Two years after began its military campaign against the -based militant group began, observers say is down but not out. That is despite the Israeli military’s vastly superior firepower and weapons, and Israeli leaders’ insistence on “total victory.”
“Hamas has seen a lot of military setbacks, but it still has the ability to regroup and also retains command and control,” Marina Miron, a researcher in the War Studies Department at King’s College in London, told DW.
Before this current round of fighting began in the — preceded by the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks in that resulted in nearly 1,200 deaths — the militant group was estimated to have had between 25,000 and 30,000 fighters. Over the past two years, various Israeli security sources say they have killed between 17,000 and 23,000 of those.
The Israeli military has not offered any solid proof for the number of Hamas fighters killed, and many observers suggest that the number might be considerably lower.
A year into the conflict, “more detailed IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] reports on the killing of militants containing specifics on timeframes, locations, or operations, account for approximately 8,500 fatalities,” the US-based conflict monitor, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, or ACLED, reported in October 2024. “This figure also includes militants from other armed groups and possibly other non-combatant Hamas members.”
A classified Israeli database cited by British and Israeli media appeared to confirm this. It showed that, as of May 2025, only 8,900 named fighters from Hamas or its ally, Islamic Jihad, were dead or “probably dead.”
That means over in Gaza are civilians, the publications concluded.
Thousands of recruits
ACLED suggested that Hamas may have recruited more fighters over the past two years. Earlier this year, US intelligence officials told the Reuters news agency that they believed Hamas could have recruited 10,000 to 15,000 new fighters.
“There are indications, including on social media, that growing numbers of young Palestinians with no prior training have been joining the Qassam Brigades (Hamas’s military wing) and carrying out guerrilla actions,” Leila Seurat, a researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Paris, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine in August.
Observers say it’s in the interests of both sides to exaggerate the militant group’s strength. For Hamas, it’s a way of projecting power during ceasefire negotiations. For Israel, portraying Hamas as a serious adversary could be “a pretext to destroying the enclave and expelling its residents,” Mohammed al-Astal, an analyst based in southern Gaza, told the New York Times last month.
Though the number of Hamas fighters may be debated, one thing is clear: Israel has killed most of the group’s senior leadership, with only one senior commander left from its pre-October 7 military council.
Guerrilla tactics
Over the past two years, Hamas has changed its tactics. It operates more as a decentralized group and has increasingly relied on guerrilla warfare, hit-and-run tactics and ambushes using explosives, according to ACLED, rather than engaging in direct fighting with Israeli soldiers.
The number of cross-border rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas has dropped significantly. According to Israeli officials, much of the group’s arsenal, especially heavier weapons such as rockets, has been destroyed.
But Hamas still managed to launch two rockets in September 2025 and organize more complex attacks on Israeli soldiers. That includes one in August 2025 in Khan Younis, in which fighters used heavy weapons and also attempted to kidnap Israeli soldiers.
In areas the Israeli army says it has “cleared,” small Hamas groups have often reappeared, observers say. It’s likely that some of the group’s tunnel network, which enables surprise attacks and the hiding of Israeli hostages, still exists.
Beyond Gaza, there is also evidence that Hamas has increased its activities in the occupied after almost 15 years of remaining relatively quiet there, even though other militant Palestinian groups are still at the forefront of violence there.
What about Gaza’s civilian governance?
A much-debated question is how much control Hamas still has over Gaza.
Hamas has a military wing that is fighting the Israeli army. But the group, which has been in charge of the coastal enclave since 2007, was previously also responsible for the civilian government of Gaza: everything from hospitals and the police force to garbage collectors.
Some observers say the group’s civilian branch has adapted. That includes a new, plainclothes police force and an unofficial system of cash payments for civil servants.
But that, too, may be changing. Civil servants were apparently paid with cash that Hamas had stockpiled for emergencies, but this money may be starting to run out. The Israeli military has also increasingly targeted “individuals and facilities linked to Hamas’ governance, municipalities and police forces” to try and weaken the group’s civil control over Gaza, according to ACLED.
In late September, an aid agency official told the UK newspaper The Guardian that they had not heard from Hamas since March and were instead dealing with other community groups.
“Palestinians report that since the war resumed, Hamas officials have been increasingly absent from public duties, including policing, partly due to the chaos under fire but also in fear of Israel’s explicit targeting of structures of governance,” analysts at the think tank International Crisis Group said earlier this year.
Hamas ‘prioritized survival’
A former officer with Gaza’s internal security forces told the BBC recently that Hamas had lost control of almost all of Gaza. Criminal gangs and clans were filling the security void, he told the British public broadcaster, saying society had totally collapsed in Gaza.
Hamas is also dealing with increased domestic rivalry, with recent reports suggesting that Israel has deliberately ramped up support to anti-Hamas groups in Gaza. One prominent organization is called the Popular Forces, members of which have been associated with drug smuggling and the looting of aid. Its leader has apparently tried to coordinate other armed groups to work against Hamas.
Many observers agree that it won’t be possible to get rid of Hamas altogether and that weakening the group may be the closest thing to “total victory” that Israel can achieve.
“Hamas has … prioritized survival over direct confrontation,” ACLED reported in September. “This is consistent with the group’s view that survival itself is a form of victory.”
“Hamas is an ideology,” Hans-Jakob Schindler, an expert at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, recently told DW. “You cannot destroy an ideology. You can [only] degrade its military and terrorist capabilities.”
Edited by: Carla Bleiker
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