Democrats have been debating whether the party should move to the left or the center for nearly a decade. This month’s midterm results were almost perfectly calibrated to make sure the debate rages into the next presidential primary.
On the one hand, Democrats won in a tsunami. They often did so with a populist pitch, and despite the calls for the party to move to the center. The new progressive activist left won more races than ever before, including its first big victory in a battleground state: Michigan, where Abdul El-Sayed won a divisive race for Senate. Incredibly, in May, he even predicted his exact margin of victory: seven percentage points.
On the other hand, progressive candidates underperformed by enough and in enough races to keep the old “electability” debate alive and well. Many of the weakest Democratic results — those where the party fared relatively poorly given the national environment and the characteristics of the state or district — came in races where Democrats picked progressive candidates in contested nominating fights this summer.
Mr. El-Sayed’s victory is an example of this kind of underperformance. While he won and won comfortably, his victory was underwhelming if judged against how Democrats did elsewhere in the country. After all, Michigan usually votes about the same as the country; this year, Democrats are on track to win by 13 or 14 points nationwide. Mr. El-Sayed’s seven-point victory counts as a significant underperformance against that backdrop.
It’s important to note that many progressives fared well, even though many of the party’s weakest showings featured progressive nominees. In congressional races in Montana, Ohio and Pennsylvania, populists with a blue-collar background — like firefighters and union leaders — won in districts that voted for President Trump in the last election. Progressives also fared extraordinarily well, like Democrats of all political stripes, in districts with large Hispanic populations, including in key battlegrounds in California and Colorado.
And if one accepts a broad definition of progressive — which might include much of the mainstream of the Democratic Party, not just factional candidates of the progressive left — progressives didn’t merely perform well but may have also found a way forward for a divided party.
Democrats of all ideological leanings gravitated toward a distinctly progressive message, including embracing populist economics and opposing Israel’s conduct in Gaza, even while many tried to steer clear of “socialism” and the “woke” politics of the early 2020s. The appeal of this affordability-focused message was first demonstrated by the democratic socialist Zohran Mamdani in his New York mayoral campaign. But Democrats across the ideological spectrum — from Jon Ossoff and James Talarico to Mr. El-Sayed — can be said to have followed a similar blueprint.
Nonetheless, the party’s weakest results tended to come when Democrats nominated progressive candidates in high-profile primaries, where ideological differences were likely to be amplified. They also tended to come in states where Democrats appeared burdened by the perceived excesses or failures of progressive governance. In a blue tsunami, it did not ultimately cost the Democrats many elections — the races for Florida Senate and Maine’s Second District stand out as the likeliest candidates — but in a more competitive year the toll could have been more significant or even decisive.
The question of how well progressives or moderates fare is always fraught, and the answer can be highly sensitive to the way the analysis is conducted. This year, the Democratic Party’s extraordinary gains among younger, Hispanic and red-state voters — along with the G.O.P.’s relative resilience among older, white and blue-state voters — make it even more challenging. This analysis attempts to account for the demographic and political characteristics of a state or district, as well as the prior political strength of the Republican incumbent, if one is running.
Even when progressives clearly underperform, it’s not necessarily clear whether their ideology or policy views were the reason. After all, there are many progressive Democrats — like those who support Medicare for all or oppose aid to Israel — who are well within the mainstream of the Democratic Party and fare well in elections. Tammy Baldwin and Cory Booker (who overperformed Nov. 3 in New Jersey, by our measures) are examples of mainstream progressives with solid electoral track records.
Instead, the progressives who systematically underperform have tended to come from a narrower faction of the party: the new, activist left. This faction is clearly to the left of the party’s mainstream progressives, most obviously when its members embrace socialism and slogans or positions like “defund the police.” But they’re often different in other respects that can contribute to their electoral woes. They are “fighters,” not compromisers. They often focus on issues that animate activists, like Gaza and climate change, rather than bread-and-butter economics (though Mr. Mamdani’s affordability playbook helped ease this issue this cycle). And they run against the mainstream of the Democratic Party; in doing so, they signal to voters that they’re not just a little farther to the left, but different in kind.
All of these challenges make it harder to identify whether progressives underperform and, when they do so, exactly why. But at least in this year’s Senate races, a complicated analysis isn’t necessary to see that all six of the Democrats who substantially underperformed (by at least five percentage points) are progressives — and it includes all five of the progressives who prevailed in high-profile, contested nominating battles this summer: Mr. El-Sayed, Angie Nixon in Florida, Ed Markey in Massachusetts, Peggy Flanagan in Minnesota and Troy Jackson in Maine.
The findings hold in a more sophisticated analysis that accounts for their opponents, control of state government and the demographics of their states. In some cases, the progressive showing looks better by this measure. Mr. Jackson’s underperformance, for instance, isn’t nearly as large after considering Maine’s relatively old and white population, let alone the strength of his opponent, Susan Collins.
Nonetheless, the same Democrats underperformed, and moderate or establishment-backed Democrats did not. The one moderate Democrat who seemed to be at risk of underperforming under similar circumstances — Chris Pappas in New Hampshire, who faced the former senator John Sununu after a competitive primary in a relatively old and white state — did not underperform at all by this measure and won by a wide margin. All other major Democratic Senate candidates ran ahead of Democrats nationally.
