Last month, with a stroke of a pen, President Donald Trump upended America’s security role in the Middle East. For the first time in its history, Washington formally committed to the defense of a regional partner (except for Turkey, a NATO ally). That partner is not Israel, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, but the tiny Gulf Arab nation of Qatar.
To say that Trump’s executive order was a shock would be a massive understatement. It was a historic decision, even if it didn’t gain the public attention worthy of one. But to acknowledge its significance, however, is not to suggest it was prepared with any degree of care.
The run-up to the decision indicates its rushed nature. On Sept. 9, Israel launched an attack against Hamas officials in Doha as they were gathered to discuss a proposal by the Trump administration to release the Israeli hostages and reach a cease-fire in the conflict with Israel. At first, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to apologize to Qatar for the attack (which killed a Qatari citizen), vowing he would strike again if the Qatari authorities did not evict Hamas from Doha.
But to save his administration’s 20-point plan to end the war, Trump intervened. He knew that Qatar, the designated mediator between Israel and Hamas, had to be brought back in after threatening to quit. Trump thus urged Netanyahu to call Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and apologize for the strikes. Netanyahu reluctantly complied, saying, according to a White House readout of the phone call, “that, in targeting Hamas leadership during hostage negotiations, Israel violated Qatari sovereignty.” He also “affirmed that Israel will not conduct such an attack again in the future.”
Then, completely out of the blue and in a dramatic reversal of decades of U.S. Middle East policy, Trump signed an executive order committing the United States to the defense of Qatar in the event of an armed attack against it. The most important passage in the one-page document said that “the United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.”
Trump’s decision was consistent with his generally impulsive style in foreign policy. Little strategic thinking and planning seemed to be behind the order. First, it did not take into consideration America’s changing geopolitical priorities. Previous administrations suggested these should center not on the Middle East but on Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s national defense strategy is likely to emphasize the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere.
If the order were driven by a strategic assessment of regional dynamics and U.S. considerations, we would have seen the signs. There would be hints of a U.S. security commitment to Qatar in their last strategic dialogue in March of last year. We would have seen major defense posture adjustments made by the Pentagon in the Middle East and elsewhere anticipating such a major commitment. In a town like Washington where it’s hard to keep a secret, there would have been leaks of at least discussions internally or with the Qataris about such a decision. Yet there was none of the above, which suggests that the whole thing was spur-of-the-moment.
Perhaps an alarmist reaction to this announcement is unwarranted since it is just an executive order. Although it reads like a NATO Article 5 security commitment, it is not ratified by the U.S. Congress and thus not legally binding. That means that the moment Trump leaves office, the document should be considered to have expired. The next administration might keep it, but this is anything but guaranteed, especially if a Democratic president is elected.
But that’s more than two years away. Plenty could and most probably will happen in the region between now and then that needs to be considered in the new context created by this security guarantee. Maybe Trump’s security assurances to Doha were necessary to persuade it to resume its mediation role and ultimately to help him seal the big peace deal in the Middle East, as advertised by his administration. But there are at least three reasons to think that Trump’s executive order is overkill.
First, it’s unclear if the guarantee is even credible. Consider the range of possible threats to Qatar. Even though Netanyahu expressed regret for the strike and vowed not to do it again, his extremist government, unhappy with his apology, is still committed to destroying Hamas. A phone call to the Qataris is unlikely to change the fact that Netanyahu will do anything to stay in power (as he has shown repeatedly), including breaching his promise to his Qatari counterpart.
So, if Israel strikes Hamas in Doha again, will the United States intervene militarily against Israel? Not a single American thinks that would ever happen. That immediately undermines the credibility of the U.S. security commitment.
And then there is Iran. What if Tehran attacks Doha again like it did on June 23 in response to the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites? Or if any of Iran’s regional proxies strike Doha? Will Trump, devotee of an “America First” foreign policy, really risk American lives to defend Qatar and go to war with Iran?
Second, while Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the region and plays a helpful security and mediation role, nothing in Trump’s executive order suggests it has any obligations toward the United States in the event of an attack against U.S. troops in the region. No security partnership should be one-sided. It should be a mutual defense pact with language clarifying that Qatar would militarily respond to attacks against U.S. interests in Qatar at least. It doesn’t have to specify how exactly, just something to suggest that Qatar has responsibilities, too, beyond hosting U.S. troops and assets on its soil.
Third, if Trump just committed to the defense of Qatar, one wonders if the U.S. offer to extend a mutual defense pact to Saudi Arabia still stands. That’s the security guarantee that Middle East observers have been most expecting, since it has been discussed in some detail for more than two years by both Trump and his predecessor, Joe Biden. But somehow, it’s Doha that has first received the prize. Can the United States now afford to give formal security assurances to multiple partners in the Middle East? That’s a recipe for strategic overstretch.
Ironically, Qatar and all other Gulf Arab partners deserve something more politically credible and militarily effective than an executive order or even a congressionally ratified defense pact. These are pieces of paper at the end of the day, no matter how powerful they might sound. They still have to be translated into measures and mechanisms of cooperation and collaboration on the ground that can effectively support the promises made in those documents and demonstrably improve U.S.-Gulf security ties.
Actions speak louder than words. The best way to ensure Qatar’s security, and America’s strategic interests and plans in the Middle East, is to continue to patiently upgrade security relations and seek to integrate militarily on multiple levels. The former has been underway for years, but the latter has yet to happen.
The next time the United States decides, ideally after careful consideration, to extend a mutual defense pact or security assurances to any Gulf partner, it will have a strong enough foundation to last.
Bilal Y. Saab is the senior managing director of Trends U.S. and an associate fellow with Chatham House.
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