The sudden death of conservative President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May has led to a surprising shift in Iran’s political landscape. Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist, has been elected as his successor, ending three years of conservative dominance over all branches of government. This period was characterized by enduring economic hardships and widespread dissatisfaction, which fueled protests, most notably the violently suppressed “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in 2022.
Many Iranians approached these elections with apathy and deep disillusionment with the Islamic Republic and its politics. But the election results sent a clear message of change, expressed both by those who participated and by the significant number who chose to abstain.
Elections in the Islamic Republic are neither free nor fair, but they can be competitive. The Guardian Council, a 12-member body of jurists and clerics, controls candidate eligibility, often barring reformists or those out of favor, including former presidents like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Unlike in the 2021 presidential election, this time a prominent reformist, Pezeshkian—a five-term parliamentarian, former health minister, and cardiac surgeon—was permitted to run.
Pezeshkian was approved to run in a crowded field of six candidates, where he was the sole reformist. The others ranged from moderate conservatives to ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili, who became his main competitor in the runoff. The election results were telling: Approximately 40 percent of eligible voters participated in the first round, a record low, which increased to nearly 50 percent a week later with Pezeshkian’s victory. Both the low turnout and Pezeshkian’s decisive 16.4 million votes compared with Jalili’s 13.5 million underscore the electorate’s discontent with the status quo and their rejection of many policies that have defined the Islamic Republic.
Pezeshkian campaigned on a platform of tangible reforms. He pledged to fight corruption to spur economic growth and to reduce international tensions to attract foreign investment. Emphasizing the need to get Iran off the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist, he advocated for aligning Iran’s financial laws with global standards on money laundering and terrorism financing. Pezeshkian defended the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran adhered to until the United States withdrew unilaterally in 2018. His conservative rivals blasted him for wanting to follow the centrist path of former President Hassan Rouhani, who they claim naively relied on the United States and Europe and ultimately failed.
Beyond economic and foreign policy, Pezeshkian also focused on domestic reforms. He promised to reduce internet restrictions, addressing the pervasive use of virtual private networks by Iranians to bypass censorship. “I will reform the ineffective filtering system to reintegrate thousands of virtual businesses into the economy,” he pledged. On gender, he advocated for women’s equal participation in all social, economic, and political fields. Concerning mandatory hijab enforcement, he questioned, “If we haven’t guided them despite extensive investment in religious centers, can we correct them with these [forceful] methods?”
Pezeshkian, who comes from a Kurdish Azeri family, tried to attract the votes of ethnic minorities in the country. His electoral success was significantly bolstered by the support of such voters, particularly in East and West Azerbaijan provinces in northwestern Iran, his home region. The votes from these areas proved to be decisive in the final tally.
Against this backdrop, Iranian civil society and human rights activists were divided in their approach to the election. Many advocated for a boycott, arguing that the election could not bring about the substantial change they sought. They believed that participating would only legitimize an inherently flawed system. On the other hand, some prominent pro-democracy activists, including Keyvan Samimi, Alireza Rajai, and Fakhr al-Sadat Mohtashami-Pour, chose to vote. Samimi, in an essay urging support for Pezeshkian, stated, “You expect me to resist authoritarianism, and you are right, but in my view, based on a specific analysis of specific conditions, voting for the discourse against authoritarianism is a continuation of resistance.”
Another influential pro-democracy activist, Farhad Meysami, did not endorse voting for Pezeshkian but expressed that both voters and abstainers were on the “same team” fighting for change. The 2009 Green Movement leaders were also split: Mehdi Karroubi voted for Pezeshkian, while Mir Hossein Mousavi remained silent about the election. Both have been under house arrest since 2011.
Pezeshkian’s unblemished political record stands out in stark contrast to the pervasive corruption and nepotism that have plagued many officials in the Islamic Republic. Known for his forthrightness, Pezeshkian has a long history of criticizing government abuses. After the contentious 2009 presidential election, marked by violent suppression of dissent, he publicly denounced the government’s harsh response to protesters, prompting harsh backlash from conservative parliament members. He also took a strong stance against the death of Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman who died in the custody of the morality police in September 2022, which ignited the widespread “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests.
In an interview with Iranian media, Pezeshkian criticized the government’s response to the 2022 protests: “Is it religious to treat people harshly and forcibly impose beliefs on them? We do not have the right to dictate to the people.” He has also condemned the so-called Chastity and Hijab Bill, which would introduce new penalties for not observing mandatory hijab, and promised to block its passage into law.
Notably, Pezeshkian has not always been favored by the Guardian Council, facing disqualification in previous elections. In 2021, his presidential candidacy was rejected by the Guardian Council. Last year, the Interior Ministry’s executive board initially rejected his qualification for parliamentary elections, citing a “lack of adherence to the Islamic Republic,” but the Guardian Council later approved it.
The extent to which Pezeshkian can fulfill his campaign promises remains to be seen. The president is not the highest authority in Iran; that position belongs to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Although the president oversees the day-to-day administration of the government and has significant influence over domestic and foreign policy, his powers are limited, particularly in matters of national security.
A crucial indicator of Pezeshkian’s administration will be his cabinet appointments. His inauguration is set for early August, after which he will have 15 days to propose his ministers to the parliament for approval. Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi, a former communications minister under Rouhani, mentioned on the day of the runoff that Pezeshkian’s cabinet would be inclusive, featuring reformists, conservatives, independents, and “the essence of all good governments to date.” During the presidential debates, Pezeshkian described himself as a “reformist principlist [i.e., conservative],” stating, “I am a principlist, and it is for these principles that we want to reform.” He emphasized his nonpartisan stance, expressing a willingness to collaborate with all political factions, both reformist and conservative.
Another aspect to watch is whether Pezeshkian will appoint ethnic minorities, such as Sunnis, Kurds, or Baluchis, to ministerial positions and if he will follow Ahmadinejad’s precedent by introducing a female minister into his cabinet. These decisions will reflect his commitment to inclusivity and reform in his government.
Regardless of its composition, Pezeshkian’s cabinet must secure a vote of confidence from the parliament, currently dominated by conservatives led by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, this year’s defeated pragmatic conservative presidential candidate. Due to intense conservative infighting between Ghalibaf’s and Jalili’s factions in the parliament, Pezeshkian could find a willing partner in Ghalibaf. The reformist Shargh newspaper noted in this regard, “Ghalibaf-Pezeshkian can be a good pair for building consensus on national projects, from the JCPOA and FATF to the country’s economic development.”
However, parliamentary hard-liners are certain to make Pezeshkian’s ability to meet his agenda challenging. Before the election, Khamenei stated that officials should neither deviate from the revolution’s goals nor be enamored with the West. This stance will likely drive parliamentary scrutiny of Pezeshkian’s appointments, particularly figures such as pro-diplomacy former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Traditionally, Iranian presidents must also vet appointments for four key ministries—intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, and interior—Khamenei, seeking his approval before finalizing their list.
As Pezeshkian takes office, he faces the challenge of navigating a complex political landscape and delivering on his promises. His presidency holds significant implications for U.S.-Iranian relations and the prospects for de-escalation. Former reformist parliamentarian Heshmatollah Falahatpishe remarked in this regard, “The United States and Europe missed opportunities for de-escalation with Iran during the tenures of [Mohammad] Khatami and Rouhani, incurring significant costs. I hope they do not miss this chance with Pezeshkian’s administration.”
The post Iranians Voted for Change. Will They Get It? appeared first on Foreign Policy.
