Iran’s presidential election, scheduled for June 28, has effectively narrowed to a three-way contest among reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and the two leading conservative candidates, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili. While much attention has been focused on Pezeshkian, a veteran parliamentarian and former health minister, less has been said about the intense dynamics within the conservative camp.
This is a mistake. While Pezeshkian is leading in several polls, the race is far from settled, and his chances greatly improve if the conservatives fail to unite behind a single candidate. Meanwhile, the conservative infighting is crucial, as the differences between their two leading candidates are significant and can profoundly shape Iran’s future direction.
The conservative camp in Iran, known domestically as “principlists” and often referred to as hard-liners abroad, is far from monolithic. The recent parliamentary elections highlighted these internal divisions, where various conservative factions competed against one another. The establishment conservative list, known by its Persian acronym SHANA and which included Ghalibaf, who has been the speaker of Iran’s parliament since 2020, faced significant losses to more hard-line groups led by conservative clerics and activists. That same dynamic is now playing out in the presidential race, complicating efforts for conservative unity and inadvertently benefiting the reformist candidate, Pezeshkian.
The contrast between the leading conservative candidates becomes quickly apparent in their respective resumes. Ghalibaf is seeking the presidency for the fourth time and has a background as a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and Tehran’s mayor. During his tenure as mayor, Ghalibaf focused on modernizing Tehran’s infrastructure, leading notable projects like building out the metro system. Politically, he positions himself as a pragmatic conservative, advocating for reduced government intervention in the economy, emphasizing the harmful impact of sanctions, and supporting negotiations to alleviate them. He has long presented himself as a strongman leader equipped to steer the country through challenging times with effective management.
Saeed Jalili, the former chief nuclear negotiator, is distinguished by his firm opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Jalili’s prominence grew during his tenure as Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), where he oversaw nuclear negotiations from 2007 to 2013. Like Ghalibaf, Jalili is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, in which he lost a leg. He is closely aligned with Iran’s most conservative factions and is considered more ideologically rigid than Ghalibaf, prioritizing self-reliance and resistance to Western influence.
The rivalry between Jalili and Ghalibaf traces back to the 2013 presidential election, where both competed in a crowded conservative field and neither withdrew in favor of the other. This lack of unity among conservatives contributed to the split in their vote, ultimately facilitating the victory of moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani. In that election, Jalili received a significant endorsement from the late Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, one of Iran’s most conservative clerics, who lauded him as the “most qualified” candidate.
Notably, Mesbah Yazdi was known as the spiritual leader of Iran’s most conservative faction, the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, or Jebhe Paydari. This group has officially endorsed Jalili in the current presidential race, and who have had a tumultuous relationship with Ghalibaf. T ideological divide has become increasingly evident in Iran’s current parliament. Jalili’s allies Jebhe Paydari allies in parliament have criticized Ghalibaf, for example, for reportedly trying to water down a bill aimed at increasing enforcement of the mandatory hijab. Ghalibaf allies have condemned Jalili’s camp in return, accusing them of pursuing a “purification” purge similar to the one that sidelined former moderate conservative parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani. Ghalibaf himself has labeled these figures, including those in Jebhe Paydari, as “super revolutionaries” who undermine unity within the conservative camp.
This parliamentary bickering has been an ideological preview of the presidential contest. Jalili’s uncompromising stance on negotiations with the West, especially his strong opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal stands in stark contrast to Ghalibaf’s more pragmatic approach. Jalili has emphatically stated, “If I had become president, I would not have signed the JCPOA because my thinking is different.” Throughout his current run for president, he has consistently emphasized his commitment to a self-reliant vision for Iran, showing little interest in pursuing sanctions relief. This rigid position underscores his belief in long-term self-sufficiency over immediate economic concessions
In contrast, Ghalibaf has consistently highlighted the detrimental effects of international sanctions, advocating for a strategy of diplomacy. He proposes lifting sanctions through a process of reciprocal, phased concessions, reflecting a more flexible mindset. Ghalibaf’s approach seeks to mitigate the immediate economic hardships faced by Iranians, presenting himself as a leader capable of navigating complex international negotiations.
