I hope Special Envoy Steve Witkoff made some progress toward ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine when he met with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow earlier this week. This barbaric war must end. I fear, however, that the negotiations that the Trump Administration has spent the better part of a year pursuing have not brought us any closer.
[time-brightcove not-tgx=”true”]
President Trump’s decision to engage directly with Putin is the right move. You cannot negotiate the end of a war by talking to only one side. But throughout 2025, Trump and Witkoff have been trying in vain to change Putin’s mind. The recently published 28-point plan was full of gifts for the Russian leader. This strategy of appeasement has not worked. In fact, it has the opposite effect. Putin has pocketed concessions offered earlier in the year and then asked for more. His most audacious ask has been to get the Trump Administration to pressure President Volodymyr Zelensky to give up the parts of Donbas in eastern Ukraine that Ukrainian soldiers still control.
If ending the war is still the goal, there are better strategies that the Trump Administration can pursue.
First, instead of trying to change Putin’s mind, the Trump Administration should focus on changing his capabilities. As long as Russia can keep taking territory in Ukraine—however incremental and irrespective of the massive numbers of Russians that must die to do so—Putin will keep fighting. He will only stop and earnestly negotiate when he no longer has the means to continue the war. A stalemate on the frontline is a necessary condition for serious peace talks. That can only be achieved if President Trump provides more and better weapons to Ukraine and imposes and enforces more and better sanctions against Russia.
On the military front, the Trump Administration must supply the Ukrainian air force with new stocks of AIM-9L and AIM-9M missiles for its F-16 fighter jets, which are now in very short supply, and deliver the first shipment of AIM-120 missiles much sooner. Ukraine also needs more NASAMS air defense systems and more long-range strike capabilities such as Tomahawk missiles to hit military targets deeper inside of Russia. New materiel would not only help on the battlefield but signal a U.S. commitment to Ukraine.
On the sanctions front, the Trump Administration could start with the entire shadow fleet that is being used to export Russian oil by sea. They could then sanction all Russian banks and hand over Russian assets frozen in U.S. accounts, which would make a similar decision by the Europeans easier. They could also sanction—or threaten to sanction—Western firms that allow their technologies to reach Russian military firms via third countries. And they could threaten secondary sanctions against China to reduce Beijing’s purchase of Russian energy exports.
Second, the Trump Administration must untangle negotiations about ending the war from talks about a Western security guarantee for Ukraine. This second discussion must occur without the Russians at the table. It was a significant mistake to give Putin a say in this conversation. The founders of NATO did not ask Joseph Stalin for permission to create the alliance in 1949. No one called Nikita Khrushchev to see if he was okay with bringing West Germany into NATO in 1955. The same principle must apply today. Putin does not get a say.
Third, the Trump Administration must also delink the issue of improving U.S.-Russia relations from ending the war in Ukraine. These are different issues. In particular, future U.S.-Russian business deals should not be on the agenda for peace talks. Most of the participants—two Americans and one Russian—in the last round of talks in Moscow this week were businesspeople. That makes no sense. It also creates the perception that President Trump is selling out the Ukrainians so American firms can profit in Russia.
Fourth, and finally, Secretary of State Marco Rubio must take the lead in negotiations with both the Russians and Ukrainians. It’s called “shuttle diplomacy” for a reason. Having one person taking the lead in talking to Putin and someone else talking to the Ukrainians is unwise.
Whether President Trump and his team are genuinely committed to ending the war on terms that would create permissive conditions for a prosperous, secure, and independent Ukraine is not always clear. But the embrace of a Plan B—since Plan A has not worked—would signal a credible commitment. More of the same will signal the opposite.
The post Trump Needs a New Ukraine Strategy appeared first on TIME.
