In Geneva earlier this month, the world tried for a sixth time to negotiate a plastics treaty, and for a sixth time, it failed. Without a binding international framework, the production and consumption of plastics and associated waste generation and pollution are set to continue rising. This will exacerbate risks to human health, biodiversity, and ecosystems worldwide.
National governments around the world, many of which were awaiting clear guidance from the treaty to design or update their domestic legislation, now face delays in implementing policies to curb plastic waste and leakage. The absence of a legally binding multilateral agreement leaves regulatory gaps unaddressed, undermines companies that are developing innovations and technology solutions, delays investments for recycling infrastructure, and perpetuates inequities as vulnerable communities continue to bear the brunt of pollution.
As a result, uncontrolled plastics pollution will continue to inflict widespread harm on both the environment and human health. Oceans, rivers, and soils are increasingly contaminated, threatening marine ecosystems, biodiversity, and critical food chains. And microplastics will continue to enter water supplies and the human diet, with growing scientific evidence linking them to health risks.
Who can be blamed for this calamitous outcome? Country positions did not change significantly since the last meeting, held in Busan in November 2024.
But there was one notable exception: The United States’ position shifted from one of potentially backing an effective instrument to one of actively pursuing a low‑ambition stance. This stance was informed by U.S. domestic policies that support oil and gas companies and limit the country’s ability to commit to any ambitious international environmental action.
Compounding the situation, the White House issued memos and attempted to leverage economic threats to sway more ambitious countries from pursuing stronger commitments. Observing these developments, like-minded countries in the low-ambition bloc—Russia and the 22-member Arab Group, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran—were emboldened, while other major economic players—China and India—similarly curbed their own ambitions.
What happened in Geneva, and the way that the United States shaped discussions in a way that undermined constructive outcomes, bodes ill for future global environmental agreements.
The political dynamics that prevented an agreement in Geneva were both incredibly complex and surprisingly simple.
On one hand, negotiations are shaped by a tangle of national interests, corporate influence, international alliances, emerging scientific evidence, and the advocacy efforts of various stakeholder groups from around the world. On the other hand, the reality comes down to the difficulty of reconciling two broad groups with fundamentally different visions: one seeking to preserve and expand the industrial plastics paradigm and its economic prerogatives, the other demanding an outcome that effectively addresses the environmental impacts of plastics in an equitable way.
In the former group are fossil fuel and petrochemical industry players, who were heavily represented in Geneva with 234 lobbyists, outnumbering even the combined 27 member state delegations of the European Union. Alongside those lobbyists were representatives from countries whose economies are heavily dependent on plastics production. Their priorities are clear: maintain so-called business-as-usual industrial production of plastics and their profits (according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, production is expected to triple by 2060), and avoid binding obligations that would cut into their economic interests.
In the latter group are environmental nongovernmental organizations, representatives of waste picker organizations, developing country delegates impacted by plastics pollution, and Indigenous people’s representatives. They share a fundamentally different vision: a treaty that internalizes costs to protect and remediate ecosystems, provides funds for communities long impacted by plastic pollution, and ensures limits on future production.
The challenge of finding an agreement is fundamentally political: how to reconcile the ambitions of the powerful with the needs of the vulnerable; the realities of the $1.1 trillion annual global plastic trade with the imperatives of planetary health (plastic pollution causes health impacts resulting in $1.5 trillion in economic losses per year); and the constraints of domestic politics with the requirements of effective multilateral governance.
The United States has traditionally coordinated and sided with partners in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, South Korea, and Japan who are aiming for higher-ambition and stronger environmental standards—including a phaseout of problematic plastic products and chemicals. This time, the United States took a strikingly different approach, aligning with major producers such as Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia.
This realignment was consequential for the outcome: By changing its position, the United States effectively further emboldened the low-ambition country bloc and encouraged China and India to shift their positions, particularly regarding harmful chemicals and primary production targets. The result was a convergence of positions among the largest producers of plastics.
Worse still, Washington reportedly tried to leverage its economic power to influence the positions of other countries. Ahead of the negotiations, the Trump administration sent memos to countries urging rejection of certain plastic production measures. Information circulated among Geneva delegates indicating that the United States had signaled potential trade repercussions for countries advocating higher ambition.
Coincidentally, representatives from Switzerland—as the host country—were in the United States negotiating their tariff levels while the negotiations were taking place. Australia, in particular, found itself at odds with the United States, facing implied threats of tariffs or other trade measures if it pressed for higher ambition.
Also, the U.S. approach to international development—characterized in recent months by the cancellation of roughly 80 percent of all the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs as of March and the final closure of the USAID agency in July—indicates a retreat from multilateral technical cooperation. This was clearly reflected in the negotiations. When it came to financial compensation for small island developing states, the United States consistently advocated for minimal obligations.
As a result, the late-night draft text presented was described as the lowest common denominator and therefore rejected by the majority of countries. This type of consensus-seeking risks effectively codifying inaction: agreeing to weak targets or voluntary measures primarily to accommodate the interests of fossil fuel and petrochemical-dependent economies does not advance meaningful environmental outcomes or protect human health.
One thing that all participants seem to agree on: A historic opportunity was missed. However, that opportunity isn’t lost forever: In 2026, Australia is potentially hosting the United Nations climate summit, and it could leverage its environmental diplomatic strength to broker an outcome on plastics.
But the United States’ continued support for fossil fuels, petrochemicals, and unsustainable extractive models has implications far beyond the failed plastics treaty negotiations. By aligning with industrial interests, it has not only shaped the trajectory of the plastics negotiations but also set a precedent that may influence other multilateral environmental agreements and processes, such as the seventh meeting of the United Nations Environment Assembly (the world’s highest-level decision-making body for matters related to the environment), to be held in Nairobi in December, and the U.N. Water Conference in 2026.
And although the United States has already withdrawn for a second time from the Paris climate agreement, the Trump administration has also threatened to use tariffs to undermine international climate policies aiming to curb emissions. This posture signals to other major emitters and fossil fuel economies that low ambition can be leveraged to block or weaken collective action, potentially slowing progress on climate, biodiversity, and chemicals management treaties.
In practical terms, it increases the difficulty of building coalitions around ambitious targets, reduces trust in multilateral forums, and risks normalizing approaches where economic self-interest consistently outweighs scientific evidence and the needs of vulnerable populations. The plastics treaty thus becomes a bellwether, illustrating how entrenched support for extractive industries can ripple across the international environmental agenda.
In the meantime, in the absence of an international agreement, countries committed to addressing the plastic pollution crisis will need to leverage technical and policy instruments: phased finance mechanisms, national regulatory steps, and pilot projects that allow testing new solutions.
The goal can no longer be a perfect agreement; the way forward will need to be pragmatic. And with the United States—for the time being—taking a position that encourages low ambition on environmental issues more broadly, other countries are being directly encouraged to limit their own commitments. In this context, multilateral negotiations need to find new mechanisms and processes to drive meaningful action and allow the coalition of more ambitious countries to move ahead.
Such approaches could ensure that progress on tackling plastic pollution continues, even in the face of broader global inertia.
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