Qatar, the small emirate on the Persian Gulf, has long enjoyed unmatched influence over Hamas, the ruling power in Gaza. It is now threatening to withdraw its services as a mediator between Hamas and Israel unless Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ceases what Doha considers to be a smear campaign against it. The fate of the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza could now hang in the balance of this new diplomatic dispute.
Last week, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said that the mediation process had been abused for “narrow political interests,” and that Qatar will make “the appropriate decision at the right time.” It was a message intended for Netanyahu, according to an Arab official who spoke to Foreign Policy.
Qatari officials reportedly believe that Netanyahu is deliberately delaying a possible release of hostages to prolong the war and stay in power. By threatening to walk away from the negotiations, they believe they can pressure Netanyahu into clarifying whether negotiating a hostage release is a priority for him at all. “We only negotiate when both sides want us to,” said a Qatari official who spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity considering the sensitivity of the matter.
Netanyahu knows Qatar is necessary to the negotiations owing to the leverage that it gained over Hamas in the years prior to the current war. Qatar sent $1.3 billion in aid to Gaza between 2012 and 2021, at a time when Israel had otherwise largely cut off the territory, and it lent Hamas international credibility by giving its representatives airtime on Al Jazeera.
Qatar is well aware of its unique diplomatic position and is enjoying the limelight on the global stage. And yet there have been valid questions around Qatar’s intentions. There is strong suspicion in Israel and in parts of the U.S. government that it is biased in Hamas’s favor and pushing for its agenda. Doha, they say, could more effectively compel Hamas if it threatened those of its leaders who have taken residence in Qatar with expulsion, or with extradition to a country that lists Hamas as a terrorist organization.
Qatar started to host Hamas in 2012 after the group ran afoul of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and claims to have opened its doors at the behest of then-U.S. President Barack Obama. But the Arab official aware of the negotiations Foreign Policy has learned that despite bipartisan pressure from both Democratic and Republican lawmakers, Qatar has not yet asked Hamas to relocate.
Last week, U.S. Rep. Steny Hoyer accused Qatar of blocking negotiations, essentially abusing its role as a mediator. He was the fifth lawmaker to urge Congress to scrap Qatar’s status as a major non-NATO ally granted to the Arab nation in 2022 for supporting evacuations from Afghanistan. Any such demotion would not only be a global embarrassment for Qatar but would relegate it below Egypt and other competitors in the neighborhood who also hold the same designation.
“Qatar needs to make it clear to Hamas that there will be repercussions,” Hoyer said in a statement. Earlier this month, Republican Sens. Ted Budd, Joni Ernst, and Rick Scott introduced a bill that would require the United States to conduct a review to “terminate the designation” if Qatar didn’t expel or extradite Hamas’s leadership, “including Ismail Haniyeh, Khalil al-Hayya, Khaled Mashal,” its biggest leaders.
Orly Gilboa—the mother of 19-year-old Daniella Gilboa, who has been held hostage by Hamas since Oct. 7, 2023—said that the United States’ pressure on Qatar could work. “Qatar supports Hamas, but they want good relations with the U.S., so they will do what the U.S. wants them to do,” she told Foreign Policy over Zoom.
But some U.S. lawmakers said the move to scrap the status was premature and unwarranted. That has encouraged Doha to stay the course. But the Arab official believes that those who asked to strip Qatar of the designation are perhaps pro-Netanyahu lawmakers and do not speak for the Oval Office.
Budd’s legislation argues that if Hamas is refusing “reasonable” negotiations, then there is no reason for Qatar to continue hosting Hamas’s political office or members, parroting the viewpoint of many in Israel’s security community. But “reasonable” is being defined differently by the various parties concerned.
While Israel expects Qatar to convince Hamas to release hostages and then intends to resume the war to eliminate the group entirely from Gaza, Qatar finds merit in Hamas’s demand of a permanent cease-fire. This is the crux of the disagreement between Qatar and Israel.
“I don’t think it’s an unreasonable request,” said an Arab official familiar with the negotiations. “If they release all hostages, they want an end to the war.”
However, the Israeli security community suspects that’s not all Hamas wants. They argue it could have achieved an end to the war had it agreed to disarm and leave Gaza. Israelis fear that Hamas wants to return to Gaza, victorious, and carry out more attacks that match the cruelty of Oct. 7.
“We can’t hand Hamas a victory,” said Eran Lerman, a former Israeli deputy national security advisor. “After what they have done, we refuse to live with Hamas as our neighbors. And it’s not just Netanyahu, but there is wide support for the policy to eradicate Hamas.” Israel is ready to offer only a temporary truce until Hamas has been vanquished.
Doha makes the case that since the war had limited its ability to send aid to Gaza, it simply doesn’t have the kind of leverage it once did over Hamas’s leaders holding the hostages inside Gaza.
“Sinwar will rather die inside Gaza than agree to a deal to leave,” said an Arab official aware of the negotiations, referring to the Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader within Gaza who was behind the Oct. 7 attack. “This is the mistake—this is what Israelis are not understanding.”
He said that threatening to kick out Hamas’s political leaders from Qatar will not bring the desired pressure on Hamas. Sinwar, who is making the final decisions about the hostage negotiations, doesn’t care about his group’s political representatives or where they live, “whether in Qatar, Turkey, Oman, or Iran.”
Israel also doesn’t care where Hamas’s leaders reside and has already declared that it will hunt them down wherever they may choose to hide. But Israeli leaders say that in the short term, they are focused on bringing back the hostages and eliminating Hamas.
Lerman said that Egypt has already been partly involved in negotiations, noting that it could become a single point of communication with Hamas if Qatar doesn’t succeed in mediating the release of the hostages in exchange for a temporary truce not a permanent cease-fire. “It’s not like we won’t be left with a channel of communication,” he said. “If Qatar cannot live up to its claim, that it has leverage over Hamas, then what’s the point?”
Some in the Israeli security community believe that once the long-expected Rafah operation has been successfully carried out and all of Gaza brought under Israeli occupation, Hamas’s leaders and members would be in for a run for their lives and more inclined to accept a deal on Israeli terms.
“Hamas will feel a very different kind of threat than they feel now—that will change their minds,” Lerman said.
It’s a tricky gamble. If Qatar walks out, Israel risks losing a mediator with more influence over Hamas than any other Arab state, and if Doha fails in ensuring safe hostage release, it may damage its ties with the United States. Thus far, neither side is willing to concede, and negotiations will likely go down the wire, further procrastinating the homecoming of the more than 130 Israelis believed to remain in Gaza.
Families of hostages have said that they want their loved ones released “despite the difficult price,” but they also don’t want Hamas to live next door, preferably.
“I prefer if there is a solution,” Gilboa said. “Maybe Hamas’s leaders can move to Qatar and live there.”
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