The United States is preparing for its artificial intelligence dialogue with China, and our officials are under tremendous pressure from many sincere people to cooperate on A.I. risk with our foremost strategic competitor. Because American and Chinese companies are building the most powerful models, these people argue that an agreement, even a treaty, between the superpowers is humanity’s last backstop against potential catastrophe.
I get the logic. But as the former State Department envoy who co-led the first U.S.-China A.I. dialogue, I fear the coming talks will not save us. If the past is prologue, China will have little interest in anything beyond gaining a competitive advantage.
The agenda of the May 2024 meeting was crystal clear to both sides because our presidents had agreed to it: Focus on the risks of advanced A.I. systems and the potential for safety cooperation. Yet Chinese officials steered talks away from the potential risks of A.I. systems for hours. They even demurred from explaining their domestic A.I. regulations — despite having regulators in the room.
Instead, China chided us for our concerns about A.I. risks. They portrayed our safety approach as a barrier to unlocking the technology’s opportunity and a way to stop poorer countries from accessing A.I. tools. They unfurled proposals for subdialogues that would have most likely resulted in endless procedural diplomacy.
A moment outside a hotel conference room sticks in my mind. A Chinese counterpart turned to me with a puzzled expression and asked why we actually wanted to talk about A.I. risk. We took the mandate from our presidents seriously. They saw only the opportunity to jockey for strategic advantage.
In this month’s meetings, I expect China to again downplay safety risks. It could dangle the possibility of safety cooperation in exchange for concessions such as the softening of chip controls. I think it will continue to portray itself as an altruistic savior dedicated to ensuring that the developing world gains A.I. access. Meanwhile, it will be likely to keep doing everything it can to get ahead — like generating propaganda in the hopes of inflaming opposition to data centers and encouraging Chinese companies to continue exploiting U.S. models to improve their systems.
Maybe China will toss its old playbook. Even President Xi Jinping is talking about risk and loss of control in A.I. Vivid new incidents show that A.I. systems can slip the leash of human control. Fear may converge with interest to produce coordinated action. Or at least a new understanding.
But if Beijing now takes the risks of A.I. seriously, the message has not reached its domestic companies. The Chinese government touts the global adoption of its open models, but Chinese models do not currently match U.S. models in safety performance that matters — thwarting access to the most dangerous capabilities. Its companies rarely disclose these risks and say almost nothing about signs that their models, too, might act recklessly beyond human control.
Complicating this already muddy situation for U.S. officials are the A.I. scientists, politicians, Wall Street and technology heavy hitters demanding an immediate A.I. alliance to thwart rogue A.I. I worry China will take advantage of these individuals’ sincerity, especially if diplomacy fails to produce a comprehensive safety agreement. Beijing could feign seriousness, float a hollow offer, then pin blame for its failure on the United States. The result could spark internal debates that weaken the core bipartisan consensus that the United States must lead in all facets of A.I., making it easier for China to forge ahead in the global technology competition.
What’s more, no durable diplomatic agreement can be reached while domestic policy is under construction. Companies must first start with technical and oversight solutions, which can be turned into policies by the government and only then translated into international agreement. Rather than press American officials for a diplomatic solution that cannot be realized, safety advocates with influential voices should push developers in both countries to raise standards, invest real money in research to build safer A.I. and increase transparency and reporting. And they should continue unofficial conversations with Chinese business leaders and former officials — a step that could encourage the government to act.
That’s not to say these summits can’t accomplish anything. The United States can and should test China’s commitment to addressing A.I. risk and hold its developers to the same transparency and safety performance benchmarks that American developers follow. Future talks could verify that progress has been made.
If both sides meet in earnest, the very best I could envision is a nonbinding commitment in which each side would agree to put pressure on its companies to publish and improve safety benchmarking for cybersecurity and biological risks, and to disclose (rather than bury) reports of concerning incidents. Both sides could also affirm their existing shared commitments on A.I. safety, including the 2024 agreement to maintain human control over nuclear weapons decisions. This will be a multiyear endeavor; countries should begin by affirming they are players in a longer arc of progress.
I realize this sounds underwhelming for those who see catastrophe ahead. But considering the rigidity of great power diplomacy and the immaturity of domestic policy, this would be an achievement against which to measure whatever comes next.
I am confident U.S. officials understand the stakes, as well as the tactics of their counterparts. And I hope that their efforts to find a balance will be supported by our A.I. safety community. At home, the core work must continue to build a path that all countries can sign on to.
Source photograph by Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters.
Seth Center led A.I. diplomacy at the State Department from 2023 to 2025 and served at the National Security Council in the first Trump administration. He is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
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