On Friday, Venezuelans opposed to President Nicolás Maduro awoke to unusually hopeful news: Opposition leader María Corina Machado had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized her tireless work to advance Venezuela’s return to democracy in the face of Maduro’s authoritarianism.
In a way, the prize honors not only Machado, but also the millions of Venezuelans eager for change who mobilized around her ahead of the 2024 presidential campaign. Her leadership contributed to the opposition’s overwhelming victory in that election, according to verified independent counts—and galvanized resistance when Maduro blatantly stole it.
The prospects for a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela remain unclear. Machado has close ties to several members of the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio. But since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January, he has sent mixed signals on his policy toward Caracas.
The White House initially seemed to favor a more transactional approach to dealing with Maduro. In recent months, however, its actions have become more belligerent. The United States in September sent a large naval deployment to the Caribbean, which it claims is cracking down on the flow of cocaine, fentanyl and other drugs transiting Venezuela. U.S. aircraft have, to date, bombed at least five civilian boats alleged to be carrying drugs. Democrats in Congress have raised concerns about the unauthorized attacks, which have killed at least 27 people.
Expectations that the United States will pursue a more militaristic path in Venezuela are high.
In the wake of the U.S. naval buildup, Machado promised her followers that Maduro’s days in power are numbered, saying in online videos that the regime “is over.” Many Venezuelans, understandably frustrated with years of authoritarian repression and economic chaos, have taken to speculating when, not if, Trump will send the Marines into their country.
Trump on Wednesday confirmed reports that he has already instructed the CIA to carry out covert operations inside Venezuela. That same day, in an interview with CNN, Machado appealed to the United States for help in fighting what she called Maduro’s “war.”
When asked if the White House is considering striking targets inside Venezuelan territory, Trump has refused to rule it out, saying only, “Well, you’re going to find out.” This week, he dropped more hints about such a move. “We are certainly looking at land now, because we’ve got the sea very well under control,” Trump told reporters on Wednesday.
Further U.S. strikes could target more alleged drug shipments, or they could include drug flights, many of which take off from clandestine airstrips along the Venezuelan-Colombian border. But after blowing up a few more vessels, what’s Washington’s endgame? There are three possible ways U.S. policy toward Venezuela could play out from here.
The first scenario would require disaffected members of the Venezuelan military, opposition-led demonstrations, or some combination thereof to lead an uprising against Maduro. Machado herself has called for security forces to engage in a campaign of “disobedience” against Maduro in recognition of the opposition’s election win. (The opposition leader has repeatedly claimed to have sources within the Venezuelan military.)
Such a rebellion could count on U.S. logistical, intelligence, or even direct support from the current deployment in the Caribbean. But Washington would not lead the charge. As in 2019, when the United States recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s “interim president” and encouraged the country’s military to turn on Maduro, the Trump administration would prefer to play a behind-the-scenes role in regime change.
But an organic, mostly Venezuelan-led uprising is unlikely. For one, Maduro’s government has brutally repressed the opposition since last year’s election. Machado has been forced into hiding, and presidential candidate Edmundo González fled the country. The opposition that remains in Venezuela is divided over whether to participate in increasingly controlled local and regional elections or organize a more confrontational resistance movement. Meanwhile, the regime’s security and intelligence apparatus has proved effective at preventing cracks.
A second scenario would see the United States strike Venezuela directly. Washington might carry out an overwhelming preemptive strike on Venezuelan military targets followed by subsequent decapitation strikes on leadership targets, perhaps even tasking special forces with apprehending Maduro to bring him to justice. Senior Trump administration officials have refused to rule out the possibility of such an escalation.
Despite these reports, there is reason to be skeptical that the U.S. military would strike inside of Venezuela—much less invade it. That’s in part because the country has a capable air defense network—at least on paper.
Analysts differ over how much of Venezuela’s air defenses are fully functional and maintained, but there is consensus that the military possesses a nationwide network of S-125 Pechora anti-aircraft batteries, as well as multiple air defense units armed with ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons and Igla-S man-portable air defense systems. The military also has multiple S-300VM Antey-2500s, a sophisticated long-range missile system capable of shooting down aircraft and ballistic missiles, although these are more focused along the country’s border regions.
Any serious U.S. plan to carry out airstrikes on Venezuelan soil would likely seek to neutralize these systems first, which would mean directly engaging in hostilities with Venezuelan armed forces. Direct, open conflict with the Venezuelan military would be risky. It could devolve into a chain of violence that could last for years and potentially spill over into neighboring countries.
Venezuela is home to one of the largest stockpiles of guns in the Western Hemisphere, not to mention dissidents of Colombian guerrilla groups and thousands of members of pro-government paramilitary organizations known as colectivos. Complicating matters further is the Bolivarian Militia, a volunteer civilian corps that Maduro has carried out training exercises with in recent weeks.
If Trump is not careful, unilateral U.S. military action in Venezuela could see the country collapse into chaos, potentially fueling a Libya-style meltdown just a three-hour flight from Miami.
The most likely endgame for U.S. Venezuela policy may be the least satisfying to Venezuelans who are desperate for change and voted overwhelmingly against Maduro in last year’s stolen election.
Maduro may be betting that Trump will soon want to declare victory after all his boat strikes in the Caribbean. Maduro in September sent a letter to Trump offering to negotiate with Washington; until the administration paused outreach recently, U.S. presidential envoy Richard Grenell said that he maintained contact with the regime with Trump’s blessing.
Once it becomes clear that Maduro’s hold on power isn’t weakening, Trump may revert to seeing how he can use Grenell’s diplomatic channels to advance U.S. interests beyond democracy and human rights promotion, such as in energy, migration, and regional security.
A new agreement between the United States and Venezuela could be public, like July’s prisoner swap and the corresponding sanctions waiver that Trump gave U.S. oil company Chevron to operate in Venezuela. Or it could be private—like the terms of an existing agreement by which the U.S. government sends twice-weekly Immigration and Customs Enforcement deportation flights that currently arrive directly in Venezuela.
Any U.S. deal must address Venezuela’s political crisis. Washington should press for the release of the more than 800 political prisoners in the country, as well as for an end to repression of opposition parties and civil society. But above all, the United States should try to advance a road map to restore Venezuela’s democratic institutions.
This does not require starting from scratch. In 2020, the first Trump administration proposed the Democratic Transition Framework, which sketched out a plan for democratic reforms and power sharing, leading up to free and fair elections. The road map offered Caracas phased sanctions relief in exchange for the creation of a joint transitional government made up of both the opposition and ruling party.
Trump and Rubio should dust off the plan for the current moment, revisiting the idea of incentivizing a glide path for Venezuelan democratic reform rather than insisting on a magical overnight solution. Of course, since Maduro has repeatedly used dialogue as a stalling tactic to buy time until pressure blows over, any new talks must be measured against his history of broken commitments. Agreements should be verifiable, time-bound, and measurable, not simply based on empty promises.
In gaming out its next move in Venezuela, the Trump administration faces a choice: whether to use its naval deployment to the Caribbean as a pressure tactic to advance U.S. interests and democratic reforms, or whether to roll the dice with military escalation and risk potentially destabilizing conflict.
If Trump can manage to avoid war and advance a peaceful, democratic transition in Venezuela, he might finally get the Nobel Peace Prize he so badly wants next year.
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