President Trump’s recent meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, led to a de-escalation of the tense trade war between the superpowers. But what could this truce mean for the United States in the long term, especially as China continues to demonstrate dominance?
In this episode, the Opinion editor Ariel Kaminer speaks with Oren Cass, the founder and chief economist of the conservative think tank American Compass, and Jason Furman, an economist at Harvard and a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, about the possible ways to engage with Beijing and the merits of blowing up a world built on free trade.
Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYTimes app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts.
The transcript has been lightly edited for length and clarity.
Ariel Kaminer: I’m Ariel Kaminer. I’m an editor at New York Times Opinion.
Donald Trump’s latest round of trade talks with China could mean a temporary calm in our turbulent relationship. In the past week, the countries have agreed to a reduction in tariffs on China and a commitment from that country to continue buying American farm exports and supplying rare earth metals.
So this seemed like a good moment to discuss the deal and the bigger picture. I’m joined today by two regular Times Opinion contributors whom I have had the frequent pleasure to edit. Oren Cass is the founder and chief economist of the conservative think tank American Compass. Oren has argued against free trade with China in our pages.
Hi, Oren.
Oren Cass: Good morning.
Kaminer: And Jason Furman is an economist at Harvard and a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers who has written about the benefits of free trade.
Hi, Jason.
Jason Furman: Hello.
Kaminer: Thanks for joining me today. We are taping this on a Friday morning, just a day after President Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader, struck a trade deal. Let’s start with the deal. How big of a moment is this? Jason?
Furman: Basically: Nothing new gained, nothing new lost. Broadly meh, but better than the alternatives.
Cass: Well, it’s funny. I agree with that, although I suspect we might have a different alternative in mind. I would say the alternative would have been their striking a more significant deal and ratcheting down what has become quite a significant conflict. It seems like they mostly maintain the status quo, which is quite high levels of conflict on trade and driving toward decoupling, which I think is very important.
Kaminer: For whatever it does or does not amount to, Jason, do you want to start us off by telling listeners how Americans will experience that deal — whether there are any effects that they will register. And if so, when?
Furman: So most of the deal that the United States reached with China was to call off escalations that they had both either started doing or announcing that they were going to do. The United States had threatened to add another 100 percent to tariffs. They’re not going to be doing that. China had probably stopped exporting certain rare earths, which are really important for certain American industries. They’re not going to do that again. So for a “normal” person, you’re not going to see very much.
But mostly you should think of this as like a cease-fire. Neither country is going to escalate. They’re going to keep talking. They’re going to try to figure more things out.
In terms of what the more is, though, it’s a really open question as to whether that will be less economic engagement with China — or actually more, where we’re trying to get them to buy more things and actually integrating even more with them than we are now.
Kaminer: Let’s step back a little bit to how we got here. The story took a big turn in 2000 when Congress granted China permanent normal trade relations status. At that time, free trade was a big bipartisan win. Economists were unanimous on its virtues.
Not anymore. Oren, what happened in 2000, and how did that consensus crumble?
Cass: In 2000, we were at the very peak of the post-Cold War enthusiasm for an “end of history” — the idea that the whole world was moving toward a harmonious future of liberal democracy and open markets. Embracing China was seen as an important part of that vision. As you said: Economists were probably literally unanimous and certainly trumpeted their unanimity in believing this was a wonderful idea in emphasizing specifically that this would be good for American workers, would create better opportunities for American workers and that somehow it would help China to move toward a market economy, as well.
The reality is that none of that happened. Every single assumption this vision was built on — that countries were moving in that direction, that free trade would automatically benefit everyone, that it would create better opportunities for American workers — turned out to be wrong. We’ve seen the fallout over the past couple of decades. As people have begun to recognize that, I think there’s now a very important rethinking underway about the conditions you actually need if trade is going to work.
Furman: We should really start the story in 1979. That’s when the United States first cut tariffs on China. It established what is called normal trade relations, and that was part of our recognizing China and no longer treating China like an enemy on par with the Soviet Union. Then regularly from 1979 to 2000, Congress extended those normal trade relations, and everyone fully, fully expected they were going to be extended every year for the rest of time.
