The fatal attack against Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Israel accused Hezbollah of perpetrating but the Shiite militant group denied, could be the act that disrupts the delicate balance of deterrence between these two old enemies.
The fatal attack against Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Israel accused Hezbollah of perpetrating but the Shiite militant group denied, could be the act that disrupts the delicate balance of deterrence between these two old enemies.
Hezbollah and Israel have been exchanging fire since the former decided to open a front against the latter on Oct. 8, to support Hamas a day after it attacked Israel. The assumption, and the risk, all along has been that at any moment either Hezbollah or Israel was going to miscalculate and trigger a large-scale war. Does the strike in Majdal Shams, which killed 12 children and teenagers belonging to the Druze sect, represent that miscalculation?
It’s unlikely due to structural factors, including the desire by both to avoid a destructive regional war, and Washington’s uncertain security support for Israel in such a military conflict.
Israel cannot go it alone in a drawn-out war against multiple, well-armed foes from multiple directions. Of course, none of this means that Israel will sit back and simply absorb the latest hit. It will respond, as the Israeli government has voted to do. But perhaps like the choreographed aerial tit-for-tat between Israel and Iran in April, it will most likely refrain from escalating to the point of no return.
In April, Israel responded to Iran’s historic barrage of missiles against it by launching a measured strike that destroyed part of an air defense system in Isfahan. Israel intended to signal to Iran that it could have hit more strategic targets in Iran, but it didn’t do so to avoid escalation.
Hezbollah’s intentions toward Israel have been made clear by Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s leader. In a recent speech, he said that the moment a cease-fire in Gaza is reached, he will order his men to stop their attacks against Israel, without having to negotiate with anybody.
Israel’s implicit condition to reach a settlement with Hezbollah—chiefly the withdrawal of elite units of the group from the border by a few miles—reflects its interest in containing the war, despite the heated confrontations of late. Indeed, had Israel demanded that Hezbollah disarm or remove all its forces from the south, for example, this would have been a clear indication that the Israeli leadership was not interested in any compromise or diplomatic solution. Instead, Israel has asked for something more realistic.
Yet even with this achievable demand, Israel knows full well that it is virtually impossible for any entity—Lebanese, Israeli, or multinational—to verify and enforce any such deal should there be any violations.
Hezbollah’s fighters easily blend among the population in southern Lebanon. One day they can pull back, another they can return to their positions without being detected. A Hezbollah member is a soldier during the day and a family man at night.
Israel’s demand is inherently political and hardly security-based (after all, Hezbollah has long-range weapons that can hit any target in Israel). It is meant to assure Israeli residents in the north that they can safely return to their homes. If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can tell the Israeli public that he was able to “remove the immediate Hezbollah threat to the north,” some of the political pressure against his government may subside.
There’s also a psychological factor behind Israel’s fixation on Hezbollah’s elite Hajj Radwan forces—named after the late military commander Imad Mughniyeh whose nom de guerre was Hajj Radwan and whose men could infiltrate northern Israel—in its negotiating strategy. These forces are uniquely capable of infiltrating Israeli territory in the Galilee. Given the trauma of Hamas’s invasion on Oct. 7, Israel is focusing on avoiding a repeat scenario, this time from southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s calculus is not that different from Israel’s, while it ponders a potential settlement along the Israel-Lebanon border. The group knows full well that no matter what international diplomacy produces, and no matter how many miles Israel pulls away its army from the northern border, Israel will still be able to launch attacks and conduct reconnaissance and intelligence operations if it so chooses. Both sides can strike deep inside the other’s territory. Any pullback is merely a confidence-building measure.
So, any deal Hezbollah would reach with Israel will be fragile, if history is any guide. However, it would still be useful because, like the Israeli northern residents, it would incentivize the Lebanese southerners to return to their homes (many would have to rebuild)—an outcome that would reduce public pressure against Hezbollah, which isn’t fatal for the group but has grown over time.
Beefing up the local U.N. peacekeeping force, the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, both materially and politically, as well as deploying 15,000 Lebanese government troops along the southern border would be necessary to support a revamped U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006, and enhance the political credibility of any deal between Hezbollah and Israel. Those facts on the ground, while unable to stop a war, matter a great deal.
The United States has a considerable role to play, both by checking Israel’s worst impulses and supporting a diplomatic resolution through its talented envoy, Amos Hochstein, the architect of the 2022 Israel-Lebanon deal on maritime border demarcation.
Israel cannot launch a comprehensive war against Hezbollah by itself. It would need continuous U.S. military assistance in the form of munitions, intelligence, and air and missile defense capabilities. However, the Biden administration has made it clear that it wishes to prevent the war in Gaza from spilling over into Lebanon. The U.S. position has in recent months heavily influenced Israel’s war decision-making vis-à-vis Hezbollah.
Hezbollah also wouldn’t be fighting alone. It would most likely be joined by other members of the so-called Axis of Resistance, including the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Iran, the main sponsor of the Axis. This makes any Israeli war effort even more difficult to pursue, especially without U.S. military and diplomatic backing.
This latest episode confirms once again what serious observers have known all along: The Israel-Hezbollah dynamic may have its own history, logic, risks, and consequences, but the path to defusing it runs through Gaza. A ceasefire in Gaza won’t solve it—but it will give enough breathing room for all parties to lower the temperature, until the next crisis.
The post The Road to Israel-Hezbollah Peace Runs Through Gaza appeared first on Foreign Policy.