By this measure, the biggest underperformer was actually Jeff Merkley in Oregon. As the only senator to endorse Bernie Sanders in 2016, he’s certainly a progressive. And despite winning easily, his roughly 19-point victory was a large underperformance: He won by less in Oregon than Roy Cooper did in North Carolina.
But it doesn’t necessarily follow that Mr. Merkley underperformed simply because he was a progressive, and it highlights some of the challenges involved in evaluating progressive candidates. He may have been weighed down by the unpopularity of Oregon’s Democratic governor, for instance, who won by less than 10 points. Of course, the Democratic government in Oregon is unpopular in part because of its handling of ideologically charged issues, like homelessness and public drug use, but it’s possible that another Democrat would have struggled in the Senate race.
This story repeats itself in blue states across the country. In general, Democratic candidates for Senate and House fared worse in states with relatively unpopular Democratic governments. Many of these states also happen to elect relatively progressive Democrats, including for Senate this year. Minnesota, where Ms. Flanagan is judged as an underperformer in our analysis, is another state where Democrats may have been burdened by this kind of problem.
Nonetheless, there’s an overarching pattern across the states where progressives underperformed, regardless of the popularity of Democratic government. Across these races, progressives struggled to match Kamala Harris’s 2024 support among older voters and white voters with a college degree, according to Times Voter Trends. These groups have trended toward Democrats over the last decade, but they appear to have major reservations about supporting more progressive Democrats. They usually opposed them in the primaries and in some cases may have done so in the general election.
The highest-income communities near Detroit, Boston and Minneapolis all swung to the right — in some cases voting more than 10 points to the right of the 2024 election result even in a year when Democrats ran 15 points better than Ms. Harris nationwide. So did areas dominated by older voters, like The Villages in Florida. This suggests that something similar is at play across these races — a backlash among affluent and older moderates — even if the reason for the backlash might not always be about the progressive on the ballot.
The story is even harder to tease out in the House, where establishment-backed candidates of varying ideological stripes won Democratic nominations in almost every vigorously contested race. The handful of progressive-backed candidates who did win in competitive races — based on endorsements from groups like the Justice Democrats or Mr. Sanders’s Our Revolution — were also a fairly idiosyncratic bunch. Some of the candidates even strain the usual definition of a progressive candidate, like those who do not support Medicare for all.
The group of progressive-backed candidates who didn’t support Medicare for all — usually blue-collar populists in working-class districts that voted for Mr. Trump — fared quite well. The more archetypal progressives — those endorsed by the progressive left and who did support Medicare for all — were relatively likely to underperform.
Two of the party’s three worst showings in the battlegrounds, by our measure, involved House progressive nominees. In one of those races, the Democratic candidate probably cost the party a seat.
Maine’s Second is the only district that flipped from blue to red (other than those affected by gerrymandering). The moderate Democrat Jared Golden decided not to seek re-election after he faced a primary challenge from a progressive (although he cited other reasons for exiting). In the end, the progressive, Matt Dunlap, was defeated. Remarkably, Maine’s Second has gone from being the most Republican district won by a Democrat in 2024 to the most Democratic district won by a Republican in 2026.
Democrats did not lose in Michigan’s Seventh District, a classic battleground where the party nominated William Lawrence, who until recently was a Democratic Socialists of America member. He won, but only by about three points in a district that Mr. Trump won by one point in 2024. By our estimates, this was an even worse underperformance for Democrats than in Maine’s Second. Mr. Lawrence ran behind Mr. El-Sayed in this district as well.
That said, there were two other progressive-backed candidates who fared better. One was Bob Brooks, a firefighter and labor leader who easily won a classic battleground district, Pennsylvania’s Seventh. He performed about as one might expect. Whether he modestly overperformed or underperformed depends on whether one accounts for his party’s overall strength in Pennsylvania (in general, House candidates tend to fare better in states where their party fared well at the top of the ticket; the analysis was conducted each way).
The biggest progressive winner of all was Randy Villegas, a professor who holds an overwhelming lead — 68 percent to 32 percent — in a redrawn California district that would have voted for Mr. Trump by around two points in the last election. The backstory here is simple: Hispanic voters make up a majority of the electorate, and Democrats made enormous gains among them nationwide and perhaps especially in California’s Central Valley. If Mr. Villegas paid any penalty for his progressive views, there’s no sign of it in the data. A second progressive in a relatively Hispanic district — Manny Rutinel in the Denver area — ran in line with expectations.
Beyond the contested nominating battles in competitive states, most progressives tended to fare somewhat worse than other Democrats, but not by much. There were clear exceptions — Representative Ilhan Omar in Minnesota is currently the only House Democrat who is performing worse than Ms. Harris did in 2024 — but in general the differences are modest at best. This finding has been echoed by other analysts in recent days, and it is somewhat of a departure from recent cycles, when progressives underperformed by larger margins even in noncompetitive races.
This might suggest that progressives made progress toward finding a more appealing message, perhaps in part because of the new focus on affordability. Or it may mean that this year’s blue tsunami washed over the usual ideological divides. With Mr. Trump’s approval rating in the 30s, perhaps many voters who might ordinarily consider voting for a Republican over a progressive Democrat didn’t feel they had a choice.
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