What happened in 2000 — and I’m possibly an unindicted co-conspirator here, having been in the Clinton administration and worked a little bit on permanent normal trade relations — P.N.T.R. — at the time, was that we got China to cut its tariffs on U.S. exports to China. The United States did not cut any tariffs at all. It did not open up any of our markets to China in 2000. We just said in exchange for making this permanent: You have to open your markets to us — make it easier for us to sell into China.
In terms of how this has worked out economically, I think in many respects, it has worked out quite well. People pooh-pooh gains for consumers, saying it’s just underwear and shoes. But increasingly it’s things like iPhones that are much higher up the technology spectrum.
The way we judge wages is how much people can buy. When you have cheaper products, that’s like giving a raise to every single worker in America.
It is a 25-year process that has definitely had winners and losers, as is everything in economics. Trade, technology, policy — any change you make is going to help some people and hurt others. The magnitude of the layoffs that have been attributed to China are less than 1 percent of the total layoffs we’ve had over this period of time. And there’s been a lot of new jobs in industries. Broadly, this is why we have this interdependence today that the Trump administration itself is loath to walk away from and loath to decouple from because they understand just how costly it would be for Americans.
Kaminer: So Oren, is it your position that everyone was wrong 25 years ago? Should those barriers never have been lowered in the first place? Or was it just done badly and mismanaged over time?
Cass: I think everyone was wrong, and I think it’s really important to focus in on something Jason was getting at, which is what exactly changed in 2000. Of course, at the time this was celebrated as the single most important economic move and policy that the country could be pursuing. Now that it has gone so badly, we have this revisionist history that, in fact, it wasn’t actually changing things that much. It wasn’t such a big deal. China already had this access to our market. The reason that corporations in particular were so obsessed with getting this done is that it did, fundamentally, change everything.
When you have an annual renewal process for normal trade relations, first of all, corporations have no confidence — and they have said they did not have confidence. And part of the reason for doing this was to give them confidence that it would be permanent. Which led to much, much higher levels of investment in offshoring investment in China. And second, it lost our leverage over China. China knew every year it had to behave itself or there was going to be a political issue with renewal the next year.
What we did is we essentially relieved the ability to impose that pressure. We said: We’re no longer going to be able to revisit this on an annual basis. You are going to be a World Trade Organization member. As people eventually discovered — and some even recognized at the time — the W.T.O. essentially gives you no mechanism to confront what China went on to do: pursue an extraordinarily aggressive strategy to capture leadership, jobs and supply chains in virtually every major manufacturing sector.
It’s also important to note that politicians stood up and said: This will create jobs. This will be great for Americans. And so on.
Many economists, though, took the view that jobs didn’t really matter. Paul Krugman, for example, famously argued that we should have unconditional free trade no matter what — that it didn’t matter how other countries behaved. To Jason’s point, as long as consumers got more cheap stuff, we were supposed to be happy. And I agree with Jason — we did get a lot of cheap stuff. But it’s now very clear, looking at the trajectory of the economy and, more broadly, our resilience and national security, that we gave much of it away. And that has turned out to be, really, a world-historical tragedy.
Furman: I want to get into the cheap stuff. It’s almost said in a derisive type of way. Let’s just use a different word. Instead of “cheap stuff,” let’s call it a pay raise for every single worker in America. Because that’s what it is. In terms of the leverage and what the agreement actually meant — in 2000, certainly the Clinton administration stressed quite strongly that we’re not doing anything to lower our tariffs, we’re just getting concessions from China.
The certainty mattered a little bit, but I wouldn’t overstate it. After Tiananmen Square, the United States renewed permanent normal trade relations. Bill Clinton campaigned in 1992 on taking them away if China didn’t improve its human rights — and then he never took them away. So by the year 2000, American business was pretty convinced that those normal trade relations were here to stay.
There’s been some mixed research on whether that greater certainty played much of a role in their decisions. I think, on balance, it didn’t. But definitely, I agree that agreement was part of a greater integration with China. And that greater integration with China, in the 25 years that followed, meant we had an unemployment rate that was lower than in the 25 years that came before it. We had inequality that went up less than it did in the 25 years before it. And it helped engineer a broad-based real pay increase for American workers.
