Authoritarian states’ traditional approach to conflict outside their borders is to choose sides—supplying political-diplomatic support and military muscle to their allies—or to freeze the conflict while keeping a hand in to stir the pot and shape possible outcomes. Russia has done both: the first by backing Syria’s Bashar al Assad against various rebel movements, and the second by trying to dominate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Authoritarians are not known for expending resources on peacemaking ventures with uncertain outcomes. Nor do they focus on good governance norms after a settlement. They are often content to consolidate the power and standing of local authoritarians.
Yet that pattern seems to be shifting. Today, we are witnessing a number of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states engage in mediation, and conflict management. China has mediated between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Qatar has led talks between Israel and Hamas, and Turkey has done the same between Russia and Ukraine leading to the Black Sea Grain deal that lapsed last year.
In an attempt at heavy-handed conflict management, Russia tried to freeze the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and sent in peacekeepers in 2020 but stood aside when the Azerbaijani forces took decisive action to seize the disputed territory three years later. Such activities are pursued by a wide range of nominal and quasi-democracies, military governments, presidential one-party states, and monarchies.
The impact of this surge in authoritarian peacemaking gets less attention than it deserves. Authoritarian states are buffeting the peacemaking diplomacy of Western states, blocking or undercutting Western initiatives and challenging Western leadership of the global peacemaking agenda. The most obvious impact has been the global polarization that creates gridlock in the U.N. Security Council, undercuts support for U.N. peace operations and saps coherence around critical norms such as human rights and individual freedoms.
This pattern constrains what the U.N. can do in conflict management, mediation and peacebuilding. It also directly challenges the ability of NGOs to work for dialogue and reconciliation in fragile and war-torn places such as Georgia where pro-Russian parties are imposing Russian-style controls on the activity of NGOs that receive external support. Such action undermines the unofficial playbook for peacemaking and good governance.
By pushing back against Western conceptions about managing conflict, authoritarian peacemaking is part-and-parcel of a more general global backlash against intrusive and interventionist western policies that may undercut the perceived authority and legitimacy of incumbent regimes.
This backlash privileges state sovereignty against notions about “global” norms relating to rights and governance. Sadly, the U.S. government has made the undermining of international norms easier by adopting double standards on civilian protection and human rights law in Ukraine and Gaza. Such conduct actually helps China attack American soft power in Africa and undercuts U.S. diplomatic efforts at the U.N.
But the authoritarian surge is not necessarily either effective or coherent. Consider, for example, the difficulty experienced by Egypt’s military regime and Qatar’s monarchy in bringing Hamas and Israel to a deal, even with strong backing from the U.S. and other Western and Arab states. Regional authoritarians have not been notably successful in bringing about peace and stability in Libya and have aggravated rather than alleviated its internal clan and tribal factionalism.
They have failed to cohere effectively for peace in Yemen. Regional authoritarians made Syria’s tragic civil war divisions worse before ceding the field to the Russians. In all these cases, the authoritarians ran into the hard realities of intractable conflicts where the local parties have plenty of weapons and have not yet exhausted their unilateral options. In some cases, they made the problem worse.
At first glance, it might appear that authoritarian states bring certain advantages to the table. One attribute is internal unity of command and policy coherence at the level of the individual state. Unlike liberal states, they can potentially bring not only a whole of government approach but also a whole of society focus in their strategy for dealing with conflicts. Messy internal policy debates do not bother them. Authoritarians generally place top priority on achieving stability and creating a favorable context for advancing regime interests, and their policies are best understood as transactional.
In practice the record of their approaches is quite mixed. In one model, for the transactions to succeed, it is necessary for the existing regime or the “winner” in a civil war to be capable of being a reliable partner to the external authoritarian conflict manager. In a second model, the authoritarian goal is to back a factional side—either to exploit natural resources or block an adversary or rival state, or perhaps both.
The idea of a negotiated settlement may not be a priority or be viewed as less desirable than some degree of continued instability. This scenario can slide into a third model in which rival authoritarians seek to impose a favorable outcome on the country and compete with rival external powers through the provision of military and political support. While authoritarian states may have internal coherence, they are often in conflict with other states.
It is not clear that any of these models is good for peace or for the lives of ordinary civilians. In the case of Syria, Russia prevailed by applying the first model, carpet-bombing cities to help the local authoritarian prevail, imposing a very cold peace. But it is not clear that authoritarian states will be successful in imposing outright victories in many other situations.
The case of Libya provides a vivid illustration of what can happen with the second model when outsiders pile in to pursue their varied agendas: In this case Egypt, Russia, the UAE, and the Saudis (to say nothing of the French) decided to support Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s designs against the U.N.-recognized unity government in Tripoli, backed by Turkey, Qatar, Italy, and the United States.
