When Amir Khan Muttaqi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, met with his Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, in New Delhi on Oct. 10, the fragile scaffolding of India’s engagement with the Taliban was on full view. All official communications from the Indian side referred to Muttaqi as simply the “Afghan foreign minister.” At the meeting, neither the tricolor flag of Afghanistan’s erstwhile republic nor the white banner of the Islamic Emirate were present. At the Afghan Embassy, on the other hand, the flag of the republic was hoisted outside, while Muttaqi and his coterie put up the emirate’s white flag inside, claiming Taliban ownership over the premises and the people working within it.
Beginning on Oct. 9, Muttaqi’s weeklong visit to India has faced intense scrutiny and interest, owing to the symbolism and rarity of a Taliban leader being hosted at an official level in India. Few foresaw such a visit when the insurgent group regained power in August 2021. But India, propelled by realpolitik and pragmatism, has steadily increased its engagement with the Taliban in the past few years while still abstaining from formally recognizing the regime.
In January, Muttaqi met with the Indian foreign secretary in Dubai. After the Pahalgam terrorist attack in April, he met with the joint secretary of the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran Division at India’s Ministry of External Affairs. And in May, he and Jaishankar spoke over the phone.
India’s growing engagement with the Taliban has only intensified since New Delhi launched Operation Sindoor and broadly redefined its approach to dealing with Pakistan. The deterioration of ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan following the Taliban’s return has also allowed India more room to build ties with the regime to secure its own strategic interests. Beyond this, regional dynamics have been an additional factor for India as other countries in the region slowly expand their footprints and strengthen ties with the Taliban. Russia became the first country to de jure recognize the Taliban in June. China and several republics in Central Asia have exchanged ambassadors with Afghanistan.
The Taliban regime, for its part, has pursued India out of a desire to diversify its diplomatic relationships. This fits the regime’s strategy of positioning itself as a pragmatic player—willing to work with other countries based on mutual interests, irrespective of how formal the ties are. This “enemy of none, friend of everyone” approach is meant to secure the Taliban regime’s legitimacy by selling itself as a nonideological and economically oriented government.
India might be its latest buyer.
In a joint statement released by the two sides after their Oct. 10 meeting, Jaishankar reiterated India’s long-standing civilizational and cultural ties with Afghanistan and its commitment to supporting the country’s development. He also expressed his appreciation for the Taliban’s “strong condemnation” of the attack in Pahalgam, the group’s understanding of India’s security concerns, and both sides’ commitment to “promoting peace, stability, and mutual trust in the region.” The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to continue their regular engagements.
The meeting also produced more material outcomes for India-Afghanistan relations. On the political front, India decided to fully reopen its embassy in Kabul, which was functioning as a technical mission since June 2022, and to formally accredit the Islamic Emirate’s diplomats. (Neither side mentioned appointing an ambassador.)
India also made humanitarian commitments. It promised to resume its stalled public infrastructure and development projects in Afghanistan, help rebuild houses destroyed in recent earthquakes, and continue to provide e-Indian Council for Cultural Relations scholarships to Afghan students. Jaishankar announced Indian support for new health care centers across the country and upgrades at the Indira Gandhi Children’s Hospital in Kabul. After the meeting, he gifted 20 ambulances to Muttaqi.
Muttaqi, in turn, invited India to invest in Afghanistan’s mining sector, a carrot that the regime has used to engage with other countries. He also sought cooperation on hydroelectric projects and discussed how to effectively use the Chabahar port in Iran, despite U.S. sanctions. He raised the issues of visas and investment, and he also called for the reopening of the Attari-Wagah border crossing between India and Pakistan, which was closed in May. Afghanistan and India further agreed to open an air corridor and increase the number of flights between the countries.
While in India, the Taliban leader also visited the Darul Uloom seminary in Uttar Pradesh, which holds high religious significance for Sunni Muslims. He met business and industry leaders at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, interacted with Afghan refugees, and held two press conferences. Women journalists were barred from the first one. But they showed up in force at another three days later, and their hard-hitting questions on the state of women in Afghanistan made it clear that these concerns remain paramount within India. It is too soon to tell, however, whether these concerns will be reflected in official policy, and India will have to tread a fine line between engaging with the regime and unintentionally endorsing it.
New Delhi’s high-stakes diplomacy has not necessarily gone unnoticed. Even as Muttaqi was meeting Jaishankar, Pakistan conducted airstrikes in the Afghan capital, apparently meant to target the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban responded by targeting border posts in Pakistan. Clashes killed dozens before a ceasefire was put in place on Sunday. The timing of the strikes by Pakistan reflects its uneasiness with the warming relations between New Delhi and Kabul as it struggles to convince the Taliban to stop its support of the TTP.
India’s commitment to protecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity could also add to Islamabad’s uneasiness. New Delhi has predicated its engagement with the Taliban on its assurance that Afghan soil not be used against India’s interests. Muttaqi reiterated this commitment, as he has done on previous occasions, but the Taliban’s ability and willingness to do that are still doubtful. Despite clear evidence to the contrary, the group denies the presence of any security challenges or external groups within Afghanistan.
In the short run, deteriorating ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan have worked in New Delhi’s favor, but their deeply entrenched relationship can’t be wished away. When India launched Operation Sindoor, the Taliban condemned the escalation and called on both sides to exercise restraint. Afghanistan and Pakistan also elevated their relationship to the ambassadorial level in May, and have been meeting regularly—both bilaterally and trilaterally, with China—to further cooperation. Even after the clashes this month, Muttaqi urged Pakistan to negotiate and blamed only a small subsection in Pakistan for being hell-bent on destroying the ties with Afghanistan.
All this means that in the aftermath of Muttaqi’s visit, India needs to set realistic expectations about its relations with the Taliban regime. Still, engagement remains a strategic necessity. India’s recalibration vis-à-vis the Taliban regime underscores New Delhi’s commitment to prioritizing regional stability at a time of turbulence.
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