Kaminer: So Jason, you also acknowledged a moment ago that all policies have trade-offs. So once the trade barriers came down here, were there missed opportunities to benefit American workers? Was there a way to have the benefits of expanded trade without the deindustrializing effect on the United States?
Furman: Deindustrialization is mostly about technology, in that for a while, even after the China agreement, American manufacturing output was rising. It has now basically leveled off, and we’re doing it with fewer and fewer people. China is also losing enormous amounts of manufacturing jobs. They are in some sense deindustrializing if you look at the number of people who produce stuff — not if you look at the amount of stuff that is produced.
So most of what we’re talking about with deindustrialization is primarily about technology, not trade.
Kaminer: Trump ran at least in part on his opposition to China. But he’s not turning out to be much of an isolationist.
Oren, you have many times called for a complete break, a total end, to trade with China. How is this middle path looking to you?
Cass: Well, I should say, I think a complete break with China doesn’t mean there’s literally nothing being put on a boat in China and sold to the United States, or put on a boat in the United States and sold to China. I think the complete break that we need is, first and foremost, in the degree of our investment going back and forth — that we have American companies trying to build their operations in China or that we let Chinese companies come to try to build their operations in the United States.
I think fundamentally what has gone so wrong in this relationship is that we had an idea that somehow free trade is just a logical extension of free markets. If you like free markets, well then, obviously, you want as much free trade as possible. And the reality is that if you say: Well, therefore we need to have free trade with China — you are importing not just a lot of goods, but you’re importing every one of those distortions.
If China decides it’s going to be the electric vehicle maker and is willing to plow literally hundreds of billions of dollars into supporting its producers, that, in effect, crushes American producers who might want to produce or compete with electric vehicles. And so to call that the free market solution, or say that promotes free markets, is exactly backward.
Part of the case in 2000 was that China was going to change. I think that, ultimately, is the big question in my mind for folks like Jason — for economists who kind of continue to make the case that no, no, no, this was a good idea, it has produced benefits.
Let’s kind of go back knowing what we know now and say, if you’d known that over the next 25 years China was going to become more authoritarian and less democratic and was going to turn away from markets and toward state control, was going to pursue this model of industrial policy and attempt to take leadership in virtually every significant supply chain, would we still have been getting up at the White House podium in 2000 and saying: Economics says this is a good idea — this is something the U.S. should embrace?
I don’t think that’s what economics says. I don’t think, based on the arguments that they were making at the time, they would have done this if they’d known how it was going to work out. But certainly there are some people who say this is going just fine.
Furman: Absolutely. There are a lot of really deep problems with our trade relationship with China. Not all of those can be solved with trade tools.
Some of the ways in which we’re overly dependent on China, we need to fix. We need to develop more rare earth capabilities in the United States and in our allies, for example. We put a little bit too much weight on tariffs and trade as a solution — even if trade was a cause of the problem. But definitely trade is part of the solution, and that’s what has disappointed me with President Trump’s approach to this. He has approached China entirely unilaterally.
It is just the United States versus China. And when it’s the United States versus China, they have a lot of leverage. They threatened us with rare earths. They stopped buying our soybeans, and that brought Donald Trump to the table, making concessions in a way he didn’t to basically any other country in the world. And given China’s importance, given how much it has grown, its manufacturing and the key role it plays in so many different industries, I’d much rather that we were getting together with our allies focusing on China rather than engaging in bilateral trade disputes with every country on the planet Earth, when with most of the issues that we have with China just don’t come up.
Cass: I agree with Jason that the kind of multilateral “Let’s all team up on China together” is absolutely the ideal we should be trying to get to. I think it’s important to say that the reality as of the start of 2025 is that other countries were not willing to do that.
But if I could just kind of throw out one more question I think is really important here: Jason, why do we need to confront anything that China is doing? Rare earths are cheaper per your formulation. It is a real wage increase for American workers if we rely on Chinese rare earths. It would be a bigger real increase if we allowed subsidized Chinese electric vehicles to take over the U.S. market.
So I certainly think those are bad ideas. I’m not clear on why you think so.