Commercial, strategic, and ideological agendas coursed across the strife-torn land, leading a succession of U.N. special envoys to resign in frustration, blaming the Libyan factions (rather than their backers) for a lack of political will to work for reconciliation and create conditions for holding elections. Libya’s disorder does not remain in Libya, as the neighboring Sudanese can attest.
In the case of the Ethiopia-Tigray civil war in 2020 to 2022, the Ethiopians enjoyed military support from the authoritarian regime of Eritrea as well as Turkey, Iran, and the UAE. But it was the African Union-based mediation of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo supported by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and senior envoys of the U.S. and South African governments negotiated an end to the fighting. This followed the Ethiopian government’s ability to impose itself militarily on Tigray at a key moment in 2022 thanks to Turkish drones—though the country is still facing insurgents in other regions.
But it is clear that Sudan is not endowed with such resources for conflict management, despite the high hopes generated by the internationally celebrated Juba Accord of October 2020 between its transitional government and a range of rebel movements. Two and a half years later, the current civil war erupted, causing the gravest humanitarian crisis in the world, affecting some 6.6 million internally displaced persons and 2 million refugees fleeing into neighboring countries.
Rival military factions are tearing the country apart while attracting external authoritarians like flies to flypaper. The Saudis and the United States continue to host peace efforts, but Sudan’s military leaders enjoy widespread backing from authoritarian states: The regime’s forces are aided by Egypt, the Saudis, and Iran while the rival Rapid Support Forces are allied with Libya’s Haftar, the Chad regime of Mahamat Deby, plus the Russians, the UAE, and an assortment of allies in neighboring states. This is the second model with a vengeance, and it looks increasingly like it is sliding into the third model of authoritarian rivals pushing their proxies to the finish.
Spectacles like these do not seem to augur well for the peacemaking business. They undercut the potential for international organizations to play their traditional role. The Security Council regularly takes up the Sudan file but is prevented by gridlock from naming names and using serious pressure to stop the fighting. The UAE strenuously denies its role in fueling the fighting in an unholy alliance including Haftar and Deby, and the western permanent members of the Security Council are well aware they cannot ignore likely vetoes from China and Russia.
At the regional level, African Union members are divided, and the Gulf Cooperation Council is hampered by the intense feuding between the Saudis and the UAE. Sudan is a laboratory case of how warring factions export their divisions to external sponsors who return the favor by exporting their own divisions back into the conflict.
At first glance, all of this may look bad for the United States and, more generally, the West because it points to the erosion of the West’s hard and soft power. High-minded efforts at conflict management and good governance contend face-to-face with the most cynical practitioners of transactional statecraft. However, U.S. diplomats need a closer look at peacemaking cases to understand how U.S. statecraft can sometimes be effective in corralling recalcitrant antagonists, operating behind the scenes or employing more of an invisible hand.
When necessary, the United States is capable of standing back and advancing its interests by empowering others, sharing credit, and borrowing leverage and even credibility from other players, including the transactional authoritarians, however unprincipled they are.
During the Balkan wars of the 1990s, it fell to the U.S. government to knock mostly authoritarian heads and impose a stop to the fighting. Representatives of the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the European Union attended the Dayton peace conference. In the case of Colombia’s long civil conflicts, Washington first deployed diplomatic leadership via Plan Colombia and helped shape the balance of power between the government and the Marxist rebels of the FARC.
In the next phase, the U.S. government operated more indirectly via a special envoy who participated discreetly in a process led by Cuba and Norway with facilitator countries Venezuela and Chile, all loosely coordinating with major European and neighboring states, the U.N., and the E.U., leading to the 2016 Colombian peace accords. Washington played its hand decisively but less visibly in the Northern Ireland process leading to the 1998 Good Friday agreement.
This less direct public face of peacemaking has a history. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt indirectly maneuvered Tsarist Russia and imperial Japan to terminate a hugely costly war, leaving the visible negotiation to the direct parties. He never personally visited the conference table in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, but actively communicated with relevant governments and, in effect, borrowed leverage from authoritarian and democratic states alike, while blocking alternative approaches. The process required Roosevelt to navigate the politics of two authoritarian regimes which could not admit their need for his help.
Fast forward to the 1980s and 1990s when U.S. negotiators borrowed leverage from allies and erstwhile adversaries in bringing authoritarian regimes to make peace in Southern Africa (working with the British, Portuguese, and other Western allies as well as the Soviets, Cubans, Zambians, Congolese, Cape Verdeans, Mozambicans and the U.N. Secretariat), and to avert civil war in Ethiopia (working with Sweden, Britain, the Soviets, Israel, Sudan, and the Marxist-oriented rebel Eritrean and Tigrayan movements).
This is not a brand-new way of operating but one that could become more common in an age of multiple overlapping alignments where other states are partners on some issues and troublesome obstacles on others. It could also be less of a drain on the political capital available to presidents and secretaries of state. To work, it requires top level officials to delegate and a willingness to work closely with friends, partners, and other parties they wouldn’t want to bring home for dinner.
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