The early weeks of 2022 were filled with a lot of debate about whether Russia would really invade Ukraine.
Few doubted that an invasion was a possibility. Some 160,000 Russian troops had been moved to areas near the border of Ukraine. It was no secret that President Vladimir Putin believed Ukraine to be an artificial country with an illegitimate government that really belonged to Russia.
The debate at the time centered on whether Mr. Putin’s actions and bluster were merely for show. Those — including me — who thought an invasion was unlikely did not think so because Mr. Putin had said it would not happen; we knew better than to rely on his denials. But we also knew that an invasion would be an absurd undertaking. The Ukrainians would surely fight, supported by Europe and the United States, and even if their army was defeated, they would resist subjugation. Mr. Putin would inevitably get bogged down in a long conflict from which he would struggle to extricate himself and his army.
In the event, we doubters were half right: The invasion was a terrible idea. Mr. Putin went through with it anyway.
I have been reminded of those arguments of almost five years ago in recent months, as Russia’s hybrid attacks on Europe have become increasingly brazen. Having miscalculated so badly then, could Mr. Putin make an even bigger miscalculation now, and take his overstretched, battle-weary army into another, potentially bigger war? Could he be desperate enough to avoid a humiliating defeat in Ukraine that he would be willing to raise the stakes on his original bet? It would be another absurd undertaking, yet dare we rule it out?
Last month a Russian drone struck a passenger train at a station near the Ukrainian border with Poland shortly after a train carrying Boris Johnson, a former prime minister of Britain, and other European dignitaries had departed. David Petraeus, a former C.I.A. director, was at the train station when the attack took place.
The German government has said that Russia was behind a drone carrying explosives that was found close to a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle airport in eastern Germany in early August. There have been Russian reconnaissance drone flights over sensitive targets. Facilities connected with industries supplying arms to Ukraine have been surveyed and, on occasion, attacked.
The term “hybrid” is often used to refer to nonmilitary activities — for example, cyberattacks and misinformation — that are designed to probe red lines and destabilize their targets. By keeping attacks deniable and below the threshold of a full war, Russia can make a political point and create a sense of threat without triggering a military retaliation. But the current Russian campaign is getting close to the edge, as attacks attributed to Moscow have caused significant damage. Some of these could have resulted in loss of life, and that they have not seems to be a question of good luck more than anything else. What might seem to be a modest addition in scale and purpose, or just a miscalculation, could take us to a new and more dangerous place.
The Russians are playing this game because they are desperate to bring the war with Ukraine to an end on their terms. Europe’s continuing financial and military support for Ukraine is seen as a barrier to victory. Mr. Putin is becoming more blatant in his warnings and brazen in his actions to get the Europeans to turn off their support. The timeline of Western rearmament plans assumes that Russia would be in no position to try anything until its army is reconstituted in a few years’ time, and that even then, a military adventure would be even more of a gamble than it was in 2022, especially since Russian forces have since struggled to defeat a much smaller country.
The argument that we should nonetheless worry, which has been developed fully by the Institute for the Study of War, is as follows: Mr. Putin believes that the conflict with NATO is deep and existential and goes beyond Ukraine. At some point this conflict will come to a head, and there are arguments inside Russia for not waiting. With European rearmament still in its early stages, Russia could strike before the alliance is capable of a full response. Such a strike would not need to be total war and could instead be a limited move against one of the Baltic States, for which Russia could have sufficient forces. Estonia has been mentioned. Mr. Putin could calculate that any attack would put NATO in a state of shock, its members dithering about whether to trigger Article 5, and ultimately weaken political will in Europe for supporting Ukraine. The United States, with President Trump in charge, would be expected to do little.
If such an attack went as planned, it could create a crisis that would isolate Ukraine, weaken NATO and put Russia in a better position to assert itself.
This would still be a high-risk operation. Russia does not have much spare capacity. Western intelligence agencies would most likely spot preparations, as they did in 2022, reducing the possibilities of total surprise. Even if some NATO members were reluctant to get involved, the most affected countries could and most likely would defend themselves without waiting for a collective response. What might begin as a manageable operation could quickly escalate into something much larger.
In 2022 Mr. Putin took bold action out of an excess of confidence, assuming erroneously that he would get a quick victory and leave Ukraine subjugated and NATO stunned. If he acted against another European country now, it would be out of desperation and with the prospect of a worse outcome.
There is no need, however, this time, for endless speculation about Mr. Putin’s plans. Whether he continues with the current level of provocations or raises the threat higher — even risking a major war — European countries should follow the same policies, with or without American participation. First, leaders should be prepared to call out Russia and be candid with their citizens about these dangers, the nature of the struggle and how Russian threats are best addressed. Second, they must better defend against attacks at whatever level they occur, which requires stepping up intelligence efforts and accelerating rearmament plans. And third, to demonstrate that Russian efforts will fail, they should give Ukraine even more support.
Lawrence Freedman is an emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London and the author, most recently, of “On Strategists and Strategy: Collected Essays, 2014-2024.” He is a writer of the newsletter Comment Is Freed.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
The post Putin’s Desperate, Dangerous Game in Europe appeared first on New York Times.