Furman: So that’s a great question, Oren. And the reason is national security and resilience. I don’t know where that says you draw the line. But if you are incredibly dependent on something where China basically has a choke point over U.S. industries, as it does with rare earths, that puts us in a vulnerable position in a country with which we have an unstable and sometimes cooperative and sometimes competitive relationship.
I would put limits on microchip exports in that category, as well. That’s why the fact that President Trump is considering selling our advanced microchips to China, the Blackwell chips made by Nvidia, makes me quite nervous.
But stepping back: A big problem the United States has is that we are incredibly important. We are incredibly powerful, but we are nowhere nearly as important and powerful as we think.
The majority of countries in the world trade more with China than with the United States. So if they had to choose, they would choose China. China has technology that, in many dimensions, are actually beyond ours, and we should be learning from them in the way that they learned from the United States. That’s where cross-border investment can help.
And finally, in some sense, it was really arrogant of the first Trump administration to center its trade agenda around getting China to buy more soybeans and American products. Because you’re not going to team up with Europe and Japan to force China to buy more American products. Japan and Europe just aren’t going to join us on that. We need to have our goals not be mercantilist — like: Here’s how much we can sell to you — but instead, something broad based that appeals to global sentiment, where the world is nervous on things like Chinese dominance of certain key choke points for global industry.
Cass: I completely agree that we have lost leadership to China virtually everywhere. The way that happened was exactly this model of free trade that said: We don’t care if we move our manufacturing to China. Even on electric vehicles.
It was Tesla’s moving into Shanghai in the late 2010s, induced by China’s ridiculously unfair trade policies, that led to China’s taking this leadership on E.V. technology. So it’s very frustrating to me when economists simultaneously say: No, no, free trade is good, and it doesn’t matter which things we make here or don’t, except for maybe some small national security exceptions.
But then when the result of that is: Yes, things are not static, they are dynamic — we do lose this technological leadership everywhere. We find ourselves in this terrible position. Now the next step is to turn around and say: All right. Well, I guess we’re going to have to let the Chinese Communist Party-controlled companies come and essentially take leadership within the United States. I mean, I understand why on a blackboard that doesn’t consider —
Furman: Investment in the United States is not taking leadership in the United States, but go on.
Cass: Well, I guess I’m not sure how you envision this happening. So Chinese companies are going to set up factories in the U.S. subsidized by the Chinese Communist Party to use their own technology to make and sell vehicles more cheaply than the U.S. producers can. I’m not sure what the endgame is there. I guess in an ideal world, you’d say: Well, this is great. The U.S. companies are going to learn from the Chinese ones. But that’s obviously not in the Chinese companies’ interest.
It’s an extraordinarily asymmetric relationship.
Furman: We’re sort of leaving the issue of what this actually means for people in the economy. A lot of what you’re talking about that China has done over the last decade — getting dominance in all these technologies — has actually worked out quite badly for the Chinese people.
Youth unemployment is rising. Economic growth and productivity growth has slowed. And in some ways I prefer what we do here in the United States. We have a lower unemployment rate than they have in China.
We’ve had an increase in the pace of wage growth over the last decade. We’ve had faster wage growth at the bottom than the top over the last decade. And so I guess I’d look at what this means for actual workers and people — rather than making huge sacrifices for American workers and American people based on some set of geopolitical theories about zero-sum-ness and the need to dominate some specific list of industries.
Kaminer: Let’s return to the deal that America and China have just struck.
Oren, what do you think President Trump’s real goal is here? Is it balanced trade? Is it dominance? Is it working toward a break? Is it just his personal love of a successful negotiation? He did just raise tariffs on Canada because he took offense at a television commercial. So what’s going on here?
Cass: Well, I think the best way to understand Trump’s position on China is: In a funny way, it’s been almost too consistent.
Trump’s view has always been: Essentially, we’re getting screwed by China, and we should get a better deal with China. And in the 2015-2016 period when he was rising to prominence, that was seen as an extraordinarily hawkish position in a world where most people would still have said: What are you talking about? Free trade with China is good. They sell us lots of things at very good, low prices.
And what has happened in the roughly 10 years since is that a lot of political consensus and part of the economic thinking has shifted to say: This relationship with China is broken in a lot of fundamental ways. It’s not even clear you could work out a deal. And Trump, I think, is roughly still where he always was, which is: We’re getting screwed by China, and I want a better deal. The big question though is: Is such a deal possible?
