Although much of Russia’s foreign policy has been directed at the Middle East, Africa, and—since February 2022—the conquest of Ukraine, Moscow has recently shown that it remains a formidable presence in the Indo-Pacific. Between mid-May and mid-June, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited China, North Korea, and Vietnam to shore up key strategic partnerships. Yesterday and today, Putin is also meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Moscow in what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called “a devastating blow to peace efforts.”
Moreover, half of Southeast Asia, much of South Asia, and nearly all Pacific Island countries stayed away from the Ukraine peace summit held in Switzerland in mid-June. Several of the countries from these regions that did show up declined to sign the joint statement that the summit produced, demonstrating the Kremlin’s continued sway over their strategic calculations.
To be sure, Russia’s influence in the Indo-Pacific is much smaller than that of China and the United States, the two superpowers vying for the upper hand across the region. Other than being a major arms and oil supplier, Moscow has little of concrete substance to offer Indo-Pacific nations. Although the Kremlin seems to desire a Cold War II-style bloc standoff between the West and East, it is unlikely to succeed in the Indo-Pacific region, given that most countries—with a few prominent exceptions—are pursuing hedging strategies and doing their best to avoid a classic balance-of-power alignment. As a second option, Russia is content with building strong relationships in the Indo-Pacific to counter what Putin calls U.S. “hegemony” and distract from its invasion of Ukraine. In this, the Kremlin has experienced some success.
For Russia, no partner is more important right now than China. While meeting in Beijing in May, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping reinforced their “no limits” strategic partnership. In music to Putin’s ears, Xi told him that “China is willing to … jointly achieve the development and rejuvenation of our respective countries,” suggesting that Beijing will continue to assist Moscow economically, especially in circumventing U.S.-led sanctions.
In a more dramatic turn of events, North Korea has emerged as a Russian strategic partner as well—quite the change from just seven years ago, when Moscow supported harsh United Nations sanctions against the regime for conducting its sixth nuclear test. In June—for the first time since 2000—Putin visited Pyongyang to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Putin received a hero’s welcome, with Kim waiting at the foot of the airplane steps to greet Putin as he disembarked.
More significantly, the two leaders resurrected a 1961 defense pact pledging each country to deploy “all means at its disposal without delay” and provide “military and other assistance” in the event that either one is invaded. The renewal of the Cold War-era alliance outraged South Korea—and could blow back against Russia if Seoul now decides to support Ukraine with weapons in retaliation.
At its crux, the recent flourishing of North Korea-Russia ties is a strategic quid pro quo. At their previous summit in Vladivostok, Russia, in September 2023, Putin and Kim agreed that the Kremlin would receive North Korean munitions for use in Ukraine in exchange for Russian technical support for North Korea’s missile (and possibly nuclear) programs.
While details remain murky on Russian assistance, Pyongyang has since sent multiple shipments to Moscow. As of last month, according to estimates made by the U.S. State Department, North Korea has supplied more than 11,000 containers of munitions to Moscow since the 2023 meeting. Recent unverified reports even suggest that North Korea may now send troops to Ukraine. At a minimum, a strengthened partnership with North Korea will be a strategic nuisance for the United States and Europe—but it is already inflicting a bloody toll on Ukraine.
After his North Korea visit, Putin moved on to Vietnam—his first state visit since 2013. In contrast to the lavish welcome he received in Pyongyang, Hanoi’s ceremony was far more low-key, suggesting that Vietnam was treading cautiously, especially within the context of its burgeoning ties with the West. Although Vietnam’s partnership with Russia, particularly on the security side, remains a delicate factor for Washington, U.S.-Vietnam ties have not appeared to suffer.
That makes strategic sense from Hanoi’s perspective: Vietnam’s number one past, present, and future concern is China, and any help it can get will be welcome. There is therefore little chance of Hanoi joining a Moscow-Beijing alignment, as much as Putin might hope.
And now, one of Russia’s other strategic partners from the Cold War—India—is again in the headlines. Modi traveled to Russia on July 8 to meet with Putin in the first bilateral summit between the two leaders since before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It will be interesting to see how New Delhi handles its sensitive ties with Moscow, which continues to provide arms and other security assistance—potentially in violation of U.S. law—as well as heavily discounted oil to evade U.S.-led sanctions.
