan risks becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism once again.
In July 2022, U.S. intelligence located and eliminated Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the leader of al Qaeda, in Kabul. This operation in itself underscored the group’s continued presence in Afghanistan. Additionally, reports suggest that al Qaeda operatives may be embedded within the Taliban government, potentially acting as advisors. Notably, Saif al-Adel, likely the current leader of al Qaeda and believed to be based in Iran, recently called for jihadis to travel to Afghanistan for training and regrouping, aiming to target U.S. and Western interests.
The rise of IS-K, a militant group affiliated with the Islamic State that emerged in Afghanistan around 2015, adds another layer of complexity. Afghan intelligence sources, including former official Amrullah Saleh, claim a close link between IS-K and the Taliban, alleging that both receive funding, weapons, and training from the same sources within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This challenges the prevailing Western narrative that portrays these groups as distinct entities with conflicting agendas. Afghan intelligence suggests that this “good cop, bad cop” dynamic might be a deliberate strategy to deceive the international community.
If the terrorist groups are coordinating, so too must the international community. The United States needs to take the lead on a unified response to this growing threat.
The perceived distinction between the Taliban and its supposedly more brutal counterpart, IS-K, has led some regional actors—such as China, Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan—to treat the Taliban as a potential tool for containment. (Latterly, the Taliban’s participation in some reported joint operations with U.S. special forces against IS-K in the Afghan province of Kunar has bolstered this perception.)
These countries have been pursuing closer ties with the Taliban since 2015, when China, Russia, and Iran began vying for influence with the group. In that time, officials have extended invitations for representatives of the Taliban to visit Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Tashkent. Initially, these bilateral trips were kept secret, only coming to light starting in 2017, when the same countries began inviting representatives from the Afghan republic to attend meetings with the Taliban in Moscow. The first public meeting was held in November 2018. Notably, these countries continued to keep their embassies open and operational under Taliban rule even after the collapse of the Afghan republic when almost all other countries closed theirs.
By portraying themselves as the lesser evil compared to IS-K, the Taliban may have gained a tactical advantage—and as they consolidate power, the threat of IS-K could actually be amplified. First, a resurgent IS-K could be used as a bargaining chip, pressuring the international community for aid or concessions. Second, even with limited direct interaction, the Taliban might benefit from IS-K’s activities by creating an environment of regional instability, potentially justifying their own hard-line rule. Lastly, by appearing to fight IS-K, the Taliban might gain a veneer of legitimacy, allowing them to operate with more freedom on the international stage.
Terrorist organizations such as the Taliban, IS-K, al Qaeda—as well as regional militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—pose a global threat. These predominantly male-dominated groups operate clandestinely, sharing tactics and ideology, such as an antipathy to Israel, across borders. Despite perceived Sunni and Shiite divides, they share a similar agenda: to force nonbelievers to either convert or be killed, and to establish and expand their version of caliphate.
While their short-term goals may vary—from complete eradication of dissent to regional dominance or ideological expansion—they all employ violence, manipulation, and exploitation of existing fault lines to achieve them. Terrorist organizations may even exploit tensions between countries to further their own agendas, in the process potentially acquiring destructive weapons that threaten global security.
The United States can play a crucial role in forging a unified international response to counterterrorism emanating from Afghanistan—but it must avoid repeating past mistakes, such as making nation-building attempts without proper context or neglecting regional dynamics. Bilateral engagements with the Taliban by individual countries create vulnerabilities to manipulation. To counter this, a multilateral approach that includes information sharing is essential. A mechanism for sharing diplomatic notes and intelligence among countries engaging the Taliban would expose inconsistencies and prevent the group from exploiting individual nations. This transparency is also crucial to holding the Taliban accountable and exposing their supporting of terrorist groups such as IS-K, al Qaeda, Hamas, and others.
The term “war on terror” is divisive, because it came to represent military intervention, the imposition of a system of governance that didn’t match ground realities, a weak focus on the root causes, and a lack of international consensus on tactics and goals. The fact remains that China, Russia, the West, and regional powers all have a stake in defeating this common enemy. A collaborative global task force, led by the United States and focused on specific goals—such as eliminating IS-K—could share intelligence, disrupt terrorist financing, and address the root causes of extremism.
In the meantime, the United States should reassess its engagement with the Taliban and avoid cooperation on any aspect of Afghan governance that strengthens the group’s rule. The United States is currently engaging the Taliban in pursuit of cooperation on efforts aimed at counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and a range of economic and humanitarian issues. But while the United States has gained little, the Taliban has used U.S. engagement to solidify their power. The U.S. should instead consider supporting non-Taliban Afghans, particularly women. At a recent United Nations meeting on Afghanistan held in Doha, Qatar, U.N. envoys compromised with the Taliban by not inviting any women or civil society representatives.
The United States must set aside its Taliban-centric approach and focus instead on diplomatic efforts and investing in Afghan political forces that are trusted and proven counterterrorism partners. Afghan political groups are mostly based in exile in the United States, Europe, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia, but they have the expertise and reach to discuss and cooperate on issues related to Afghanistan. This approach would promote long-term stability and a terrorism-free future for Afghanistan—and the world.
The post The Taliban and IS-K May Not Be Opposed After All appeared first on Foreign Policy.