The current contest between Ghalibaf and Jalili has been marked by sharp public criticisms. Ghalibaf has openly questioned Jalili’s lack of executive experience and his ability to build consensus, arguing, “We should not have a president who wants to test their ideas. … We should not have a president who is not knowledgeable about the issues and lacks authority. We should not have someone who cannot build consensus, has no strong record, and lacks experience.” Highlighting his own extensive background as Tehran’s mayor and the head of the IRGC air force, Ghalibaf presents himself as a seasoned leader. Jalili, however, has countered by dismissing Ghalibaf’s executive experience as merely “contracting,” asserting, “The position of the presidency is not a position of execution in the sense of contracting. It is a place for discernment and decision-making.”
Supporters of both candidates have ramped up their rhetoric, with each camp aggressively targeting the other’s weaknesses. Majid Rafiei, a media activist for Ghalibaf’s team, labeled Jalili a “dreamer,” stating, “The presidency is not a place for trial and error. The fate of a nation is at stake. Some candidates should at least have the experience of contracting a three-story building in their resumes.”
On the other hand, Jalili’s supporters have capitalized on controversies surrounding Ghalibaf’s family and associates, emphasizing corruption allegations. They frequently bring up the “baby clothes scandal,” where Ghalibaf’s pregnant daughter was accused of purchasing a large amount of goods in Turkey in 2022 amid Iran’s economic struggles. Additionally, they point to individuals in Ghalibaf’s circle with histories of corruption charges. This narrative has been bolstered by the imprisonment of three journalists—Saba Azarpeik, Yashar Soltani, and Vahid Ashtari—who have reported extensively on Ghalibaf’s alleged corruption, further questioning his integrity and leadership.
Despite their differences, Ghalibaf and Jalili do share significant commonalities as they both hail from the broader principlist camp. Compared to Pezeshkian, both candidates are more resistant to improving ties with the US, aligning closely with the Supreme Leader’s vision for Iran’s foreign policy orientation. Domestically, they are less supportive of social and political liberalization, favoring policies that uphold the principles of the Islamic Revolution and maintain conservative values.
As the election approaches, pressure is mounting for either Ghalibaf or Jalili to withdraw to avoid splitting the conservative vote. Leading conservative figures and newspapers, such as Vatan Emrooz, have suggested that Ghalibaf has a better chance of defeating Pezeshkian, urging Jalili to step aside. Vatan Emrooz highlighted a survey indicating that if Ghalibaf withdraws, only 38.2 percent of his votes would go to Jalili, whereas if Jalili withdraws, a significant 45.7 percent of his votes would shift to Ghalibaf, enhancing the conservatives’ chances. Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor in chief of the influential conservative newspaper Kayhan, echoed this sentiment, calling on principlists to “change the situation from multiple candidates to a single candidate” to prevent a Pezeshkian victory.
However, both Ghalibaf and Jalili appear resolute in their candidacies. Recent statements from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have been interpreted by both camps as supportive, further entrenching their positions. Khamenei has maintained close relationships with both figures; however, a Jalili presidency is more likely to antagonize disenchanted Iranians who seek fundamental political change and secularization. Conversely, Ghalibaf might offer greater stability.
If neither candidate withdraws, the election is likely to go to a runoff, with the likely scenario involving Pezeshkian facing either Ghalibaf or Jalili. However, should voter turnout exceed expectations in the first round, and if both conservative candidates remain in the race, splitting their vote, Pezeshkian could achieve an upset victory similar to Rouhani’s in 2013. If the election proceeds to a second round, Pezeshkian could generate additional public enthusiasm by framing the contest as a direct showdown against the conservative track record in recent years. The upcoming election thus hinges on whether the conservative factions can unify in time or if their internal divisions will enable a reformist resurgence. The next few days will be crucial in determining the outcome of this high-stakes political contest, with significant implications for both Iran and the West.
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