That is, if you think about the things Trump said he cares about that would be part of a deal, balanced trade is certainly very important to him. Certainly, he has concerns about resilience and national security and some of the areas where China has become dominant. And so you’d have to have some mechanism for China to be willing to relinquish that dominance. And as far as I can tell, it’s just not at all plausible that China would ever actually agree to those things.
In fact, to the contrary: President Xi Jinping has made very clear that the Chinese economic strategy is — in a sense — to decouple itself. It wants to become more self-sufficient. It wants to have soup-to-nuts control of its own supply chains. It wants to be exporting even more. As long as that’s the case, there is sort of no deal to be had.
And so I think what we’re seeing — and what I hope we continue to see with this sort of series of truces and cease-fires — is essentially a recognition on both sides that this relationship is going to come apart. That in fact, both sides want it to come apart at as low a cost as possible. Neither side really gains anything by going to a mutually assured destruction path.
Economists love to point out things are not zero sum. I would say the decoupling is not zero sum — it can actually serve what both political classes want and what both countries need for their economic strategies.
Furman: Well, first of all, we’ve been talking almost entirely about China. The trade war is being conducted against every country in the world, and it’s being conducted in just a really bizarre and inconsistent manner.
Canada is a country that just does not do particularly unfair things to the United States vis-à-vis trade. Yes, there are small debates we have over lumber and things like that, but they have small debates with us. Roughly, we had free trade before. Now we have higher tariffs because we didn’t like a television ad they had.
We have national-security-invoked emergency-run trade deficits. And then we used that to put tariffs on Brazil, which we run a trade surplus with because we were upset about how they were treating their former president. We have tariffs on coffee, bananas and mangoes right now. The last one is probably the worst, according to my particular family.
I just don’t understand most of what we’re doing. What type of message are we sending to countries when it’s so arbitrary and capricious who we will trade with and how we’ll trade with them?
Cass: Well, I certainly agree with some of those criticisms. I’m actually a lot less concerned about the mangoes and the bananas and the coffee because I think there’s a very important point about political economy. Which is: If you are going to do tariffs, I think you’re actually a lot better off doing a broad-based one, recognizing that’s certainly imperfect in various ways, than suggesting that we want to have either an administration or Congress go line by line through the tens of thousands of items in the harmonized tariff schedule and decide what can or can’t be made in the U.S. and what the tariff should be on every one.
When it comes to the way we’re approaching countries broadly, I completely agree that a 10 percent tariff in response to being unhappy with an ad is not a good way to do tariffs. Though I think if you broaden that out and say tariffs are a negotiating tool, and when you’re trying to negotiate and reach an agreement and you feel like the other party is going in the other direction, then that is something that you would consider in how you use tariffs.
I think at the broad level, what the U.S. is trying to do with a lot of its core trading partners is replace a completely broken post-Cold War W.T.O. system — of which embracing China was the seminal example — with a model that actually does what free trade is supposed to do and have an open market among countries that are committed to doing trade the right way.
Furman: I do think, Oren, more countries in the world are like Canada than like China — that they largely play by the rules, and more products are actually like coffee than E.V.s: They’re things that we don’t really make in the United States. We don’t aspire to make E.V.s in the United States — it would be really costly to make E.V.s in the United States.
So having an entire trade conversation focused on China, to me, makes a certain amount of sense, because it’s not Canada. And the products we’re talking about are not the same as coffee. Almost everything else in the world, though — I guess I’d just rather focus on the living standards of the people who work and live in the United States and everything we’ve done.
You know, manufacturing jobs are still falling. The Trump administration bragged back in February: Oh, look, manufacturing jobs were up in our first month. Well, they’ve been going down for the rest of the year. It’s still early — maybe this could all end up working out with a lag.
But I’d be quite surprised if we get the things that I actually care about — which are full employment and good wages — out of any of that. To do that, we need to focus on what matters, which is the domestic economy. Much of this is a counterproductive distraction.
Kaminer: OK, I’m going to jump in. I’m glad you mentioned the domestic economy. One major goal of this administration’s trade policy has clearly been to reshore industries that have gone overseas. And there have been some signs that big corporations are willing to move at least some production back to the U.S.
