U.S. President Donald Trump wants a quick resolution to the war in Ukraine. But that goal has proved elusive and is likely to remain so, in part because of how highly the Kremlin values its multiple objectives in Ukraine.
The Trump administration made its latest gambit—sanctions on Russia’s top oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil—on Oct. 22, striking a blow against one of Russia’s largest sources of revenue.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent presented the sanctions as a response to Russian intransigence in negotiations and called for an “immediate cease-fire.” Trump, speaking on the sanctions, appeared optimistic about their chances of bringing Russia to the negotiating table, saying, “We hope that they won’t be on for long.”
The Kremlin, however, isn’t budging: The next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin shot back that Moscow would not change its negotiating stance. Russia has opposed a cease-fire along the current battlelines and instead pushed for broader concessions as a precondition for ending the war. Among its core aims is control of the Donetsk region, which it has failed to conquer despite more than three years of efforts and tens of thousands of casualties.
The sanctions follow a previous attempt at tempting Russia with economic deals and sanctions relief during an August meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska. That approach similarly resulted in no substantial agreement as Russia’s refused to agree to a cease-fire.
Neither the carrots nor sticks immediately available to Trump are likely to solve the war, according to Max Bergmann, director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“There’s absolutely no quick fix,” Bergmann said.
In part, that’s because the war is a matter of personal prestige for Putin. “This is about Vladimir Putin’s place in history,” Bergmann said. “He wants to be Vladimir the Great. And how is he going to be Vladimir the Great if the war ends tomorrow?”
Putin’s efforts to convince his own population that the war is necessary is another factor, added Laura Cooper, who oversaw Russian and Ukraine policy at the U.S. Defense Department under the Biden administration.
“You have to understand how much Putin has invested in this war, and how much he’s invested in convincing his population that this war must be successful,” she said. In addition straining the economy, as many as 250,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war, with hundreds of thousands wounded.
The Trump administration’s initial pressure on Ukraine—including ending security assistance support for it—may have also driven Putin to believe that he doesn’t need to take U.S. threats seriously, Cooper said. “That has been a miscalculation on the U.S. part.”
Further complicating the negotiating picture is the fact that, for Russia, territory is just part of its war aims, said Andrew Peek, who served as senior director for European and Russian affairs at the National Security Council before leaving the position in May.
According to Peek, Russia’s core issues include a desire for Ukraine’s territory; concern over Ukraine’s security alliances, such as Kyiv’s interest in joining NATO and its insistence on securing a Western security guarantee; and the future composition of Ukraine’s military. Russia previously insisted that Ukraine should reduce its army to just 85,000 servicemembers and limit its missiles to ones with a range of 25 miles, among other demands.
“The Russians have shown a little wiggle room on the territory piece over the last six months,” Peek said, pointing to Russia’s reported willingness to cede its claims to Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.
But Russia has offered no concessions on a security guarantee from Ukraine’s Western partners, which is a sticking point for Kyiv, Peek said.
“That’s a political decision that I can’t really give a good timeline for the Russians making—I think it’ll take a beat,” he said, adding that Ukraine and Russia have also made little progress on the issue of Ukraine’s future military composition.
The last point is particularly important to Ukraine as it seeks to deter future Russian aggression, Peek said. “They’ve got to be able to prepare themselves fully for any future conflict.”
A more successful strategy would be to pressure Russia economically and militarily, Bergmann and Cooper argued. That would include more sanctions, increased security assistance for Ukraine, and plans to boost Ukraine’s postwar military to deter future Russian aggression, Cooper noted. “The Russians have to feel like they are losing, and they also have to feel like Ukraine is succeeding,” she said.
Bergmann discounted the likely impact of economic carrots in the form of trade deals or lifting some sanctions. In part, that’s because a Democratic Party victory in the U.S. midterm elections in 2026 could lead to those sanctions being reimposed, he said.
Meanwhile, Russia is continuing to engage with the Trump administration, seemingly in the belief that it can convince Trump to go back on his proposal of an immediate cease-fire.
Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev arrived in the United States last week and reportedly met with Trump administration officials over the weekend. “Only by taking Russian interests into account can the solution be found,” Dmitriev told to Fox News on Oct. 25, listing a resolution of the “territory” issue and Ukrainian neutrality among Russia’s desired outcomes.
The Trump administration, so far, isn’t buying it. Speaking to CBS, Bessent slammed Dmitriev’s statements and called him a “Russian propagandist.”
The post Why There’s No Easy Button to End the Russia-Ukraine War appeared first on Foreign Policy.
