The Los Angeles Fire Department has released its long-awaited analysis report regarding the deadly Palisades Fire, which highlights the unprecedented challenges, successes and possible failures in the agency’s response in the first 36 hours after the fire’s ignition.
The Palisades Fire After-Action Review Report was crafted by LAFD leaders who compiled information provided through nearly 100 interviews with department staff and support agencies. Photos and video, emergency radio traffic and eyewitness accounts were among the sources drawn upon as part of the report’s writing.
The 70-page document was strategically released Wednesday, in coordination with the U.S. Department of Justice, after federal officials announced the arrest of the suspect believed responsible for sparking the blaze.
Among the key findings, the report details how ground and air resources arrived within minutes after the initial call but were faced with steep and inaccessible terrain and hurricane-force winds that created a “perfect storm” for deadly fire behavior.
According to the report, several factors compounded and created an unprecedented emergency, including “dry vegetation, unrelenting and unusual wind activity, significant ember cast, a landscape packed with combustible vegetation, large vulnerable structures, a diminishing water supply, and a loss of aerial suppression support.”
Aerial support was grounded due to the high winds with gusts that exceeded 100 mph, and were decidedly “not typical” of Santa Ana winds that firefighters often face.
The local water infrastructure, which led to national controversy, conspiracy theories and pointed criticism from the federal government, only heightened those challenges further.
LAFD officials say the overtaxed water system was never designed to support firefighting operations at the scale or intensity seen during the January blaze. The system also experienced thousands of “breaches” in residential supply lines due to open pipes.
Homeowners who turned on their automatic sprinklers in hopes of wetting their property and saving their homes actually contributed to widespread water shortage, with many firefighters having to go door to door to turn off water at abandoned homes, many of which were already destroyed by the flames.
“The system is primarily engineered for residential and commercial use, not to sustain the extraordinary water demands of a large, fast-moving vegetation fire combined with the leaking open residential pipes,” the report states. “Firefighters and leaking pipes were flowing water at a rate that exceeded the system’s ability to replenish local tanks, which in turn affected both pressure and availability.”
Communication was also a challenge, as network issues caused breakdowns that delayed evacuation coordination between responding agencies.
“There was a delay in communicating evacuation orders, warnings, and shelter-in-place notifications to the public. As a result, spontaneous evacuations occurred without structured traffic control, causing citizens to block strategic routes to the fire,” the report states.
Due to terrain and crowded radio frequencies, many resources on the ground also had to shift to less-used channels to keep communication flowing, but ultimately scattering important updates.
A message provided to local media outlets that requested assistance of firefighters not already assigned to the blaze actually ended up causing more issues, as the dial-in line received thousands of calls and crashed the phone line while overwhelming staff. Hundreds of calls came from people outside the state offering to provide assistance—a problem that persisted throughout the entirety of the incident.
The report was also critical of the way resources were staged leading up to the blaze, and dispatched to the scene after it began.
“The LAFD balanced fiscal responsibility with proper preparation for predicted weather and fire behavior by following the LAFD predeployment matrix,” the report states. “LAFD command staff determined not to hold over off-going LAFD members to fill every available seat. The fire conditions and initial ferocity of fire behavior overwhelmed the immediately available resources in the Palisades area.”
Crews initially dispatched to respond to the blaze did not always have the appropriate resources for fighting fire in the extreme weather conditions that would normally be deployed during a Red Flag event, meaning specialized units would have to travel further to arrive on scene.
Many fire crews that were battling the blaze did so for more than 36 hours without rest, often leading to fatigue and exhaustion that “severely hindered their ability to make safe decisions.”
Organizational failures also left many units unsure of who was in charge or how their roles were defined. After a clear hierarchy was put in place hours after the fire began, many were not informed of the structural changes and were still left unsure of whom to report.
“Accountability for specialized resources … was left to individual company commanders, leading to informal assignments and a lack of accountability,” the report reads. “Initially, there was no medical unit or medical group established to address injuries or burns among civilians or firefighters.”
But the Department leaders also highlighted successes in the firefight, crediting the emergency responders with safely evacuating more than 30,000 residents, including elderly and vulnerable populations. Dozens of homes were saved using “specialized wildland-urban interface tactics” and alternative water sources. And real-time tracking systems, including those used by aerial crews at night, slowed the fire’s advance.
Equipped with the information gathered from the After-Action Review Report, LAFD leadership laid out a list of changes and improvements meant to better prepare for a catastrophe of this scale, should it happen again.
Now, during Red Flag Warnings, all staff will be immediately recalled, and all available firefighting apparatus will be staffed, “regardless of external factors or financial impact.” Meetings and pre-positioning of resources will now take place sooner after a Red Flag Warning is issued.
LAFD says its has made roles and responsibilities during disasters of this scale more defined, in hopes of clearing up confusion. Network “redundancy tools,” including Starlink satellite internet service, has been added to maintain communication lines when traditional methods fail.
Staff has also received additional training to identify and acquire “alternative water sources” independent of the hydrant system, including pools and reservoirs.
The report also mentions the hiring of LAFD Interim Chief Ronnie Villanueva, who took on the role after his predecessor, Kristin Crowley, was fired by Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass. At the time of her dismissal, Bass alleged that Crowley had refused to conduct the very report in question. Crowley later attempted, unsuccessfully, to appeal her dismissal.
In total, 19 leadership positions have changed since January, officials said.
The Palisades Fire burned for nearly the entirety of January 2025, scorching more than 37 square miles and destroying thousands of structures. It displaced more than 100,000 people and resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people, with several people still reported as missing.
In addition to the devastation of the landscape and local communities, it is expected to become the most expensive wildfire in the state’s history.
On Tuesday, Jonathan Rinderknecht, 29, of Melbourne, Florida, was arrested on a federal charge of destruction of property by means of fire.
Federal authorities allege he had fantasized for months about sparking a massive blaze, using artificial intelligence tools to visualize it. Rinderknecht, according to the DOJ, was a former resident of Pacific Palisades and was working as an Uber driver on the night the fire was started.
For more information regarding the Palisades Fire After-Action Review Report, click here.
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