But what I always wonder when I read these stories is: Why should we assume that this reindustrialization is going to happen in a way that’s good for U.S. workers? Won’t at least some of these be dark robo-factories? And I guess, in a broader sense: Can building factories in 2025 return us to the better working conditions of the 1950s?
Cass: I don’t think that’s the goal. I think to your point about the dark robo-factories, there’s this sort of other extreme of people imagining factories that employ nobody. Which certainly isn’t the case, either.
Building factories in the United States in 2025 means building highly automated high tech factories, for the most part. Which means they’re also ones where the workers in them tend to be highly productive — which means that the jobs in them are also better jobs in all sorts of ways, including that they tend to be at much higher wages.
And so we’re certainly not going back to the 1950s model of 20 percent plus of the American work force screwing in bolts on assembly lines. That’s not at all the goal. Every new, highly automated, highly productive factory that we open in the United States is an increase over not having the factory, right? And the amount of increased investment and production that we would be looking at over, say, a decade, if we actually reindustrialized, if we actually closed our trade deficit, is on the order of millions of new, more productive, better paying jobs — in many cases with a lot of investment in work force development also.
You know, in many cases, in a lot of parts of the country that have not been the beneficiaries of the type of economic growth we’ve seen in finance, in tech and in certain high-end services in major metropolitan areas, this is exactly what we should be looking for. And, you know, to the extent that we have started to see green shoots, as you’ve said — that is, in fact, what we’re seeing.
I don’t know if I’m allowed to refer people to a Wall Street Journal article on this podcast, but there was a wonderful one a week or two ago about the reshoring of Sharpie. They did it by investing $2 billion in capital, heavily automating the process and retraining the workers they had.
The end result was that they didn’t lay off anybody. They massively increased output speed, and they were able to raise wages by 50 percent. That’s what we should be looking for.
Furman: So first of all, Oren, the manufacturing wage premium has actually gone away. If you just do a raw comparison of how much manufacturing workers make compared to all workers — and exclude managers — manufacturing workers used to be paid, you know, 6, 7, 8 percent more. Now they’re paid, you know, 6, 7, 8 percent less than all workers.
So the idea that this is this great pathway for people without a college degree into the middle class — it’s just less of one now. And it’s less of one now in part because there are not just fewer jobs but even the jobs that are left, if you exclude the managers, actually pay less than other jobs, not more.
But the issue here isn’t: Do you want to have a job or not have a job? Generally, the answer to that question would be yes. The issue is: If you’re going to have an unemployment rate of 4 percent, what types of jobs do you want to have?
And I don’t have any particular preference. I’d say the ones that are most productive — because those are the ones that are going to be the highest wage. The ones that people most want to be in — because those are the ones that are going to have the most attractive benefits.
Manufacturing has a number of things that are good and attractive about it, but it’s also a very risky thing. When the plant closes, it can take the whole town with it.
Having more diversified service-sector jobs, in some ways, can be less risky. So I don’t have some grand master plan of the jobs I’d like to have. When it comes to jobs, I don’t see anything particularly special about manufacturing. And even if you thought there used to be, that premium has just gone away.
Kaminer: Jason, Oren, I really want to thank you for engaging these questions and with each other so deeply. I have really learned a lot.
My last question for you, which maybe you can answer briefly: Did either of you learn something from the other? Jason, has Oren shifted your thinking in any way? And Oren, has Jason?
Furman: I guess I used to think of Oren as focused on sort of workers and living standards. He seems a little bit more about a grand geopolitical project vis-à-vis China — and that’s not a crazy thing to be for. But it’s something different from where I thought he was coming from before and something that you could actually start coherently defending some of these policies vis-à-vis China.
Cass: I think this question of what actually happened with the W.T.O. and how policy did or didn’t change and how businesses did or didn’t react is a really important one that I haven’t studied as much as I’d like to. And so I have to go back now to what Jason was saying about that to try to better understand exactly how it played out in practice.
Kaminer: Well, thanks for those answers and thanks to you both for joining me.
Cass: This was a lot of fun.
Furman: Thank you.
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