New Delhi’s traditional position of strict nonalignment in foreign policy has given way in recent years to strengthening strategic ties with the United States to help counter China, particularly after its invasion of Indian-controlled land along the disputed border in 2020. Although India has expressed discomfort with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the summit is treading lightly on the topic to tout advances in commerce, security, agriculture, technology, and innovation. That said, Modi did tell Putin that “peace is of the utmost importance.”
Finally, Indo-Pacific participation and nonparticipation in the Ukraine peace summit in June showcased Russia’s continued sway in the region.
While U.S.-friendly nations such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea were present, China did not attend because it sides with Russia in the dispute. Among Southeast Asian countries, only Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and East Timor attended—and only two of them, the Philippines and Singapore, signed the joint statement calling for peace in line with Kyiv’s peace formula rather than Moscow’s.
Indonesia, which maintains strict nonalignment in its foreign policy and has attempted to broker a deal between Russia and Ukraine, only sent low-level officials in an effort to maintain neutrality, since Russia was not present. Thailand’s motivations are less clear, but they may have something to do with Bangkok’s focus on its application for membership in BRICS, the grouping that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and several other newly added countries.
The nonparticipation of Southeast Asian authoritarian regimes—Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam—was unsurprising, but the absence of Malaysia, a fellow democracy like Ukraine and its supporters, was. As with Thailand, it is unclear what motivated Malaysia’s decision to boycott the conference, but Kuala Lumpur’s anger at U.S. support for Israel in its ongoing war against Hamas probably was a significant factor.
From South Asia, only India attended the summit—and only with low-ranking officials in apparent avoidance of appearing to endorse the meeting and its outcome. New Delhi did not sign the joint statement. No other South Asian country participated in the summit, even though they are all fellow democracies: Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This hedging is largely unrelated to Ukraine, but it’s also a testament to the chilling effect that Russia can have over any small to medium-sized nation’s strategic calculus.
Among Pacific Islands countries, only Fiji and Palau were in attendance—a feeble showing for a region that usually sees itself as a global advocate for democracy and peace. In practice, logistical constraints in terms of both the distance required to travel to Switzerland and limited government personnel available for such events likely played a role. But to have only two of 16 Pacific Island nations and territories present for such an important conference suggests that Moscow’s influence remains formidable.
While Russia’s sway is not at the level of China’s or the United States’, it is certainly enough to promote its anti-Western interests and disrupt the already precarious regional order. In recent months, the Kremlin has shown that it can continue to leverage the Indo-Pacific as a useful distraction and complicating factor for Washington and its partners—and their attempts to ensure that Ukraine hands Russia a defeat. Whether shoring up ties with China, India, and Vietnam; expanding the partnership with North Korea; or dissuading most of the Indo-Pacific from commenting on Ukraine, Russia’s role in the region cannot be ignored.
Moreover, Russia is increasingly positioning itself to play the role of strategic spoiler. Aligning itself ever more closely with North Korea and China, Russia is creating the opportunity to support both nations militarily in any potential attack on South Korea or Taiwan, respectively—even if the bar is likely still too high for Moscow at present, since its own security interests are not directly at stake.
And as formidable as Russia’s influence in the Indo-Pacific is, only China and North Korea can count as staunch supporters. All other countries in the region—even if they have no love lost for the West—resist the idea of helping the Kremlin build a competing strategic bloc. As the great powers try to align their respective supporters, many Indo-Pacific countries seem to be taking their cues from the Non-Aligned Movement that emerged during the Cold War.
For the United States, the best policy will be to resist being hyperbolic—particularly about the Russia-North Korea defense pact—and recognize that the threat of a Russian military intervention in the Indo-Pacific is improbable for now, not least because Moscow’s attention is fixed on Ukraine.
As long as Russian interference does not fundamentally challenge the United States’ own Indo-Pacific strategy, then Moscow’s interference is just part and parcel of the emerging multipolar order.
The post Russia Is a Strategic Spoiler in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Foreign Policy.
