Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Violent protests in Ladakh could cause trouble for New Delhi, the Taliban release another U.S. citizen a few weeks after sensitive talks, and U.S. President Donald Trump hosts the Pakistani Army chief and prime minister.
India’s Latest Ladakh Crisis
Protesters clashed with police last week in the Indian border region of Ladakh, resulting in at least four deaths (including an Indian army veteran) and leading authorities to institute a curfew. The demonstrators were calling for the restoration of Ladakh’s statehood, which would give the region more autonomy.
In 2019, Ladakh was split from Jammu and Kashmir and reclassified as a union territory, bringing it under New Delhi’s direct rule. People in the region didn’t initially resist this move, but in recent months, there have been a few protests, culminating in the demonstrations that turned violent last week.
The protests subsided by the end of the week, but on Friday, local authorities arrested the movement’s leader, activist and environmentalist Sonam Wangchuk. He is accused of stoking violence and receiving foreign sponsorship, including from Pakistan. New Delhi frequently maligns critics by labeling them foreign stooges; Wangchuk and his supporters have rejected the allegations of foreign links.
Wangchuk has actually previously praised Indian government decisions, including—initially—the 2019 move that made Ladakh a union territory. He is also a very popular figure in the region: He has built award-winning schools, pioneered innovations in water management technology, and even inspired a Bollywood film. The arrest of Wangchuk, especially if it is extended, could generate more local anger.
It might be tempting to compare last week’s protests to recent anti-government movements elsewhere in South Asia: the successful uprising last month in Nepal, the movement that caused Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign last year, and the mass protests that ousted Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2022. (According to Ladakh authorities, Wangchuk cited the Nepal case to inspire protesters.)
However, last week’s protests in Ladakh were localized, with no parallel movements in New Delhi or anywhere else in India. And Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi remains a highly popular leader after more than a decade in office. In this sense, even if protests were to resurge in Ladakh, the political risks are relatively limited for New Delhi.
That said, local officials could face some heat for being unable to quell turmoil in restive areas—such as in the state of Manipur and now Ladakh—despite taking a tough stance on law and order. Further political instability in Ladakh could also undercut the national government’s big push to bring more tourism to the region.
The biggest implications of the protests for New Delhi are related to security. In 2020, Ladakh was the site of a deadly border clash between India and China. A deal a year ago eased border tensions in the region by restoring patrols, and the two countries have taken additional steps to reduce bilateral strain. But Chinese provocations remain a threat, and India can’t afford the distraction of ongoing political unrest.
Yet the steps that New Delhi is taking to strengthen its border posture risk provoking further anger. India is making infrastructure improvements along the border to counter Chinese moves; Wangchuk and other critics have opposed these steps, citing their environmental harm. If calls for statehood in Ladakh increase, locals may also become more uncomfortable with large, securitized projects and the power that they give to New Delhi.
If unrest flares anew in Ladakh, India will need to strike a careful balance between carrying out national security imperatives and acknowledging local political sensitivities. It also faces this challenge in other border areas, from Indian-administered Kashmir to the northeastern states of Manipur and Assam. What had made Ladakh different is its relative political stability.
India may soon have to grapple with a larger plate of internal security dilemmas, even as it confronts challenges beyond its borders in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China.
What We’re Following
Another U.S. hostage freed in Afghanistan. On Sunday, U.S. citizen Amir Amiry was released after nine months in Taliban captivity—the fifth American captive to be freed in Afghanistan this year. Few details have been made public about the release, or for that matter about Amiry and why he was held captive.
The timing of the release was significant, coming a few weeks after U.S. and Taliban officials reached an accord on prisoner releases—but also amid escalating demands by U.S. President Donald Trump that the Taliban turn Afghanistan’s Bagram Airfield over to the United States. Presumably, the administration concluded that the prisoner deal was firm enough to rule out the possibility that an angry Taliban would renege on its commitment to free Amiry.
The release of Amiry also highlights the critical role that Qatar’s government is playing in the sensitive talks over prisoners. A Qatari diplomat was present in Kabul when Amiry was released and flew out of Afghanistan on a plane with Amiry and U.S. hostage envoy Adam Boehler. (Washington designated Doha to serve U.S. interests in Afghanistan after the 2021 U.S. military withdrawal.)
According to CBS News, Qatar began negotiating for Amiry’s release on behalf of the United States in March, and it has also helped facilitate the release of the other four Americans released from Afghanistan this year.
Trump hosts Pakistani leaders. Trump hosted Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Pakistani Army chief Asim Munir at the White House last Thursday. The United States didn’t provide any statement on the meeting, though it did release photos, including one that showed Munir displaying a box of what appeared to be rare-earth minerals to Trump.
The meeting reflects an unexpected resurgence in U.S.-Pakistan ties, but despite extensive high-level bilateral engagements, there has been little substantive cooperation. Pakistan is keen to get more U.S. investment and security aid. The United States is intrigued by critical mineral and cryptocurrency opportunities, as well as the potential for counterterrorism cooperation.
However, if the relationship doesn’t soon start to shift from mere talk about cooperation to actual cooperation, then both sides could be disappointed.
More India-Pakistan cricket drama. It should have been a cricket fan’s dream: a championship match at the prestigious Asia Cup in Dubai between India and Pakistan, two of the sport’s historic heavyweights. But instead, following a stirring Indian victory on Sunday, things descended into a theater of the absurd.
In earlier Asia Cup matches, India’s team had refused to shake hands with the Pakistani squad. And after India’s triumph on Sunday, the team refused to accept the winner’s trophy because it was to be awarded by Asia Cup chair Mohsin Naqvi, who happens to be Pakistan’s interior minister. Then, another Asia Cup official whisked the trophy away without explanation, prompting Indian cricketers and cricket officials to allege that the trophy was denied to them.
Ultimately, India was left to celebrate without a trophy, and Pakistani fans excoriated India, once again, for poor sportsmanship. The politicization of cricket appears to have become a new normal, as I wrote last month. Even Modi is now getting in on the act, drawing links between cricket and the India-Pakistan conflict in May. After the match, he tweeted, “#OperationSindoor on the games field. Outcome is the same – India wins!”
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Under the Radar
Last month, Dhaka University held student body elections for the first time since 2019. The vote at the country’s largest and most prestigious university generated headlines across Bangladesh because it was seen as a bellwether of broader political trends and moods ahead of national elections in February.
This makes sense, given Bangladesh’s massive youth bulge: The country’s median age is 26. But the significance of the campus elections has been heightened by the political events of the past year. Student leaders played a large role in ousting Hasina last year, and several of them have taken up posts in the current interim government.
The results have generated ample interest, too: The student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, swept the polls—defeating many candidates from the student wing of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is favored to win the national elections. (Last year, the BNP ended a long-standing alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami.)
The results appear to illustrate the growing political strength of religious actors since Hasina’s departure, which will no doubt embolden Jamaat-e-Islami and its base and worry other observers, from secular-minded Bangladeshis to the Indian government. It may also prompt the BNP to intensify efforts to explore electoral alliances with other religious parties.
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