U.S.-Pakistan relations are undergoing a significant shift in President Donald Trump’s second term, which seemed to begin in the spring—shortly after a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir triggered a conflict between India and Pakistan. Trump asserted that he had played a critical role in ending the crisis, and Islamabad lauded his supposed intervention.
Pakistani officials have clearly appealed to Trump’s sensibilities, first with words and then with offers: of access to rare earths, investments in cryptocurrency, and, most recently, the offer of a port facility on the Arabian Sea. To the Trump administration, these developments suggest a positive shift.
However, historical record shows that hopes of a reliable and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Pakistan are likely to be unfounded.
In 1954, shortly before announcing a defense pact with Pakistan, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a letter to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru arguing that the accord was not aimed at India and assuring that U.S. military aid would not be turned against the country. “What we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India,” Eisenhower wrote.
Beginning with Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who governed from 1947 to 1951, Islamabad had courted Washington by asserting that it could serve as a bulwark against communism in South Asia. Keen on containing Soviet expansion, Eisenhower acquiesced. But Pakistan wanted to draw the United States into South Asia primarily to balance Indian power due to the Kashmir dispute, as U.S. diplomatic historian Robert J. McMahon has shown. And despite Eisenhower’s assurances, when Pakistan initiated the second Kashmir war in 1965, it relied on U.S. weapons extensively.
As a result, India has long been wary of any U.S. role in Pakistan, much less military assistance. The 1971 East Pakistan crisis, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, dramatically reinforced these misgivings: U.S. President Richard Nixon tilted toward Pakistan and against India, sending a U.S. carrier group to the Bay of Bengal to intimidate New Delhi and demonstrate support for Islamabad. Nevertheless, Pakistan considered the U.S. assistance to be inadequate—Pakistan lost the war anyway—and the alliance withered.
In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. President Ronald Reagan turned to Pakistan as a staging ground to help the Afghan mujahideen fight the Soviets. Pakistani military dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq described the relationship as a “handshake but no embrace,” highlighting its transactional nature. Decades later, Pakistan’s participation in the so-called war on terror under the leadership of military dictator Pervez Musharraf took the same approach: Faced with an ultimatum from U.S. President George W. Bush, Musharraf proved to be at best a partial partner.
This history underscores how the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has not been based on ideological affinity, cultural ties, or a convergence of strategic interests—but is instead transactional. There is little reason to believe that Pakistan courting Trump this time around will yield markedly different results for the United States. Instead, it could undermine the strategic partnership that that the United States has diligently forged with India since the 1990s—likely part of Pakistan’s intent.
In the last few months, some of Trump’s policy choices have stoked New Delhi’s fears that Washington may prove a fickle strategic partner. From India’s standpoint, the first distressing move came in July, when Trump invited Pakistani Army chief Asim Munir to the White House without any elected Pakistani official accompanying him.
There, Trump asserted that he was responsible for bringing about the cease-fire between India and Pakistan in May, contrary to the views of Indian officials. He also agreed to sell Pakistan an advanced version of the F-16 fighter jet, as well as a range of missiles. To compound matters, Trump offered to mediate the Kashmir dispute—even though the Indian political elite has for decades adamantly opposed any third-party intervention over the issue. In India’s view, it faced pressure to settle the conflict on terms favorable to Pakistan in the early 1960s.
Also in July, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and also lauded Pakistan as an invaluable counterterrorism partner and force for regional stability in South Asia. Meanwhile, Trump has continued to reiterate that he was instrumental in brokering this year’s cease-fire, which has continued to rankle Indian officials.
Other developments in U.S.-Pakistan relations have fueled doubts in New Delhi about India’s partnership with the United States, which has enjoyed bipartisan support for the last two decades. Trump has responded favorably to Pakistani gestures, including partnering with a Trump-backed cryptocurrency enterprise, nominating the U.S. president for the Nobel Peace Prize, and offering to allow U.S. firms to excavate rare earths from Pakistan. All of these were clearly designed to bolster Trump’s willingness to work with Islamabad rather than isolate it, as he did during his first term.
Most recently, Pakistan took the unusual step of offering the United States the chance to develop and operate a port facility in the fishing village of Pasni on the Arabian Sea. Its location is of considerable strategic significance: a mere 100 miles from Iran and 70 miles from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, where China has made significant infrastructure investments. If Washington and Islamabad reach such an agreement, the port would cost about $1.2 billion and could become a hub for the shipment of copper and antimony, both critical minerals.
Ultimately, the seeming bonhomie between the United States and Pakistan is deceptive once placed in historical context. The Trump administration appears to be enamored of the current Pakistani regime largely because it has variously appealed to Trump’s personal sentiments (including his seeming obsession with winning a Nobel Peace Prize). In turn, Pakistan is happy to pander to these sensibilities in the hope of diminishing the U.S. partnership with India. But this brief convergence of interests is bound to be fleeting.
There are a few reasons to suggest that the current thaw in U.S.-Pakistan relations will be ephemeral. First, Pakistan will not walk away from its close ally China just because of the Trump administration’s recent moves, and China remains the principal strategic competitor of the United States in Asia and beyond. Second, as experience has shown, Pakistan is far from a wholly reliable counterterrorism partner.
In its pique with India over trade and other issues, the Trump administration is now on the brink of frittering away an invaluable strategic partnership in the pursuit of what is likely to prove to be little more than a chimera. The costs of doing so are likely to be considerable for the future of enduring U.S. strategic interests in South Asia.
The post Trump Should Be Wary of Partnering With Pakistan appeared first on Foreign Policy.
